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This thesis aimed to explore the influence of intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
protection reform gained from WTO accession on technology diffusion in China. 
China‟s entrance to the WTO in 2001 brought and will continue to bring significant 
impacts on China‟s economic, political and social development. Under pressure from 
the developed countries, China reformed its IPRs protection in order to accede to the 
WTO. There was heated debate on whether stronger IPRs protection was beneficial for 
developing countries‟ technological progress. This research investigated the impact of 
IPRs protection reform arising from WTO accession on technology diffusion in China. 
Fieldwork was the main method of this research. Semi-structured interview, 
self-completion questionnaire, official statistics and other sources such as television 
programs, interviews with government officials were used to collect data. 
The research found that its entrance to the WTO urged China to reform its IPRs 
protection. IPRs reform had both positive and negative impacts on technology diffusion. 
The impact of IPRs reform on technology diffusion in China varied in different 
industries, sizes and legal status of firms. Other relevant policies, such as the “Open 
Door” policy, economic development policies, research and development (R&D) 
policies, foreign investment policies, China‟s big market and industry development 
policies also influenced the impact of IPRs on technology diffusion. 
The importance of this research was based on the fact that it was the first research on 
the impact of IPRs reform on technology diffusion in China which disseminated unique 
and original information. Currently most Chinese policy-makers intend to implement 
stronger IPRs policy, without a comprehensive knowledge of the disadvantages of IPRs 
in technology diffusion. This research will help future policy making as it provided 
information on the limitations of the current IPRs system, which has not been a matter 
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1.1. Research context 
The development of science and technology has increasingly become an important 
factor that influences economic progress. IPRs protection has turned into one of the 
most important and concerning topics, since it is not only a crucial method for 
protecting firms‟ technology, but also a legal instrument for stimulating “industrial 
development and economic growth” for governments (Wallerstein, Mogee and Schoen, 
1993:3). This trend became stronger after IPRs had been integrated into the WTO, 
because this integration made IPRs to be part of global science, technology 
development, international trade and other relevant areas. This research focuses on IPRs 
protection and its influence. 
IPRs protect “investments in innovations by granting the innovator a temporary 
monopoly on the use of the innovation” (Wallerstein, Mogee and Schoen, 1993:3). This 
implies that IPRs ensure that innovators benefit from investing in innovations by 
providing innovators with a temporary monopoly power to prevent imitation. According 
to WTO, IPRs protection refers to “the rights given to persons over the creations of their 
minds” (WTO, 2006a). “They usually give the creator an exclusive right over the use of 
his/her creation for a certain period of time” (WTO, 2006a). IPRs are generally 
classified into two areas: “copyright and rights related to copyrights”, and “industrial 
property” (WTO, 2006a). Copyright is used to protect rights of authors in their literary 
and artistic works and usually gives protection for “a minimum period of 50 years” after 
the author‟s death (WTO, 2006a). The “rights related to copyrights” are applied to 
protect performers‟ and broadcasting organisations‟ rights (WTO, 2006a). The aim of 
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“copyright and the rights related to copyright” is to create incentives for inventive 
works by providing rewards (WTO, 2006a). Industrial property can also be classified 
into two categories: distinctive sign protection, such as trademarks and geographical 
indications, and the protection for innovation, design and technology, such as patent,s 
“industrial designs and trade secrets” (WTO, 2006a). The purpose of distinctive signs 
protection is to encourage and assure impartial competition by offering information 
about products and services to consumers. The main aim of the protection for 
innovations, designs and technology is to create incentive for innovations by providing 
rewards. Currently, IPRs protection had been integrated into WTO through the 
establishment of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), which is one of the three important agreements of WTO. The TRIPS 
agreement set up minimum standards for IPRs for each WTO member state (Salokannel, 
2006:463), and it also integrated basic “concepts of IPRs protection from prior treaties” 
(Maskus, 1998:133). Any country that wants to accede to the WTO, must accept TRIPS 
agreement. Therefore, based on these backgrounds, IPRs protection has more 
far-reaching and potential influence, which is worthy of being researched. 
IPRs protection, especially the implementation of the TRIPS agreement in the global 
area, had many impacts in different areas, such as “implications for innovation, research 
and development, economic development, the future location of industry, and the global 
division of labour” (Sell, 2003:9). “Technology diffusion is the dissemination of 
technical information and knowledge and the subsequent adoption of new technologies 
and techniques by users” (Queensland Government, 2006). According to WTO, the 
settlement of the TRIPS agreement had two main purposes: creating incentives for 
innovation to promote technological development and encouraging technology transfer 
(WTO, 2006b). These two purposes both connected with technology diffusion. 
Therefore, technology diffusion became one of the most important aspects of IPRs 
protection. 
IPRs protection was originally established and developed in the western world (David, 
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1993:44]. The developed countries have comparatively mature IPRs protection systems. 
Moreover, the integration of IPRs protection into the WTO was advocated by most 
developed countries, such as the USA, the European Union and Japan (Stegemann, 
2000:1241). For developing countries, IPRs protection was a relatively new area, and 
most developing countries just introduced their IPRs protection system from WTO 
accession under the pressure of developed countries. Therefore, there were many issues 
arising from IPRs protection systems in the developing world, which need to be 
researched. The relationship between technology diffusion and IPRs protection is one of 
the most important issues among them, because for developing countries, promoting 
technology development and diffusion is quite urgent. 
1.2. The research questions 
As one of the biggest developing countries in the world, China‟s development in 
economics and politics, especially the rapid development during recent period, has 
drawn great attention from all over the world. In 2001, China‟s entry into the WTO after 
almost fifteen year of endeavour was a significant event for the progress of Chinese 
economics and politics, which had brought and continues to bring extensive impacts on 
China. The influence on IPRs protection in China arising from WTO accession is of 
particular concern, because China has a very short history of IPRs protection and IPRs 
has great relationship with technological and economic development. In order to accede 
to the WTO and under the pressure from developed countries, especially from the USA, 
China made many reforms to its IPRs protection policy in the past, especially in the 
period from the late 1980s to the 1990s. The world has witnessed the establishment and 
rapid development of IPRs protection in China in the past 25 years and especially 
during the period of China‟s trying to accede to the WTO (Cao, 2007:ix). The 
implementation of the TRIPS agreement also meant that China has strengthened its 
IPRs protection, because the minimum standards set up by the TRIPS agreement for 
IPRs protection were higher than those in China at that time. According to the WTO, the 
TRIPS agreement has two main purposes: creating incentives for innovation to promote 
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technological development and encouraging technology transfer (WTO, 2006b). 
However, whether stronger IPRs protection can bring benefits for developing countries 
in technological progress is still an issue. Some people consider that stronger IPRs 
protection cannot only be beneficial to developed countries but also be helpful to 
developing countries in technological development and diffusion. However, others 
believe that stronger IPRs protection cannot bring benefits for the development and 
diffusion of technology, especially for developing countries. Whether China can get 
benefits for its technology diffusion from implementing a stronger IPRs protection 
policy is worthy of being researched. Therefore, this research explores whether the 
stronger IPRs protection arising from WTO accession can bring positive or negative 
influences for technological development and diffusion in China. 
The main purpose of this research is to explore whether the reform of IPRs protection 
during entry to the WTO can bring benefits to technology development and diffusion or 
not in China and to analyse the reasons. This research divided technology diffusion into 
two aspects—domestic technology development and technology transfer from foreign 
countries, in order to make the analyses systematically. Thus, this research explored 
impact of strong IPRs protection obtained from WTO accession on domestic technology 
development and technology transfer from foreign countries in China. It summarised 
the impacts in these two parts to conclude the general results. This research also focused 
on patent and copyright, which were the most important parts of IPRs protection and 
were the most important parts of IPRs that had relation with technology diffusion. 
In order to explore and analyse the influence on technology diffusion in China by 
stronger IPRs protection obtained in the process of China‟s entry to the WTO, a series 
of research objectives should be successfully achieved. These different research 
objectives were established as following: 
 Identify the concept of IPRs protection and its categories. 
 Explore alternative theories that support the establishment of IPRs as well as 
theories that are more critical of IPRs. 
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 Explain the meaning of technology diffusion. 
 Discuss the link between IPRs protection and technology diffusion from alternative 
perspectives. 
 Examine the development of China‟s IPRs protection policy. 
 Explore the link between IPRs protection and technology diffusion in China and 
compare these findings with similar previous researches. 
1.3. Research methods 
This research reviewed published theories on IPRs to clarify the concepts and their 
characteristics. Moreover, a review of the literatures about technology diffusion was 
also indispensable, since it could provide the concepts and properties of technology 
diffusion which were the bases of planning and doing fieldwork for this research. In 
addition, relevant development on IPRs protection in China was also explored to 
provide the research backgrounds. 
The main method of this research was doing fieldwork in China. This fieldwork used 
semi-structured interviews, which were held mainly with technological executives of 
selected Chinese firms. The fieldwork also included self-completion questionnaires, 
which were done with technological executives of selected Chinese firms. Some 
relevant statistics were collected in this research. In addition, information from other 
sources such as television programs and interviews with relevant government officials 
were collected and compared with data obtained through the above methods. Personal 
connections were an important factor for accomplishing this fieldwork, because without 
recommendations through personal connections, it would be very difficult for these 
executives to accept interviews and questionnaires. However, the use of personal 
connections should not affect the objectivity of fieldwork data, as it had only played a 
role as an introducer and was not involved in detailed content of this fieldwork. The 
research methods are explained in detail in chapter five. 
Finally, conclusions were drawn through combining analytical results of different 
Page 6 
fieldwork data. These conclusions were compared with the relevant literature to obtain 
unique factors about the impact of IPRs reform on technology diffusion in China. 
1.4. The importance of this research 
Firstly, this is the first research about the impact of IPRs protection reform on 
technology diffusion in a particular country—China. There were some articles that 
discussed the relationship between IPRs protection and some aspects of technology 
diffusion. Yang (2003) and Yueh (2009) found that with implementing stronger IPRs 
protection policy, the use of IPRs protection system in China, especially the use of 
patents, copyrights and trademarks were increased dramatically. Meyer (2001) and 
Awokuse and Yin (2009 and 2010) concluded that better IPRs protection encouraged 
imports and FDI through creating favourable environment, which could have positive 
impacts on technology transfer from foreign countries to China. Bosworth and Yang 
(2000) also found that stronger IPRs protection had positive impacts on technology 
transfer through licensing in China. Certainly, there were some articles discussing that 
stronger IPRs did not have positive impacts on some aspects of technology in China. 
Lanoszka (2000) and Yu (2007) concluded that stronger IPRs did not have positive 
impacts on FDI, which was an important channel of obtaining technology transfer from 
foreign countries to China. These articles researched the relationship between stronger 
IPRs protection and technology diffusion in some aspects, such as the use of IPRs 
protection, technology transfer through importing, FDI and licensing. They did not 
investigate the full scale relationship between stronger IPRs protection and technology 
diffusion, including domestic technology development and technology transfer through 
important channels such as international trade, FDI, licensing and imitation. This 
research explored it. Thus, it is the first research about the impact of IPRs protection 
reform on technology diffusion in China. Moreover, previous articles used either the 
analyses of official statistics or economic models to do the investigation. No one has 
done this research through using fieldwork. Fieldwork was a very important and 
interesting method for this research, which helped to find out more detailed and 
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fascinating information from selected samples. Thus, the method using fieldwork also 
provided contributions for this research. Secondly, this research explored the impact of 
IPRs protection reform on technology diffusion in firms with different legal statuses and 
sizes in China. No one explored this issue until now. Thirdly, this research found some 
important, detailed and unique information about the impact of IPRs protection reform 
on technology diffusion in China. Besides more detailed explanations in the later parts 
of this thesis, three important and unique characteristics are provided here as examples. 
1. IPRs protection reform did not have a great influence on technology transfer from 
foreign countries for the petroleum sector. Because petroleum is a very important 
product for a nation‟s security, technology in this sector is strictly controlled by firms 
and governments. Moreover, China has a different ideology from developed countries, 
so it is still difficult to get petroleum technology transferred from developed countries, 
which hold the most advanced petroleum technologies, even after China reinforced its 
IPRs protection. 2. Stronger IPRs protection encouraged more domestic technology than 
technology transfer from foreign countries in China. 3. Without good IPRs protection 
policy, Chinese firms with production capabilities that were difficult to build in a short 
time could still get benefits to cover their cost in doing R&D; and there would be still 
some technology transfers because China‟s big open market attracted foreign companies 
to transfer their technology to China. Fourthly, this research result is very helpful for 
Chinese police-makers. Currently, the Chinese government considers that stronger IPRs 
protection is good, which leads to the fact that Chinese policy-makers intend to 
implement stricter IPRs protection, without an understanding of the limitations of IPRs 
protection in technology diffusion. This research result can help Chinese police-makers 
to understand that there are some limitations in the current IPRs protection system, 
which may help future policy decisions. Finally, this research is very useful for future 
theoretical development in considering alternative IPRs protection systems. 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
The second chapter explores the process of integrating IPRs into the WTO. The 
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historical review helped to understand the purpose of IPRs establishment and the fact 
that developed countries persuaded developing countries to implement strict global 
IPRs protection by the WTO, which was an important background of this research. This 
chapter also analyses the main theories that supported IPRs establishment, which are 
Locke‟s “labour theory of property”, Hegel‟s “necessity of private property” theory and 
the Utilitarian view. The Utilitarian view on IPRs was based on economic analysis. 
Many debates about IPRs focused on IPRs‟ impact on economic development, and 
countries also tried to get economic benefits by using the legal instrument of IPRs and 
economic analysis of IPRs was related to this research. Therefore, this chapter 
emphasises the economic analysis of the Utilitarian view on IPRs. This chapter also 
explores arguments against IPRs, including reasons for these arguments and some 
comments, advantages and disadvantages of these arguments. 
Implementing the TRIPS agreement caused the level of IPRs protection in many 
countries to be improved, especially in many developing countries and the least 
developed countries that either had none or very limited IPRs system before accepting 
TRIPS. There were heated debates about whether IPRs protection or the stronger IPRs 
protection brought by TRIPS could bring benefit for promoting technology development 
and diffusion for a country. The third chapter reviews arguments related to IPRs 
protection and technology diffusion. It focuses on patents and copyrights and their 
relationship to technology diffusion. Arguments related to IPRs protection and 
technology diffusion are analysed at country level rather than the world level. 
Technology diffusion is also divided into two groups for a country, which are domestic 
technology development and technology transfer from foreign countries, in order to 
make the analyses systematic. Finally, it also analyses other important factors that had 
direct and indirect relation with IPRs protection and technology diffusion. Generally, for 
IPRs protection and domestic technology development, there were three kinds of 
argument. Some researchers considered that IPRs protection or stronger IPRs protection 
could promote domestic technology development, others stated that stronger IPRs 
protection had negative impact on domestic technology development, and yet others 
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believed that the relation between IPRs protection and domestic technology 
development depended on other factors, such as different industrial sectors, different 
characteristics of innovations, different market characteristics and other relevant 
policies. For IPRs protection and technology transfer from foreign countries, there were 
different channels including formal and informal channels that could bring technology 
transfer. This chapter focuses on the main channels for technology transfer, including 
international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), licensing and imitation. 
The fourth chapter provides background information on IPRs development in China and 
introduced its IPRs history. Like most other developing countries, China has a very 
short history on IPRs regulations. Although there were some IPRs regulations after the 
foundation of People‟s Republic of China in 1949, the real establishment of IPRs 
protection regulation started after the country implemented the “Open Door” policy in 
the late 1970s. Generally, there were three IPRs development climaxes, which occurred 
in early 1980s, early 1990s and the period from the mid 90s to the beginning of the 21
st
 
century. IPRs establishment and development in China resulted from several factors, 
including internal factors and external pressures from foreign countries, especially those 
developed countries, which are also analysed in this chapter. 
The fifth chapter introduced the research methodology. As mentioned before, this 
research used fieldwork to collect data. This chapter explains fieldwork questions, 
explores the main methods used for collecting data in the fieldwork, which are 
semi-structured interview, self-completion questionnaire, and collecting data from 
official statistics and other sources. This chapter analyses the reasons and limitations for 
using these methods. The detailed plan for this fieldwork and the difficulties 
experienced in the process are also explained in this chapter. 
The sixth chapter provides the results of analysing fieldwork data collected from 
interviews, questionnaires, official statistics and other sources. This chapter introduces 
the process of analysing semi-structured interview data and self-completion 
questionnaire data. The main points of analysing interview data and questionnaire data 
Page 10 
are also explained. The summaries of analysing official statistics and other sources are 
presented. This chapter does not provide analyses using relevant arguments. The 
seventh chapter explores the theoretical analyses of fieldwork results using relevant 
arguments. 
The seventh chapter applies alternative arguments on IPRs protection and its relation to 
technology diffusion to analyse fieldwork results. It firstly draws results from fieldwork 
analyses through combining the summary of different data, then theoretically analyses 
fieldwork results using arguments about IPRs protection and technology diffusion in 
different aspects. These analyses showed the similarities and differences between results 
of this research and the relevant literature. 
The eighth chapter assembles the summary and main conclusions for this research. It 
summarises the research questions, purposes and processes, generalizes the main 
findings and conclusions for this research, highlights the importance and strength of this 












Historical development of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) protection and its theories 
 
2.1. Introduction 
IPRs protection, as defined by the WTO (2006a), refers to “the rights given to persons 
over the creations of their minds. They usually give the creator an exclusive right over 
the use of his/her creation for a certain period of time”. With the rapid increase of the 
role of information and technology in promoting economic development and the 
expansion of international trade, IPRs have become a universal focus, which can be 
observed through the many arguments continuing in this area. IPRs protection was 
originally established in western countries. IPRs protection was integrated into the 
WTO system under the persuasion of the developed countries, especially the USA. The 
history of integrating IPRs protection into WTO showed that developed countries 
pushed developing countries to implement strict global IPRs protection under the WTO. 
It also showed that developing countries were not willing to accept the global IPRs 
protection system established by the TRIPS agreement in the WTO, which provided 
clues for understanding the relationship between IPRs and technology diffusion, 
especially in developing countries. Thus it is necessary to know the history of 
integrating IPRs into the WTO. Moreover, there are various disagreements related to the 
justification of IPRs. It is important to understand these disagreements, since they 
explain the basic principles underlying the economic and social effect of IPRs 
protection. This chapter explores the main theories that support the establishment of 
IPRs, which are Locke‟s “labour theory of property” (Hughes, 1988a), Hegel‟s 
“necessity of private property” theory (Richards, 2002:528) and the Utilitarian view. 
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Finally, this chapter introduces different arguments against IPRs, including the 
Libertarian view on IPRs, arguments that are against intellectual monopoly and 
arguments that prefer to reform IPRs system, since these arguments provide alternative 
criticisms of the IPRs system. Although current IPRs protection can be divided into 
different categories, “the industrial intellectual property (patents) and literary or artistic 
intellectual property (copyrights)” aroused more arguments and discussions (May and 
Sell, 2006:7). Patents and copyrights are two most important parts that have particular 
association with technology diffusion, so the discussion of the different arguments in 
this chapter focuses on patents and copyrights. 
2.2. IPRs integration into the WTO 
One of the most important IPRs developments was its integration into the WTO giving 
rise to the TRIPS agreement. However, the process of IPRs integration into the WTO 
was largely under the pressure of the USA and other developed countries. 
USA companies, especially companies in the pharmaceutical, chemical, software, and 
entertainment sectors, which held patents and copyrights, worried that their products 
might be imitated or copied at very low cost by other countries, especially by 
developing countries (May and Sell, 2006; Stegemann, 2000). The high level of growth 
in “the East Asian economies”, led by “Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore” and other New Industrial Economies, such as China, Malaysia, Thailand and 
so on, was seen by western countries, especially the USA, as being achieved through the 
copying and imitation of new technologies created in highly developed countries at 
quite low cost (Kumar, 2002:4). American companies with vested interests in patents 
and copyrights persuaded the USA government to make relevant trade diplomatic 
policies. The fact that it was easy for companies to get technically appropriate 
knowledge and information together with the fact that imitated products had been 
distributed widely pushed developed countries‟ governments to take actions “on behalf 
of their national corporate interests” (May and Sell, 2006:153). The USA government 
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initially tried to get better IPRs protection and stronger enforcement of that protection 
through the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), but it failed because the 
WIPO is one of the agencies of the United Nations, which takes decisions by a 
“one-nation, one-vote” process, and developing countries were strongly against better 
IPRs protection. Another problem was that there was no “dispute settlement 
mechanism” in the WIPO (Stegemann, 2000). Some American companies established 
the International Property Committee (IPC) in order to put pressure on the USA 
government to add IPRs protection to the agenda of multinational trade negotiations 
related to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The IPC also persuaded 
the “industrial associations in Europe and Japan” to sustain the appeal of the IPC that 
added IPRs protection into “Uruguay Round” (May and Sell, 2006:154). Then the USA 
government had to take strict trade policy on IPRs protection such as “Special 301 
section of the Omnibus Trade and Tariff Act”, which evaluated foreign countries‟, 
especially developing countries‟ IPRs protection and then took strict trade policies 
towards unsatisfactory countries each year (May and Sell, 2006:155; Stegemann, 
2000:1239-1240). Eventually, the USA persuaded the Uruguay Round to add IPRs 
protection to the negotiations (Stegemann, 2000:1241). Moreover, the USA government 
also persuaded other western countries, especially the EU to stand on the same side with 
the USA to support the establishment of better IPRs protection worldwide. At the same 
time, other countries, including developing countries, wanted to obtain market access 
into the USA (Stegemann, 2000:1241). However, the USA government did not intend to 
change domestic regulations on IPRs protection, instead it promised more market access, 
such as agricultural market access and cancelling restrictions for textile exports to other 
countries, especially to developing countries, if other countries accepted to improve 
their IPRs protection. Many developing countries had to make concessions and accept 
the TRIPS agreement (May and Sell, 2006:155). Consequently, developing Countries 
made compromises to achieve IPRs protection agreements for the WTO, in order to 
obtain their market access in developed countries. The general principle of the 
WTO—that a single undertaking principle made countries, which wanted to become 
members of the WTO, had no choice but to accept the TRIPS agreement (Stegemann, 
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2000:1242-1243). After the Uruguay Round, TRIPS was formed as one of agreements 
in the WTO. According to May and Sell (2006:158), from the brief history of 
integrating IPRs into the WTO, one may conclude that the establishment of TRIPS was 
pushed by political processes, and was also brought about by “specific industrial and 
national interests”. TRIPS as “a far-reaching agreement” had and continues to have 
significant impacts on „innovation, research and development, economic development” 
and other relevant issues (May and Sell, 2006:158). 
The history of integrating IPRs protection into the WTO was one of pressure from 
developed countries. Developing countries did not want to establish a strict global IPRs 
protection system. From their point of view, developing countries saw no advantage on 
a global IPRs protection system. Otherwise they would have been very glad to accept 
the TRIPS agreement. However, implementing a strict global IPRs system would 
undoubtedly bring great benefits for developed countries, which can be perceived from 
the determined pursuit of a global IPRs system by firms and governments of developed 
countries. This illuminated a great conflict of interest between developed and 
developing countries. Finally, the developing countries made great compromises to 
achieve the TRIPS agreement. Based on this historical background, it is wise to explore 
the impact of stronger IPRs protection on developing countries, especially for the 
technological development and diffusion which are the main concerns of developing 
countries.  
2.3. Theories that support IPRs 
In general, there are three theories that support the establishment of IPRs. Two of them 
are “Locke‟s labour theory of property” (Richards, 2002:523) and Hegel‟s personhood 
theory of property and are arguments from natural rights, which believed that innovators 
should “have a certain right” to their inventions and works because they had created 
them (Weber, 2002:11). The other one is a utilitarian view, which justified IPRs from an 
economic viewpoint. There were many debates and criticisms about Locke‟s and 
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Hegel‟s arguments, which can be found in Hettinger (1989) and Richards (2002). These 
debates are about the natural rights to IPRs. This research is about IPRs and technology 
diffusion, it does not aim to test the validity of natural rights to IPRs. This research is 
empirical, so this chapter provides a general introduction to IPRs theories rather than 
offering a detailed discussion of them. 
2.3.1. Locke’s labour theory of property 
Locke put forward the “labour theory of property” (Richards, 2002:523), which was 
rooted in “man‟s labour” (Weber, 2002:12). Locke believed that private property comes 
from the natural right of mankind. Locke (1764:215) suggested that God created 
everything for human beings and “God, who hath given the world to men in common, 
hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and 
convenience” (Locke, 1764:216). Therefore, God also allows mankind to use everything 
that God provides for humans in common in order to support human being‟s lives and 
make their lives convenient and comfortable. Everything created by God is given to 
human beings in common, hence, nobody has an original right to put things created by 
God into his or her private domain. However, it is necessary for human beings to find 
methods to appropriate things given by God before making use of these things (Locke, 
1764:216). Locke believed that although everything created by God belongs to human 
beings in common, “every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any 
right to but himself” (Locke, 1764:216), which meant that “the labour of his body, and 
the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his” (Locke, 1764:216). Therefore, 
every man who uses his labour to mix things created by God can be given private 
property in the things. He suggested that because the labour was the property of the 
labourer, no man but the labourer could have private property on things that the labourer 
used his labour to mix with, “at least where there is enough, and as good, left in 
common for others” (Locke, 1764:217). Thus, private property should have to follow 
these conditions. One condition was “enough and as good left for others” (Hettinger, 
1989:44). This means Locke‟s theory opposed illogical “over-accumulation of personal 
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property, which would not be morally justified” and may infringe other‟s right 
(Richards, 2002:524). Hettinger (1989:44) summarised the other condition was that the 
private property should prevent waste. Thus, if a person uses more than one, which can 
lead to waste, then it should not be moral. 
Based on Locke‟s property theory, Hughes (1988:3) made a justification for intellectual 
property. Hughes put forward three propositions for his justification of intellectual 
property upon Locke‟s theory. The first proposition was that “the production of ideas 
requires a person‟s labour” (Hughes, 1988:3). The second proposition was that “these 
ideas are appropriated from a „common‟, which is not significantly devalued by the 
idea‟s removal” (Hughes, 1988:3). And the last proposition was that “ideas can be made 
property without breaching the non-waste condition” (Hughes, 1988:3). Hughes (1988) 
believed that many people accepted these propositions and intellectual labour should be 
given property rights in a similar manner to physical labourer who mixed their labour 
with things created by God. 
2.3.2. Hegel’s personhood theory of property 
Georg Hegel brought forward a different property theory—“necessity of private 
property” theory (Richards, 2002:528). As summarised by Richards (2002:528), Hegel 
believed that humans were “essentially rational creatures”. People need to develop the 
“capacity to participate in the ethical community”, which is required by historical 
progress (Richards, 2002:528). For this reason, “people must develop personality, 
understood as a sense of their individual capacities and wills” (Richards, 2002:528). 
Hegel (2001:55) believed that human beings needed to develop themselves to create 
their personalities in historical progress. This self-development and creation of 
personalities are realized through the development of individual capabilities and wills. 
Hegel (2001:55) also considered that property rights helped to develop the individual‟s 
personality. He suggested that property rights satisfied human beings‟ basic needs. 
Property also becomes a medium through which the individual person can transit his 
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subjective personality to the objective world. Thus, “a person has the right to direct his 
will upon any object, as his real and positive end. The object thus becomes his” (Hegel, 
2001:57). Hegel (2001:58) indicated that property ownership was the embodiment of 
human beings‟ will and the will of individual people was realized through the ownership 
of property. This is because that the will can change the object through an individual‟s 
labour and the change of object also influences human beings‟ wills. Human beings 
realize their self-development in individual capacities and wills through the changing of 
the objects given by the nature. Since will is realized differently by different individuals, 
the acknowledgement of will must be identified individually and property rights should 
be private. Therefore, property should give ownership according to human beings‟ 
labour. To Hegel, intellectual property was also an embodiment of personality. 
Intellectual property was similar to physical property, in that they both embodied the 
development of the individual capacity and wills of humankind. 
2.3.3. The Utilitarian view on IPRs 
The Utilitarian view of IPRs was based on the economic benefit for the whole society 
brought by IPRs legal regulations (Weber, 2002:6). This research does not intend to 
criticize Utilitarianism, but to introduce its arguments on IPRs regulations. To 
utilitarians, IPRs establishment, especially copyrights and patents, resulted from both 
the fact that “innovation and creation are good and necessary for the „general 
happiness‟” and the fact that without IPRs protection using “monetary incentives”, 
innovations and creations would be created at very slow rate (Weber, 2002:6). This 
means that they believed that innovations were favourable and indispensable things for 
society and the establishment of IPRs protection in law could provide incentives for 
encouraging innovations. Moreover, they argued that IPRs protection could also support 
the presence of professional innovators and artists in the absence of patronage provided 
by “a ruler, wealthy merchant or even a modern corporation” (Weber, 2002:6). 
According to utilitarians, “utility maximization” was the guide to realize “efficient 
resource allocation” in a market system and IPRs provided “the necessary incentives for 
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the production of useful knowledge” (Richards, 2002:525). 
The main disagreements on IPRs including TRIPS focus mainly on the impact of IPRs 
on economic development. Many countries, including developing countries, want to get 
benefits from the regulation of IPRs and these benefits mainly lie in obtaining more 
advantages and economic profits. Economic analysis of IPRs protection should be 
beneficial to discussions of the influence of IPRs protection on technology diffusion. 
Therefore, this section explores the Utilitarian view on IPRs in detail. 
Utilitarians gave several reasons for establishing IPRs protection. Firstly, according to 
David (1993:24), there might be many problems in allocating resources for information 
and knowledge in competitive markets, because information and knowledge as 
commodities had some specific characteristics like “public goods”. Societies have a 
certain specific need for technological information in a certain specific time, which 
requires information should be generated according to social need. Technological 
information and knowledge has the following characteristics. On one hand, information 
or knowledge is a kind of “nonrival good”, which means that information or knowledge 
can be owned by and “enjoyed jointly by as many as” people who want to know and use 
it, and there is no conflict in owning and using information and knowledge among 
people (David, 1993:27). For a common commodity, such as a chair, one thing can be 
owned by only one person or one collective of people. If another person or another 
collective of people wants to own this chair, that other person or other collective of 
people must take some measures to eliminate the ownership of this chair by the original 
owner; otherwise there will be conflict about the ownership of this chair. However, in 
the Utilitarian view, if any one wanted to know and/or own information and/or 
knowledge, they could know and own the information without creating any conflict on 
the ownership of it. Significantly, the information commodity does not need to be 
invented or researched again, once this kind of information is acquired, because 
“information can be used again and again without exhausting it” (David, 1993:25). This 
means that in the Utilitarian view, after information and knowledge had been created, 
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there was no need to discover this information again to know or use it, and continuing to 
know and use the information would not deplete it. Meanwhile, once a kind of 
information has been disclosed, it will “force itself into the possession of every one” 
and no one needs to pay for it, which means it will cost nothing to obtain (David, 
1993:26). This means that information has the nonexcludable attribute, that, without 
using some special measures such as keeping it secret, it is impossible to control 
information and knowledge for the exclusive ownership and use by a person or a 
collective of people once that information and knowledge has been discovered. 
Therefore, without the control by special measures, information itself will be 
automatically diffused among the whole society and persons who want to know and use 
the information, can know and use it without offering any payment. Certainly, an 
individual can keep his information in secret or using some forms of code to prevent 
that information from being disclosed (David, 1993:26). However, coding technologies 
are easy to penetrate and the cost of keeping information secret is quite high. This 
means that though there are some methods to keep information for the exclusive use by 
a person, keeping it secret is quite costly. With the characteristics of “public 
good”—“nonrival possession, low marginal cost of reproduction and distribution and 
substantial fixed costs of original production”, the price of information and knowledge 
is prone to be quite low, which cannot give enough return to producers of information 
and knowledge (David, 1993:27). However, the fixed cost of creating original 
information is quite high. So, if creators of information cannot obtain enough return for 
their costs, they will not want to do R&D any more. The allocation of resources in 
competitive markets for creating information and knowledge will be inefficient. IPRs 
protection, which gives monopoly power for creators of technological information, is 
one of the methods that can ensure profits and return to owners of information, which 
can change inefficient allocation of resources to an efficient way. The second reason is 
that it is only through the diffusion and commercial use of information and knowledge 
that provides beneficial effects and improvements (David, 1993:24). Utilitarians 
believed that IPRs protection could promote the diffusion of knowledge and information 
into commercial production. They believed that because IPRs protection provided 
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exclusive protection for innovations and technologies for a period, owners of 
innovations and technologies would try to achieve commercial use within this period to 
earn profits which could promote opportunities for making that knowledge and 
information more widely diffused and improved. Without IPRs protection, utilitarians 
considered that owners of technological information would try to keep their information 
secret, which would prevent the diffusion of technological information. The last reason 
was that societies only needed useful inventions and information, but the creation of 
inventions and technological information did not follow the need of society. Sometimes 
there are some unusable technologies and information created in society. These 
unusable technologies and information will waste some resources and sources. IPRs 
protection can create incentives for producing useful innovations while preventing the 
appearance of useless innovations, because IPRs protection can use market power to 
evaluate each innovation (David, 1993:25). They believed that market power could 
encourage people to make useful innovations and prevent people from useless 
innovations because of the return from the market. 
Although these reasons make some senses on IPRs establishment in economic aspects, 
utilitarians also put forward some problems aroused by IPRs. IPRs protection can 
produce deadweight burden problem which means social losses in establishing IPRs 
protection, because IPRs protection creates a temporary monopoly power for inventers 
giving exclusive possession and use of technological information (David, 1993:34). 
This problem has special relevance in patents. The monopoly power created by IPRs 
protection tends to work in two ways. On one side, “in the case of non-drastic 
innovations”, monopolists, who are given IPRs protection, especially patent protection 
on their innovations, have a greater incentive to keep their position of monopoly power 
by carrying through research and making further development of their innovations than 
potential entrants, because they can get high profits in further innovations by creating 
new monopoly positions and they want to maintain this advantage (Menell, 1999:137). 
Here, the “non-drastic innovations” are new innovations that can create new valuable 
profit for owners of old innovations through doing betterment based on old innovations. 
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Therefore, monopolists who own old innovations have more incentive to get these new 
non-drastic innovations. Under this situation, monopoly power is easily maintained. On 
the other side, “in the case of drastic innovation”, monopolists cannot get much profit 
from their innovations as these innovations have already brought high benefits for 
monopolists and doing drastic innovations “may only displace all or part of the existing 
monopoly profits” (Menell, 1999:137). Here, drastic innovations are new innovations 
that can thoroughly replace old innovations, which can also create new profits that 
replace the profits brought by old innovations. Therefore, potential entrants may have 
greater incentive to do drastic innovations than current monopolists who own old 
innovations because new innovations would displace almost all profits created by old 
innovations, which creates new monopoly power in the market (Menell, 1999:137). In 
the latter situation, monopoly power has been continued, and the only difference is that 
it has been transferred from owners of old innovations to owners of new innovations. 
Thus, monopoly power will be created and continued in both ways. Under the 
conditions of better IPRs protection, monopolists will not worry about the appearance of 
potential entrants through copying, imitating, “inventing in reverse engineering”, or 
“inventing around” existing innovations (David, 1993:34). And they may add additional 
price onto their innovative products “above the marginal costs of production and restrict 
output accordingly” and get royalty income from “final customers” (David, 1993:34), 
consumers have to pay higher price for the innovative productions based on IPRs 
protection (McCulloch, Winters and Cirera, 2002:210), and therefore, the benefits 
obtained by societies and consumers in using technological information and knowledge 
will be lower than that can be got in competitive markets (David, 1993:34). Here, 
reverse engineering means the process used to discover the technological principles of 
an invention through analysing its structure and operation. It is usually used to find core 
technologies of a kind of a device or system, in order to develop new devices and 
systems. Reverse engineering is a kind of method that used to discover technologies in 
innovations, which had been protected by IPRs, without paying royalty to or getting 
permission from IPRs holders. It is usually applied in pharmaceutical and software 
innovations. Secondly, some utilitarians also believed that IPRs could lead to the patent 
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race problem. Because IPRs give protection to the person who first invents innovations, 
there will be the result that this person will take all benefit brought by the protection. 
This is so called “winner takes all”, “or substantially all” (David, 1993:34). Scientists 
and inventors will contest in the races for discovering the innovation first, which is 
called the “patent race” (Menell, 1999:136). There are two different opinions on the 
“patent race”. Some people thought that it could create the acceleration in investment 
for R&D and stressed for keeping in advancement (Menell, 1999:138). This means that 
these people considered that “patent race” could boost the investment in innovations 
and research, which could push the inventors to keep the advanced position. Others 
thought that the patent race would produce overinvestment in R&D, which would 
induce inefficient allocation of resources (Menell, 1999:138). Thirdly, IPRs protection 
can create problems in intermediate information inputs. David (1993:27-28) 
summarised, knowledge had “cumulative and interactive” characteristics. Almost all 
kinds of scientific knowledge and technological information were generated through 
“increments, with each advance building on and sometimes altering the significance of 
previous findings in complicated and often unpredictable ways” (David, 1993:28). 
Innovations can also be improved to get new inventions through adding new ideas and 
new methods by someone, who may not be the creator of the original innovations. This 
means that most technological information is produced on the base of accumulated 
knowledge created by previous inventors. However, if previous research results, 
inventions and discoveries have been protected through IPRs protection, new 
researchers may need to pay royalties for obtaining previous inventions. Some of them 
cannot afford the royalty, which can result in slower developments in the research 
process. Moreover, many scientific problems and “economically significant researches” 
are needed to solve many different “interrelated problems” (David, 1993:35). Each 
solution for these interrelated problems can be entitled to a separate IPRs protection. 
Some researchers or companies have more advantages in resolving one or some parts of 
these problems than others. This implies that some researchers or companies can solve 
some parts of these problems more efficiently than others. Under these conditions, the 
lack of communications, cooperation and coordination among different competitors, 
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there will cause a problem in the intermediate information input into researches, which 
will lead to barriers for improving and developing inventions and researches (David, 
1993:35). This means that without communication, cooperation and coordination, 
researchers and companies can only develop technologies or some parts of technology, 
in which they are more professional and more efficient than others. However, resolution 
of the final questions, which may involve all results of these different technologies and 
different parts of technologies, cannot be obtained without communications and 
cooperation among different researchers and companies. Hence, technology 
development will encounter negative impacts. 
Based on discussions of the problems above, utilitarians had put forward some possible 
solutions. Firstly, some pointed out that changing the length and the breadth of IPRs 
could optimize the system and get optimal results, especially for patents (David, 
1993:37). Secondly, some believed that forms of collaboration, sharing of patents, and 
compulsory licensing could solve the problem of intermediate informational input 
brought by IPRs protection (Menell, 1999:139-140). Finally, some suggested the use of 
other kinds of governmental methods as complements to solve problems created by 
IPRs protection. They believed that IPRs protection was not the only way to solve 
problems created by information having attributes of “public good”. There were other 
methods that could help to deal with problems generated by public good: one was 
giving “producers publicly financed subsidies” and then requiring the goods to be free 
of charge to the public (David, 1993:27). This means that governments provided 
innovators with public subsidies to support their innovations and then required 
innovators to put their innovations into public domain and made them free to the public. 
The other was using state taxation to “finance its direct participation in production and 
distribution of the good, furnish and manage the requisite facilities and contract when 
necessary with private agents to carry out the work” (David, 1993:27). This method 
means that governments used state taxes to join the innovating and distribution of 
inventions directly and governments sometimes also signed contracts for innovation 
with private agents. They believed that using these two governmental methods as 
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complements could help to settle problems brought by IPRs protection. 
2.4. Arguments against IPRs 
Besides theories that support IPRs establishment, there were also some arguments 
against IPRs protection, especially on patent and copyrights. The Libertarian view 
strongly opposed the establishment of IPRs. The alternative arguments provided some 
valuable points and discussions on IPRs protection. These alternative arguments can be 
divided into two groups. The first group includes arguments which against intellectual 
monopoly completely and suggest that other systems should be created to generate 
incentives for innovation. The second group includes arguments that IPRs protection is 
still necessary but there should be some reforms and complements for the IPRs system 
in order to increase the benefits and reduce the costs created by the intellectual 
monopoly power. 
2.4.1. The Libertarian view of IPRs 
Many libertarians considered that all kinds of intellectual creations should be “freely 
accessible and utilised” by anyone who wants to get them (Gupta and Rastogi, 2002:4). 
They supported the idea that everything made by human beings “with their hand and/or 
with their own capital in collaboration with their creative mind was their exclusive 
property” (Gupta and Rastogi, 2002:4). However, they considered that these things 
should be sold under the condition of free competition and any extra regulations such as 
the establishment of IPRs are barriers for this system, which may prevent other people 
from develop these creations and bringing benefits (Gupta and Rastogi, 2002:4). 
The Libertarian view on IPRs was based on four perspectives. Firstly, according to 
Kinsella (2001:19), libertarians “believe in property rights as tangible resources”. This 
consideration is due to the scarcity attribute of tangible resources, which means that 
“there can be conflict over these goods by multiple human actors” (Kinsella, 
2001:19-20). This implies that if tangible resources are owned by many people, there 
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will be conflict over the use of these resources. This is the scarcity character of tangible 
resources. Basic “social and ethical function of property rights” is bestowed on these 
tangible resources to prevent the conflict of using these resources by multiple human 
beings (Kinsella, 2001:19-20). This means that from the social and ethical angle, it is 
necessary to confirm property rights of tangible resources in order to avoid the 
occurrence of conflicts over their use. However, according to Kinsella (2001), ideas, 
which were the main components of intellectual creations, did not have the attribute of 
scarcity. This means there is no conflict in using an idea. Kinsella considered if A had an 
idea, B or C or any other person who used the idea would not affect A‟s using the idea. 
Thus, Kinsella thought there was no need to make intellectual idea exclusive (Kinsella, 
2001:22). Kinsella believed that the scarcity of ideas generated by IPRs protection was 
not a natural scarcity (Kinsella, 2001:24) and it was unjust to establish IPRs protection. 
However, one can question the logic of this point. Libertarians use the criteria which are 
applied to establish property rights over tangible resources to evaluate IPRs. This is 
inappropriate because intangible resources, such as ideas, have different attributes. 
Tangible resources, such as houses, can be only owned by one or joint owner. Ideas can 
be known by anyone, which means that ideas can be owned by many owners who know 
the ideas. Because there is no tangible objective for ideas, anyone who knows the idea 
may be considered as the owner of it. However, not all persons, who know the idea, are 
true owners of the idea. The true owners of ideas are the creators of ideas, who put 
manpower and material resources into R&D to get ideas, or the buyers of ideas, who 
pay a lot of money to obtain ideas from the creators. The contribution of true owners 
should be respected. Persons who know ideas without any contribution or with only 
very limited contribution, should receive different treatment from the owners of ideas. 
So, although ideas do not have scarcity attribute, it is still necessary to distinguish the 
true owners of ideas. With different characteristics, it is inappropriate to use the criteria 
that applied in tangible resources to evaluate intangible ideas. Secondly, Kinsella (2001) 
believed that “property borders and property rights must be objective” and visible in 
order to let individuals prevent using others using their property (Kinsella, 2001:20). 
Moreover, property rights must also be just. This means that property rights must follow 
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the principle that the first occupier or user owns the resource (Kinsella, 2001:20-21). 
Kinsella summarised, that only if individuals accepted that the property rights were 
ruled fairly, could property rights be implemented and the function of avoiding conflict 
on using tangible resources be realized (Kinsella, 2001:20). Nevertheless, ideas do not 
have objective character. The property of ideas will not be shown clearly, because they 
cannot be identified without an objective. Creations make ideas to be loaded on tangible 
resources (Kinsella, 2001:21). The loading of ideas on tangible resources destroys the 
principle that the first occupier or user owns the tangible resources, because it creates a 
new principle for the ownership of tangible resources—the use of creative ideas 
(Kinsella, 2001:27-28). For an example, a person creates a useful idea. This idea can 
guide a user to use his or her own tangible property. If the innovator gets IPRs 
protection for the idea, he or she can have the right to control other persons‟ use of his 
or her idea. Other persons, who own the same tangible property as the creator, cannot 
use their tangible property in the same way as the idea creator. The ownership of 
tangible property is partly controlled by the idea creator. Creating ideas then becomes a 
new principle for the ownership of tangible property. Using the example given by 
Kinsella (2001), A has a new idea to build his cabin on his land using his own materials. 
Other persons see it, but cannot build their cabins on their own lands using their own 
materials in the same way as A, because A created the idea of building cabins and the 
idea has been protected through IPRs to prevent others from using the idea without A‟s 
permission. Thus, giving ideas the IPRs protection is unjust. However, one can say that 
giving IPRs protection to idea creator does not create a new principle to own tangible 
property. Providing IPRs protection to idea creator just restricts some part of usufruct of 
the tangible property owners rather than replacing others ownership over tangible 
property. IPRs protection prevents other persons using their own tangible properties in 
the same way as the idea creator. The owners of tangible properties can still use their 
tangible properties in other ways. Moreover, the creative ideas will not be as simple as 
Kinsella‟s example—building a cabin. Ideas will have some quite creative factors, 
which mean that they cannot be found out easily. Without knowing the ideas, it is 
certain that other people cannot use their materials in the same way as those who own 
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the ideas. Even if creators of ideas want to talk about their creative innovations to others, 
they are worthy of respect as the creators of ideas and being rewarded, because they 
make progress and benefit others. Thirdly, libertarians believed that even if there was a 
need to prevent free copying and imitating of innovations, the market would find better 
methods to do it (Gupta and Rastogi, 2002:5). It means that the market will push 
creators of innovation to produce other things to prevent free copying and imitating, 
such as using coding techniques to prevent the copying of software (Gupta and Rastogi, 
2002:5). This means that under market power, human beings can produce technologies 
to prevent free use of innovations. However, one can say that, as protective measures 
improve, so do skills for copying and imitation. The strength of the free market may not 
help to push the creators of innovations to develop enough anti-copying technologies. 
We need to find other methods to protect innovations such as using IPRs for protection 
(Gupta and Rastogi, 2002:5). Finally, libertarians believed that scientific development 
was a continuous process (Gupta and Rastogi, 2002:5). This means that nowadays, any 
person‟s creations are based on his predecessors‟ creative ideas and creations. The fact 
that just giving IPRs protection to the last person while neglecting his predecessors‟ 
ideas and creations is quite unfair (Gupta and Rastogi, 2002:5). However, one can say 
that IPRs just provide protection for the creative parts made by innovative creators 
rather than others‟ ideas applied in the innovation. For an example, if A obtains a patent 
for his innovation and B improved on A‟s innovation, B can then obtain a patent for the 
improvements. Moreover, the patent granted to B does not replace A‟s patent. In 
addition, although most scientific and technological developments are continuous, many 
innovative creations push the development process forward faster than ever. These 
scienctific and technological developments can be used by many people, but not many 
of these people can invent new creations based upon these sciences and technologies. 
Persons who create inventions, do not bring slow and simple improvements on sciences 
and technologies but rather, they accelerate the development of science and technology. 
These persons‟ creations should be respected and rewarded. 
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2.4.2. Arguments against IPRs protection 
In general, arguments against IPRs protection were based on harmful effects of 
monopoly power caused by IPRs. These arguments argued that the adverse effects of the 
monopoly power in the market created by IPRs protection exceeded the benefits of 
creating incentives for innovations and consequent benefits for social welfare. Some 
researchers believed that there were other methods that could generate incentives for 
inventions without creating the social losses caused by the monopoly control of IPRs. 
Boldrin and Levine (2005) considered that IPRs could be classified into two parts. The 
first one is the right for sale, which endows innovator or any other rightful owner of a 
copy of an idea or an innovation the right to sell it to another party. The second part is 
the intellectual monopoly, which means that the owner of an intellectual property has 
the right to control and restrict how buyers utilize his or her idea or innovation after 
these buyers gain the idea or innovation through legal methods because IPRs provide 
the innovations owner with a monopoly power over the use of the innovation and 
avoiding others making use of this intellectual property to realize keeping the enjoyable 
right of intellectual property to right holders exclusively (Boldrin and Levine, 2005:8). 
The owners of other goods except ideas all have the right for sale but do not have any 
intellectual monopoly. That is the owners of other goods except ideas have the right to 
sell their goods to another party, but do not have the right to control and restrict how 
buyers utilize their goods after buyers obtain the goods through legal methods. However, 
IPRs protection provides the owners of innovations and ideas with both the right of sale 
and the intellectual monopoly. Boldrine and Levine (2005) gave an example to illustrate 
the difference between right held by the owners of ideas and the right held by the owner 
of other goods. If a person buys a potato, the person can then eat it, throw it away, plant 
the potato, or make the potato into a sculpture. The person, who brought the potato, can 
also “use the idea of a potato embodied in it to make better potatoes or to invent French 
fries” (Boldrin and Levine, 2005:9). However, according to IPRs protection, if a person 
brought a CD, a book, a kind of computer software, and medical drugs, the person 
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cannot have the freedom to do invention based on the ideas embodied in the CD, book, 
software and medical drugs. Boldrin and Levine supported the right of sale. They 
believed that it was important to let the producers of intellectual property be able to 
profit from their innovations through exercising the right of sale (Boldrin and Levine, 
2005:7). However, they were against the second part of IPRs—the intellectual 
monopoly (Boldrin and Levine, 2005:8-9). Although there was some social benefit 
brought about by the monopoly, they argued that it generated “many social costs” 
(Boldrin and Levine, 2005:9). They thought that monopoly power had the function of 
pushing wealth from the majority of people who did not have the monopoly power, to 
the minority of people who did. They also used the example of James Watt and his 
invention—steam engine—to explain that the monopoly power given to Watt prevented 
technological improvement in this area. Just after the expiry of Watt‟s patent, the steam 
engine improved dramatically (Boldrin and Levine, 2005:1-4). They considered that the 
original inventor had the “natural first-mover advantage” over the others, because the 
original inventor was the only one that knows the idea and how to use it (Boldrin and 
Levine, 2005:8). They believed ideas were scarce. The original inventor can take the 
first-mover advantage and the scarcity of the idea to acquire profit. They showed that 
Watt and his invention embodied strong first-mover advantage. After many years of 
Watt‟s invention and after many competitors obtained Watt‟s invention through reverse 
engineering, Watt still had substantial market power (Boldrin and Levine, 2005:8). They 
believed that there was no need to create a monopoly power to provide incentives for 
innovation and intellectual monopoly prohibited the creation of innovations and social 
prosperity growth (Boldrin and Levine, 2005:6). However, one can question Boldrin 
and Levine‟s explanation. With the rapid development of science and technology, new 
ideas and technologies are easily copied in a short time with very cheap methods. The 
original innovator may not have very strong first-mover advantages in some areas, such 
as computer software, because his or her innovation can be copied quickly at a very low 
cost. Without IPRs protection, no one wants to buy ideas or technologies from original 
inventors, if they can copy the ideas or technologies cheaply. Therefore, without IPRs 
protection, which provides intellectual monopoly power to prevent imitation from 
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others, the right of sale cannot be exercised by innovators, and they cannot get rewards 
to cover their expenses in doing the R&D using the right of sale. 
Fisher (2004) put forward an alternative incentive system for copyrights, especially for 
entertainment. Fisher noticed that ideas had the nature of public goods—nonrivalrous 
and nonexcludable characteristic, and there should policies to resolve problems caused 
by this kind of goods (Fisher, 2004:1-2). However, he believed that the current 
copyrights system and other governmental control systems had many disadvantages, so 
he proposed a “governmentally administered reward system” (Fisher, 2004:1-3). This 
system lets all creators who want to get a return from their songs or films, register in the 
Copyright Office. The file name created through registration will be “used to track 
transmissions of digital copies” of their works (Fisher, 2004:3-4). The government will 
provide enough money, which can be obtained through taxation, to compensate 
registrants for their costs in creating their works and then the government will put their 
works into the public domain to permit free use of them (Fisher, 2004:3-4). Government 
agencies can reckon the hearing or watching frequency of each works by consumers 
through “techniques pioneered by American and European performing rights 
organization and television rating services” and then give every registrant periodical 
payments through “a share of the tax revenues proportional to the relative popularity of 
his or her creation” (Fisher, 2004:3-4). Fisher believed that this system could make the 
public pay less for entertainments because most songs and films would be free of charge 
for the public and creators of songs and films could also gain sufficient compensation 
through this system (Fisher, 2004:4). Fisher pointed out advantages and disadvantages 
of this system. This system can bring benefits for consumers with cost savings and easy 
access to all kinds of entertainment; for creators of songs and films with reliable 
incomes and greater sources for further creations; for producers of electronic equipment 
with more “demand for their products”; and for whole societies with cost savings in 
“enforcing copyright law” and dealing with lawbreaking (Fisher, 2004:41). However, 
there are also disadvantages of this system, which include “cross-subsidies and 
associated distortions of consumers‟ behaviour”, “erosion of artists‟ ability to control the 
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public presentations of their works”, difficulties in “administrative discretion and 
rent-seeking” and “leakage across national boundaries” (Fisher, 2004:41-42). Fisher 
thought that although this system was not quite perfect, comparison with other systems 
and the benefits as well as disadvantages, showed that it was a better alternative to the 
copyright system. 
Wright (1983) suggested that a prize system was a better incentive system for 
innovations. He developed different economic models to examine three different 
invention incentive systems—patents, prizes and research contracts. He concluded that 
the reason for the patent system being better than a prize system was that the patent 
system “incorporates „the value of successful inventions‟ in the „allocative process 
researchers‟ information ” (Wright, 1983:704). Wright believed that the patent system 
was better than a prize system because the patent system used the benefit of successful 
innovations to balance and distribute resources, researchers and information. Only 
successful innovations can be given patent rights, and a patent system can also use 
market power to evaluate the usefulness and value of an innovation. The information 
that an innovation can be successful, whether it can be useful and its value, cannot be 
obtained easily in a prize system; therefore, a patent system is better than a prize system. 
However, he pointed that a patent system was not always the best incentive system for 
innovations and proposes that if governments could hold the necessary and enough 
information about the innovations and the markets, a prize system could be better than a 
patent system. 
Baker (2005:1) considered that IPRs protection, especially copyright and patent, was a 
kind of “government intervention in the market”, which could not have a positive 
impact on innovative activities in the new century. The monopoly power created by 
IPRs protection policy caused the protected software to be sold at prices that are far 
higher than the prices in a competitive market. Software should be available for the 
public “at zero cost” through the Internet, without the protection of copyright and patent 
(Baker, 2005:1). Baker (2005) believed that products should be sold at their marginal 
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costs, which could maximize the efficiency of the economy. However, the aim of 
copyright and patent protection is not to keep marginal-cost pricing, but to charge prices 
much higher than those in a competitive market through use of their monopoly power 
by the holders of copyrights and patents (Baker, 2005:3). Baker (2005:3) pointed out 
that IPRs protection on software could induce “deadweight efficiency loss”. IPRs 
protection on software has created great social loss compared with prices of software in 
free market (Baker, 2005:1). IPRs protection can also encumber the development of 
software, because researchers cannot make improvement freely to protected software. 
IPRs protection also produces unnecessary duplication, because researchers have great 
incentive to develop software that just duplicates “the function of existing software” 
(Baker, 2005:1-3). IPRs protection also results in great waste, such as “expenditures for 
advertising and marketing, and payments to lawyers and lobbyists” (Baker, 2005:1-3). 
The waste expenditure also involves “efforts to monitor the distribution of software over 
the web, legal fees associated with enforcing IPRs and contributions to political 
campaigns and public relations efforts needed to sustain and extend IPRs protection” 
(Baker, 2005:11). Baker (2005) put forward two alternative methods to encourage 
software development. One is to create a “software development corps”, which means 
several software corporations funded by governments (Baker, 2005:13-14). The 
software developed under this system should be free for the public. This system is also 
designed to incorporate enough competitive factors through dividing the public funding 
into several “competitive public corporations” and to provide sufficient monetary 
incentives for software developers (Baker, 2005:13-14). Baker (2005) believed that the 
money invested the in software development corps could easily be compensated through 
reducing expenditure on purchasing software. Another alternative system is the “Artistic 
Freedom Voucher”, which means that the government provides every adult with a 
certain amount of money to be used to support any person who is engaged in innovative 
or artistic work, including developing software (Baker, 2005:15). The person who 
receives the voucher must “register with the government” to “obtain non-profit status” 
and accept supervision by the government (Baker, 2005:15). All works created in this 
system will be free for the public. Baker (2005) believed that these two alternative 
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systems were feasible and better than the current IPRs protection system in encouraging 
software development. 
2.4.3. Arguments about reforming the IPRs system 
Although many arguments address to the costs of the IPRs system, some researchers 
believed that the IPRs system was quite useful and even indispensable. They considered 
that it was preferable to reform the IPRs system to increase its benefits to society and 
mitigate its costs and harmful effects. 
Davis (2002:2-3) proposed to use an ex ante R&D “grand prize” system to provide 
incentives for basic research. Davis noticed that with the development of a patent 
system, research results had increasingly turned toward patent and the amount of freely 
used knowledge available to the public had decreased (Davis, 2002:2). Davis pointed 
out that the USA government funded many research projects, such as agricultural 
research, and then put the results into the public domain in the early twentieth century. 
From the late twentieth century, the USA government has reduced its funding of public 
and basic knowledge and researchers had turned to patents to protect their research 
results (Davis, 2002:4). Davis summarised that “fully 73% of private patents were based 
on publicly generated knowledge from university, government and non-profit 
laboratories” (Davis, 2002:7). Private firms could get benefits from public research 
through “publications, conferences, information channels and publishing” (Davis, 
2002:7). Moreover, with the spread of patents, university scientists have became more 
willing to protect their results by using patents. The government funded innovations can 
have “socially negative effects” resulted from the fact that basic knowledge cannot be 
“freely available” to the public (Davis, 2002:6-7). Davis explained that an ex ante R&D 
“grand prize” system could be applied as a supplement to keep a patent‟s benefits while 
lessening its costs, especially in the decrease of public knowledge (Davis, 2002:2). The 
“„grand prize‟ R&D incentive system”, in his view, was the system that “one party 
defines a problem to be solved and posts a reward for the best solution, typically a large 
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monetary reward” (Davis, 2002:3). Here the party that puts forward a problem and gives 
reward for its solution is usually a government agency, but sometimes can be “a firm, a 
foundation” or “a wealthy individual” (Davis, 2002:3). These parties, including 
government agencies, firms, foundations, and wealthy individuals mostly start from 
public interests and are “not ruled by profit and loss criteria” (Davis, 2002:4). Davis 
argued that the prize system could create incentives to do R&D to resolve medical and 
socially important problems, such as serious diseases in small groups. There is not 
enough motivation to solve these problems under the patent system, because the 
research results in these problems cannot create much profit. Davis also mentioned the 
benefits of the prize system. Firstly, “winning inventions do not have to be technical, 
they might also be organisational” (Davis, 2002:16). This means that the result of 
winning inventions in a prize system can be unpatentable. In patent system, if an 
inventor wants to use a patent to protect his or her invention, the invention must reach 
the following criteria: “novelty, non-obviousness, industrial utility” (Davis, 2002:7). 
However, not all inventions can fulfil these requirements. The prize system does not 
require inventions to fulfil these requirements. Inventions that cannot be protected by 
patent can still get prize. Secondly, prize system can also help to deal with social 
problems, such as pollution and welfare problems, which may lack incentives under a 
patent system due to the difficulty in making a profitable price in the market (Davis, 
2002:16). Thirdly, there are many uncertainties in doing basic research and obtaining 
commercial use of the results, because sometimes the research does not obtain sufficient 
improvement to be commercially attractive in a suitable short period. This leads to 
under-investment in basic research. The prize system can encourage basic research 
despite great uncertainties. Finally, the prize system can also increase technological 
development because it can put innovations and knowledge into the public domain and 
let the public use the knowledge freely. However, Davis also pointed out that prize 
system might have difficulty in determining who should receive the prize and the 
amount of the prize (Davis, 2002:17). Because the prize system includes “administrative 
intervention in the market”, it might also “divert inventive resources from more 
productive uses” (Davis, 2002:17). Moreover, because entrants cannot know completely 
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about each other‟s work, or entrants may be quite convinced that their results can win, 
resource duplication may occur (Davis, 2002:18). In general, in a comparison of the 
benefits and costs of the „grand prize‟ R&D incentive system, Davis believed that the 
prize system had more advantages than disadvantages. However, one can question 
whether, if an innovation has been created under the prize system and put into public 
domain, with rapid transmission, it will be distributed worldwide. If so many countries 
without doing any efforts on this innovation will enjoy the new knowledge freely, which 
is quite unfair on the government agency that provided the prize for the innovation. 
Creating an international organisation to replace individual government agencies to 
apply the grand prize‟ R&D incentive system maybe a solution to this problem. 
Thurow (1997) believed that although it was significant and essential to establish a IPRs 
system and a unitary and simple system had powerful virtues, a uniform size of IPRs 
system could not fit all types of innovations in different industries and conditions. 
Thurow sought to build a new system to “reconcile a number of competing interests and 
allow for some critical distinctions” (Thurow, 1997:102). Thurow believed that some 
kinds of knowledge should be accessible by the public freely, including knowledge that 
was relevant to the public interest and social welfare as well as some fundamental 
knowledge. For examples, basic academic knowledge and scientific information, 
knowledge that can help to educate new generations, and knowledge to keep people 
healthy and living longer should be put into the public domain. However, it is quite 
difficult to decide what knowledge should be put into the public domain and which can 
be kept privately. Thus, it is necessary to create some public agencies to explore what 
knowledge should be freely available to the public and then buy it and put it into public 
domain. Thurow also considered that the world should have a global IPRs system. 
However, this system should not be like the current TRIPS. A global IPRs system 
should take the differences in economic development, basic human needs and 
technological improvement between developed countries and developing countries into 
account. He also proposed that there should be different types of patents for different 
industries, different kinds of knowledge and different types of innovators. 
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Kermer (1998) recognized that a patent system could generate “static distortions, 
underinvestment in research and distortion of research toward duplicating existing 
inventions” (Kermer, 1998:1140-1143). Kermer drew a method of patent buyouts as a 
complement for IPRs system to mitigate the costs aroused by the intellectual monopoly 
from the practice of “The French government‟s purchasing the Daguerreotype patent 
and placing it in the public domain” in 1839 (Kermer, 1998:1137). The patent buyouts 
method means that governments buy “patents at their estimated private value, as 
determined in an auction with a mark-up equal to the typical ratio of the inventions‟ 
social and private value”, and then most purchased patents will be put into “the public 
domain” but some will “be sold to the highest bidder to induce bidders to reveal their 
valuations” (Kermer, 1998:1137). In this system, patent holders can decide whether to 
sell their patent to governments or not, so this system is a supplement system for IPRs 
system. This method can reduce the “monopoly price distortions”, mitigating 
“incentives for rent-stealing duplicative research” and “reverse engineering” aroused by 
the patent system and enhancing innovative “incentives for original research” (Kermer, 
1998:1137-1138). Kermer mentioned that the main problematic factor of the patent 
buyout system was to decide the price of patents, and this difficulty could be resolved 
through an auction (Kermer, 1998:1138). 
Shavell and Ypersele (2001) recognized that there were two kinds of basic methods to 
induce inventions. One is a reward system employed by governments, which can make 
innovations freely accessible to the public immediately after providing rewards for 
innovators; the other one is the intellectual property rights system, which endows 
“exclusive rights” to creators under governmental regulations and generates innovative 
incentives through providing intellectual monopolies for innovative products (Shavell 
and Ypersele, 2001:525). They synchronously noticed the problems of each method: 
reward method had difficulties in getting information for accounting the amount of the 
reward; the intellectual property system, especially the patent system could do harm for 
customers by causing “high prices” and might prevent further innovations if the holders 
of current patent did not agree to use their innovations (Shavell and Ypersele, 2001:526). 
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At the same time, they made a comparison between the reward system and the 
intellectual property system, particularly the patent system, and found that these two 
systems both had advantages superior to the other and disadvantages inferior to the 
other (Shavell and Ypersele, 2001:529-530). A patent system can bring a deadweight 
loss for social welfare and may also create less incentive for innovations “because 
monopoly profits are less than the social surplus” brought by the innovations (Shavell 
and Ypersele, 2001:529). However, a patent system has advantages in the fact that 
creators always may hold better private information about the value of the innovations 
than governments in deciding the amount of the rewards. Meanwhile, a reward system 
is superior to patent system because reward system cannot create deadweight loss for 
societies; innovative productions are sold at “marginal cost” (Shavell and Ypersele, 
2001:529-530). But a reward system may also produce problems in generating 
incentives for inventions. Therefore, they proposed an optional reward system, which 
meant that innovators could select between a patent and a reward under this system. 
Moreover, in this optional system, governments can calculate the amount of rewards 
according to the volume of sales and ex post data (Shavell and Ypersele, 2001:531, 541). 
They used economic model to analyze this system and make comparisons with patent 
and reward systems. They concluded that the optional reward system was superior to 
both the patent system and the reward system because if innovators selected the reward, 
it would superior to a patent system because there was no deadweight loss and since 
“patent system may be superior to reward” “and whenever the patent system was 
superior to the reward the optional reward system must be superior to reward” (Shavell 
and Ypersele, 2001:539). However, one may think this optional reward system will only 
add reward as another option with an intellectual property rights system and the choice 
between reward and patent depends on the innovators. Innovators may select reward or 
patent according to which one can bring the most benefit for them and their selection 
may also be decided by other arbitrary factors. Moreover, once the selection has been 
decided, either patent or reward, the problems of patent and reward system still exist in 




To conclude, this Chapter introduces the brief history of integrating IPRs protection into 
the WTO system and formed TRIPS. More importantly, this chapter introduces the three 
main theories—Locke‟s “labour theory of property” (Hughes, 1988), Hegel‟s “necessity 
of private property” theory (Richards, 2002:528) and the Utilitarian view, which 
justified IPRs establishment. Moreover, based on the current situation—many 
disagreements on IPRs protection have great bearings on economic development and 
profits; this chapter presents the Utilitarian view in detail. It also explores the 
Libertarian view on IPRs. In general, the Libertarians opposed formal IPRs. However, 
according to analyses, the libertarian view on IPRs was quite weak. Then this chapter 
analyses some alternative arguments on IPRs protection. These arguments can be 
divided into two groups: arguments that are against intellectual property and arguments 
that suggest reform of the IPRs system. The historical review of IPRs integration into 
the WTO provides information on the background of establishing a global IPRs system, 
which is helpful for understanding the impact of IPRs on technology diffusion, 
especially in developing countries. IPRs theories and alternative arguments are also 
instructive for analysing a IPRs system and its impact for creating innovative incentive 













Science and technology is one of the most significant resources promoting productivity 
and peoples‟ living standard. Technology development and diffusion play important 
roles in the economic development of a country. Countries try to make the most 
favourable policies to improve their technology development and diffusion. TRIPS 
agreement, the aim of which is to encourage technology development and promote 
technology transfer, has become the most powerful international IPRs protection system 
under the WTO (WTO, 2006b). According to the WTO, each member state must accept 
TRIPS. Accepting TRIPS means the level of IPRs protection for many countries is 
enhanced, particularly in the developing countries and the least developed countries, 
because these countries have no or very limited IPRs protection. However, there are 
different opinions and heated debates about whether IPRs protection or stronger IPRs 
protection can bring benefits for technology diffusion for a country. This Chapter 
introduces and analyses different arguments related to IPRs protection and its impacts 
on technology diffusion. 
There are some points, which need to be indicated in advance. 
First of all, although there are different subcategories in the current IPRs protection 
system, two of them arouse particular debate. These are patents and copyrights, which 
are highly relevant to technology diffusion. This chapter concentrates on patents and 
copyrights and their relation to technology diffusion. 
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Secondly, the analysis of the relationship between IPRs protection and technology 
diffusion in this chapter is carried out at country level rather than at world level. It 
explores whether present IPRs protection or stronger IPRs protection can bring benefits 
for technology diffusion in different kinds of countries, such as developed countries or 
developing countries. The reasons for this arrangement are as followings: 1. The 
relationship between IPRs protection and technology diffusion is quite different among 
different countries, especially between developing countries and developed countries, 
because at present developed countries are the main producers of advanced technology 
while developing countries are main acceptors of technology. It is important to 
investigate the impact of IPRs protection on different kinds of countries, rather than to 
see it on the world as a whole by ignoring the differences among countries. 2. Analysing 
the different arguments from a country‟s perspective also helps to analyse the impact of 
the stronger IPRs protection obtained from WTO accession on technology diffusion for 
a specific country, such as China. This research also concentrates on the impact of IPRs 
protection on technology diffusion for a specific country, so, the analyses of different 
arguments related to IPRs‟ impact on technology diffusion for a specific country are 
instructive for this research. 
Thirdly, technology diffusion is the process of disseminating technological information 
and subsequently adopting new technology and techniques by the users. Technology 
diffusion is a component in the broader innovation process (Queensland Government, 
2006). This implies that technology diffusion includes two main parts, which are the 
development of new technology and the dissemination of technological knowledge. 
According to the WTO, the main aims of TRIPS are to create incentives for innovations 
to promote technological development and to encourage technology transfer (WTO, 
2006b). Therefore, technology diffusion in any country should be divided into two parts: 
domestic technology development and technology transfer from foreign countries, 
which, sometimes correlate with each other. The development of technology transfer 
from foreign countries gives impetus, technological resource and information to 
improve domestic technology development. Domestic technology development 
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reinforces the ability of technological absorption for a country from foreign countries. 
Moreover, a country‟s domestic technology development may also attract foreign 
technology producers to invest in that country, and help to obtain more successful 
technology transfer from foreign countries. 
Finally, present IPRs protection or stronger IPRs protection is not the only factor that 
can affect technology diffusion in a country. Other important factors, such as economic 
policies, political policies and foreign investment policies of that country have direct or 
indirect correlation with technology diffusion both in—domestic technology 
development and technology transfer from foreign countries. Sometimes, the impact of 
the present IPRs protection or stronger IPRs protection on technology diffusion comes 
from the collaborative effects of the IPRs protection policy together with other factors. 
Thus, in this chapter, these are also explored. 
3.2. IPRs protection and domestic technology development 
For a country, IPRs protection, particularly for patents, is mostly considered as a method 
of encouraging innovations, as mentioned in the description of TRIPS—IPRs protection 
can encourage invention and innovation in the long run (WTO, 2006b). However, as for 
whether IPRs protection can encourage domestic inventions, there are different opinions. 
Some contended that IPRs protection improved domestic technology development, 
others believed that IPRs protection inhibited further domestic innovations and 
suggested implementing weak IPRs protection, and yet others thought that the influence 
of IPRs protection on domestic innovation varied according to other relevant factors and 
the effect of IPRs protection under different conditions should be considered. This part 
analyses these different opinions about the influence of IPRs protection on domestic 
innovations development. Some IPRs theories containing arguments about the relations 
between IPRs and domestic innovation development have been analysed in chapter two, 
hence, this chapter only explores some specific opinions on IPRs and domestic 
innovation development. 
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Some researchers believed that IPRs protection encouraged innovation. One important 
argument, that IPRs protection encouraged domestic innovation in any conditions, was 
put forward by Kanwar and Evenson (2003). They did empirical research on the 
relationship between IPRs protection and innovation as well as technological change 
using cross-country panel data on R&D investment, patent protection and other 
country-specific characteristics during the period of 1981-1995. They found that IPRs 
protection had evidently positive and important influences on technological change. But, 
Falvey and Foster (2006) believed that this research had a limitation. In Kanwar and 
Evenson‟s research, the strength of IPRs protection was denoted “by an index of patent 
rights”, and the “technological change” was shown through “R&D investment 
expenditures”. Falvey and Foster (2006) pointed that although data of “R&D investment 
expenditures” could be seen as the leading input of innovative action and increases in 
this aspect could demonstrate increases of input for innovations. This data was 
problematical, as it could not allow for the risky characteristics of innovative activities 
(Falvey and Foster, 2006:24). Since not all innovative activities lead to successful 
innovations, an increase in R&D expenditure does not necessarily show an exactly 
increase in innovations. However, one can put forward some criticisms of Falvey and 
Foster‟s argument. The research done by Kanwar and Evenson (2003) showed that IPRs 
protection encouraged “R&D investment expenditures”. The fact that IPRs protection 
boosts investment in R&D is the point that has a real relationship to the impact of IPRs 
on technology development. Whether the investment in R&D can lead to new 
technologies or not is irrelevant to the debate on the impact of IPRs on technology 
development. If IPRs protection can promote more investments in R&D, it shows that 
IPRs protection has positive influence on technology development, because normally 
when there are more investments into R&D, more innovations can be expected. It is true 
that the expenditure on R&D indeed cannot show the exact technology development. 
There are two reasons for this: one is that research is risky. Not all R&D leads to 
successful results, and another reason is that some innovative activities are repeated or 
useless. Many different researchers may do similar research, but only one of them will 
get a patent for the research result, other researchers‟ innovative activities are repeated 
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and the resources put into similar R&D would appear to be wasted. However, since 
research is risky, more investment in R&D means more likelihood of producing new 
innovations. Thus, if IPRs protection can bring more investment for R&D, then it 
indicates that IPRs protection has a positive impact on technology development. 
In contrast to arguments that IPRs can encourage innovations, some researchers 
believed that present IPRs protection or stronger IPRs protection inhibited domestic 
technology development.  
1) As Kanwar and Evenson (2003) summarised, Roffe pointed out that IPRs protection, 
especially patent rights, could lead to patent abuse in developing countries. The most 
common form of patent abuse in developing countries was “inadequate disclosure” in 
the patent, which meant that there were no significant “bits of knowledge” in the 
application of patent (Kanwar and Evenson, 2003:237). It is necessary for a patent 
applicant to disclose all important knowledge about innovation in application form, so 
that this kind of innovation can be diffused after patent is expired. A patent, especially 
the monopoly power given by a patent for a certain period, is the compensation for 
disclosing important information about the innovation, which makes it balance. 
However, inadequate disclosure of patent information breaks the balance. Technology 
holders want to get patents for their innovations so that they can get monopoly powers 
to prevent others from using their innovations for production. With this monopoly 
power, technology holders can ask high prices for products containing their patented 
innovations. Meanwhile, in order to prolong the time of their monopoly power, 
technology holders try to avoid disclosing their core technology in their patent 
application form. Without significant knowledge about the innovation, even very skilled 
people in the relevant discipline cannot replicate the innovation after the patent duration 
has expired (Kanwar and Evenson, 2003:237). This leads to the technology being 
unusable and copied even after patent expires. However, one can argue that if the patent 
application does not disclose enough information about the technology, there will be a 
risk for the patent applicant that others can reverse-engineer this technology and claim 
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ownership of the innovation by providing more information. According to the current 
IPRs policy, a patent can only be given to innovations which achieve certain 
requirements. These requirements are novelty, non-obviousness and industrial utility. 
Moreover, patents can only be given to one applicant. If an innovation has been given a 
patent, similar innovations cannot get patents because they cannot reach the novelty 
requirement. Thus, even if a previous patent holder did not reveal enough information in 
its patent applications and others get the innovation through reverse-engineering, they 
cannot claim the ownership of the innovation through providing more information, 
because it is not novel. One can also put forward that a patent gives an innovation up to 
20 years protection, which is almost for its entire life-time. By the end of 20 years, there 
will most likely to be a newer invention to replace the original innovation. Even if there 
is not enough information disclosed for the original innovation, the original innovation 
is no longer useful. The inadequate disclosure of patent information does not have an 
impact on technology development. However, 20 years is not a life-time for all kinds of 
innovations, and some have life-times that are longer than 20 years. If the original 
innovation is still useful and important by the end of 20 years, the inadequate disclosure 
of patent information will restrict others using the innovation freely. One may also argue 
that inadequate disclosure of patent information is just a side effect of IPRs system and 
does not have relation with encouraging new innovations. However, it has been used by 
patent applicants to prevent their innovations from being used even after their protection 
period expires, and has turned out to be a limitation of the current IPRs system. With the 
limitation of inadequate disclosure of patent information, IPRs protection may prevent 
technology development. 
2) Lerner (2002:27) evaluated the influence on inventions by the patent protection 
system by examining the change of the strength of the patent system “across sixty 
countries” over a period of 150 years. Lerner found that the reinforcement of patent 
protection system had very few positive impacts on applications for patents by domestic 
entities in the country that was adopting the policy of strengthening patent protection 
system through investigating “177 policy changes” (Lerner 2002:27). This means that 
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Lerner obtained the conclusion that stronger patent protection could only bring very few 
encouragements on patent applications in countries that tried to reinforce their patent 
protection. Patent application is an important indicator for technology development in a 
country. More patent application in a country means that there is more technology 
available in a country. Therefore, the result gained by Lerner‟s research also showed 
that stronger IPRs protection had very little positive impact on encouraging domestic 
technology development in countries that were trying to implement stronger IPRs 
protection. 
3) Branstetter Fisman and Foley (2005) explored the impact on technology transfer 
among the USA multinational companies by a series of reforms on IPRs protection 
carried through by 12 countries in the period of 1982-1999. This research also showed 
the change of patent filings by non-residents and by residents during the period of IPRs 
protection reform. They found that by comparison with a “pre-reform period”, there was 
no obvious growth in patenting by domestic residents after the reform on IPRs 
protection (Branstetter, Fisman and Foley, 2005:24-25). 
4) Helpman (1993) also argued against stronger IPRs protection. He pointed out that 
stronger IPRs protection could only raise the “rate of innovation” in the short-term 
because stronger IPRs protection could enhance the profitability of innovations. 
However, in the long-term, stronger IPRs protection induced a decrease in the rate of 
innovation because the owners of IPRs had the tendency to produce productions using 
the older technology. 
5) Harison (2008:60-62) believed that in most cases, innovators could not obtain a new 
technology in a void, but through gradual improvements based on previous innovations, 
so the dissemination of knowledge was the most important way to promote new 
technological development. However, he drew his conclusion from empirical evidence 
that IPRs protection, especially patent protection, was widely applied for strategic 
commercial reasons, such as preventing other rivals from entering the market by using 
the new technology and demanding extra royalties for new innovations, rather than to 
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encourage the development of new innovations. This means that in the view of Harison, 
IPRs protection, especially patent protection, was generally used as legal means to 
hinder competitors from commercial use of new technology. From this point, IPRs 
protection had little positive impact on technology development. 
6) Gilbert and Newbery (1982:514) argued that strong IPRs protection, which produced 
monopolies, could result in accumulating “sleeping patent” by producers in order to 
conserve market share. According to Gilbert and Newbery (1982), a “sleeping patent” 
was “an invention that was not put to commercial use” (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982:517). 
This kind of patented technology is not used for commercial production nor is it 
licensed to other people who want to use it (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982:514). This 
means that owners of innovations want to obtain patents for their innovations, but have 
no intentions of using their innovations for commercial production for profits and 
market conditions. This action comes from a desire to keep their monopoly power by 
patenting a kind of new technology based on their old patented technology before other 
potential rivals (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982:514). The result for a “sleeping patent” is 
that the time for people to obtain innovative production is prolonged. And the time that 
other researchers, who want to do research based on such a patent, is also prolonged. 
Therefore, diffusion of this kind of technology is delayed. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) 
also indicated that with monopoly power created by IPRs protection especially by 
patent, a firm “had an incentive” to preserve the “monopoly power” through getting 
patents for new innovations before potential rivals, which resulted in that existing 
patents not being “used or licensed to others” (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982:514). 
Resources may be used to produce innovations in order to preserve a firm‟s monopoly 
market power without distributing new technology. In this sense IPRs protection does 
not encourage domestic innovation. However, the negative impact of “sleeping patent” 
can be reduced through implementing compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing 
means that a government permits “someone else to produce the patented product or 
process without the consent of the patent owner” (WTO, 2006c). According to TRIPS, 
normally, if a person or a firm wants to apply for a licence, the person or the firm has to 
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try to “negotiate a voluntary licence with the patent holder on reasonable commercial 
terms” (WTO, 2006c). If the negotiation of a voluntary licence fails, a government can 
issue a compulsory licence. If a compulsory license is issued by the government, the 
owner of a patent can still receive adequate payment (WTO, 2006c). In addition, if a 
government faces emergencies, such as “national emergencies, other circumstances of 
extreme urgency, public non-commercial use, or anti-competitive practices” (WTO, 
2006c), the government can issue a compulsory license without trying to get a voluntary 
license first in order to save time.  
7) Takalo and Kanniainen (1998) also indicated that strong IPRs protection, which 
increased the ability of inventors to wait and look at how feasible the innovation was, 
prolonged the period of waiting for commercial use of and then inhibits changes in 
technology. They found that stronger patent protection improved the capacity of 
inventors to wait for a commercial use for their inventions, which induced “delaying 
market introduction of new innovations”, because stronger protection could reduce 
losses from the entry of potential competitors (Takalo and Kanniainen, 1998:1105-1106). 
This implies that they believed that stronger patent protection could provide innovators 
with power of letting their patented technology wait for better conditions for 
commercialization. This kind of power can lead to the possibility that some innovators 
will delay commercial use of their innovations, which prolongs the time to introducing 
these new innovations into market. According to the analysis of Takalo and Kanniainen 
(1998), this is because with stronger IPRs protection, inventors do not worry about the 
entry of potential competitors as IPRs protection prevents others from using patented 
technology in protected period, and inventors do not need to worry about the loss 
created through the use of their innovations by potential rivals. Hence, innovators can 
wait and select better market conditions to put their innovative technology into 
commercial production. This action delays the introduction of new innovative 
technology to market and then holds back technological change. This negative impact of 
IPRs can also be decreased through issuing compulsory licences. 
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8) Mengistie (2003) also pointed out a negative effect of IPRs protection, especially 
patent, on domestic innovation. According to Mengistie, the expectation that patents 
could encourage local technological development and domestic innovations, could not 
be realised in developing countries. There is a problem on patent policy, the unused 
patent, in both developed countries and developing countries. It is similar to the 
“sleeping patent” put forward by Gilbert and Newbery (1982). As Mengistie (2003) 
mentioned, the problem of unused patents was more serious in developing countries, 
because of the commercial strategies of foreign patentees. Foreign patent owners just 
want to protect their market share and obstruct their domestic as well as international 
competitors in using their patents. Therefore, unused patents restrict domestic 
technological development. In addition, there are still some unreasonable articles in 
licensing contracts between domestic producers and foreign patent owners in 
developing countries, such as prohibiting local commercial use of relevant patent 
technology after contracts expire. These unreasonable articles also restrict the 
development of domestic technological capability, which then inhibits domestic 
innovations (Mengistie, 2003:9-10). 
9) Glass and Saggi (2002) also believed that stronger IPRs protection in developing 
countries would decrease innovations. The reason is that stronger IPRs protection gives 
more security of market share for the owner of an innovation. And at the same time, 
more strict IPRs protection makes imitation more difficult. Under this condition, 
developing countries will spend more labour and resource to get a successful imitation. 
Thus, less resource and labour will be left for production in developing countries, while 
more labour and resource will be used for production in developed countries, leading to 
a reduction in the labour and resource used for innovation and research. Therefore, 
stronger IPRs protection will lead to less innovation in developing countries (Glass and 
Saggi 2002:408). 
Besides the above literature which argued that IPRs protection had either direct positive 
or negative impacts on domestic technology development, there are some researchers 
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who believed that the relationship between IPRs protection and domestic innovation 
development was not straightforward but dependant on other factors. 
1) Levin et al (1987) surveyed 650 American high-level R&D executives of more than 
100 manufacturing industrial sectors about their opinions on industries‟ technological 
and economic environment. In the survey questionnaires, these executives were asked to 
rank different methods, including patent and other alternative methods of appropriation, 
for protecting their products and production process. Through this survey, Levin and his 
colleagues obtained the result that in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, R&D 
executives paid more attention to patent protection. This means that patents have 
significant effects on encouraging innovative activities in these two industries. As for 
other industries, patents had not been given so much emphasis. The reason for patents 
being particularly useful in chemical and pharmaceutical industries was that there were 
“comparatively clear standards” that could be used to evaluate the validity of a chemical 
or a pharmaceutical patent and to avoid infringement (Levin et al, 1987:798). This 
means that for innovations in pharmaceuticals and chemicals, relatively explicit criteria 
can be used to identify whether a patent can be granted, and these criteria can also be 
used to prevent others from imitating patented innovations. Other industries do not have 
similar explicit criteria.  
2) Mansfield (1986) obtained similar results to Levin‟s in his empirical research. He 
used data from 27 firms gained from “a random sample of 100 U.S. manufacturing 
firms” “from 12 industries” to explore the change in innovations‟ development and 
commercialization in the absence of patent and the extent that firms utilize patents, and 
investigated the differences that existed between firms and industries in their use patents 
(Mansfield, 1986:173-174). He concluded an estimated rate of innovations owned by 
each firm between 1981-1983 that would not have been developed and commercially 
produced if there was no patent for these innovations from leading R&D executives of 
these firms (Mansfield, 1986:174). He found that patents were quite significant for the 
development or commercial introduction of 30% or more of innovations in 
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pharmaceutical and chemical industries; important for about 10-20% innovations in the 
petroleum, machinery and fabricated metal products industries; and had only limited 
effect in the electrical equipment, office equipment, motor vehicles, instruments, 
primary metals, rubber and textiles industries (Mansfield, 1986:174). For office 
equipment, motor vehicles, rubber and textiles industries, R&D executives of these 
firms all agreed that patents were not significant for innovation development and 
commercial production (Mansfield, 1986:174). Mansfield‟s research also showed that 
without patents, 60% of the innovations of the pharmaceuticals industry and 38% of the 
innovations of the chemicals industry could not been developed. Moreover, R&D 
executives in the pharmaceutical companies indicated that about 65% of their 
innovations would not have been commercially used if they were not patented 
(Mansfield, 1986:175). In other industries, such as “electrical equipment, office 
equipment, motor vehicles, rubber and textiles”, patents were not significant for the 
innovation development or introduction of new products (Mansfield, 1986: 174). But 
according to this empirical study, although patents were not as important for most 
engineering industries, there were still many firms that made use of patents. For 
example, in the motor vehicles industry, where patents were not paid significant 
attention, around 60% of patentable innovations seemed to get patent protection. 
Mansfield summarised the reasons for the high rate of making use of patents in 
industries in which patents were less important. “The prospective benefits of patent 
protection” including royalties, the delay of prospective imitators‟ entrance and that 
patents could also be used as “bargaining chips”, were estimated by the executives in 
these industries as higher than the costs of obtaining patent protection. Whether patents 
are important for encouraging and commercially using innovations or not, companies 
still use patents to earn profits, which suggests that in these industries, although patents 
have no relation with encouraging or disseminating more innovations they are still used 
as tools for accumulating profits for individual firms. 
3) Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981:907) also obtained data about 48 production 
innovations from firms in the chemical, drug, electronics and machinery industries 
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selected more or less at random from major firms in these four industries in the 
northeast of USA. They asked firms in their samples about whether they would still 
want to introduce their patented inventions into the market if they had no patent 
protection on their innovations. They got the answer that about one-half of inventions 
would have not been introduced into the market without a patent, and most of these 
inventions appeared in the drug industry (Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner, 1981:915). 
Except for innovations in drug industry, only less than one-fourth of patented inventions 
would have been impacted in the chemical, electronic and machinery industries of their 
samples when a patent was not available (Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner, 1981:915). 
This further proves that patents have a great impact on the commercial introduction of 
innovations in the drug sector and patents only have a little influence on the commercial 
introduction of innovations in the chemical, electronics and machinery sectors.  
4) Furthermore, Taylor and Silberston (1973) also investigated the economic impact of 
the patent system using data from 27 firms of the United Kingdom. They illustrated the 
similar opinion with the above opinions. They found that R&D in the pharmaceutical 
and chemical industries was dependent on patent protection, while R&D in mechanical 
engineering and electronics industries was not quite so depended on patent protection.  
5) In another research, Bessen and Maskin (2000:1) applied a model to show that if the 
innovation was “sequential and complementary”, patent right might decrease “overall 
innovation”. They gave the definition of sequential and complementary separately. They 
considered “sequential” means that “each successive invention was built on the 
preceding one”, which also meant that inventions are accumulative (Bessen and Maskin, 
2000:2). And “complementary” means that “each potential innovator takes a somewhat 
different research line and thereby enhances the overall probability that a particular goal 
in reached within a given time”, which also implies that innovations are correlative with 
other (Bessen and Maskin, 2000:2-3). They also gave natural examples to illustrate their 
view, which were the developmental processes of the “software, computers and 
semiconductors” industries (Bessen and Maskin, 2000:2). These industries had very 
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rapid development in innovations with great and prompt imitation of productions. 
However, when the US reinforced the protection for software products, stronger IPRs 
protection induced “a period of stagnant, if not declining”, inventive activities in 
“industries and firms that patented most” (Bessen and Maskin, 2000:2). Therefore, they 
believed that if the innovations were “sequential and complementary”, imitation would 
be helpful for encouraging inventions and stronger IPRs protection would restrict 
innovations (Bessen and Maskin, 2000:2). The reasons for this were that potential rivals 
would be helpful for creating valuable progress based on original innovations if the 
innovations were sequential and complementary, and IPRs protection would reduce the 
pace of this kind of improvement and innovation.  
6) The research by Harison (2008:84-86) paid more attention to the relation between 
patent and software technologies based on environment of the rapid development in 
personal computer and the wide use of the Internet. He considered that strict legal IPRs 
protection on software technologies could not provide sufficient encouragement on 
disclosure and diffusion of software technologies, but only set up monopoly power for 
software innovators. Thus, strict IPRs protection in software technologies restricted the 
learning and using of previous software technologies to develop new technologies in 
this area. He supported the open source movement as an alternative protection system 
for software technologies, which meant disclosing the source code and removing the 
ownership right. He suggested that the alternative method of open source could help to 
encourage the development of software technologies.  
7) Cowan and Harison (2001:3) examined and evaluated whether IPRs protection policy 
was suitable for “the needs of knowledge-based economics in the broad context that 
technological changes, driven by globalization and widely-spanned information 
networks”. This research paid more attention on the suitability of IPRs protection 
systems in comparatively new technologies, such as software technologies, 
“biotechnology, Internet and databases” (Cowan and Harison, 2001:3). They believed 
that developed countries promoted the establishment of global IPRs protection system. 
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Moreover, the appearance and development of knowledge-based technologies and rapid 
commercialization of information products, which were the signals of the emergence of 
new economy, put forward new challenges for global IPRs protection system, because 
the most important characteristics of the new economy was that goods could be 
“produced at zero marginal costs” and distributed among many users without additional 
costs (Cowan and Harison 2001:51). They considered that under the new economy and 
competitive knowledge-based products, IPRs protection could not have the positive 
impact on creating incentives for innovation and restricting “monopolies over infant 
technologies” (Cowan and Harison 2001:51). 
8) Story (2004) did a research about the impact of IPRs protection on the development 
of new software technologies. This research compared the proprietary software, which 
meant that the software was owned as a kind of private property by an individual unit or 
person through different kinds of IPRs protection, and free software, which was also 
abbreviated as FLOSS from free/libre/open source software and means non-proprietary 
software (Story, 2004:6-7). Story (2004) found that different kinds of IPRs protection 
had not improved software diffusion in developing countries, but created barriers for the 
diffusion of software technology in the southern countries. Free software was widely 
used in developing countries, which also encouraged the development and improvement 
of software technologies in the South. This means that IPRs protection policy 
encumbers the development and diffusion of software technologies, however, free 
software strategies can create incentives for software diffusion and improvement in 
developing countries. 
9) Lall and Albaladejo (2002) investigated the impact of stronger IPRs protection in 
different developing countries. They found that the impact of IPRs protection varied 
according to the main factors. One was “the technological nature of the activity”, which 
meant that IPRs protection had different impacts on stimulating technological 
development in different innovative activities (Lall and Albaladejo, 2002:5). Patents are 
very significant for encouraging technology development through providing monetary 
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incentives to support the great and risky expenditures in R&D and commercial 
production of technologies in the industries where it is comparatively easy for a 
competitive firm to imitate new products, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals (Lall 
and Albaladejo, 2002:5). However, patents are not vital for encouraging technology 
development in the industries, where imitation is quite “difficult and expensive”, such 
as complex engineering and electronics (Lall and Albaladejo, 2002:5). Countries having 
“little productive investment in IPRs sensitive activities” need weaker IPRs protection 
than those countries with these activities (Lall and Albaladejo, 2002:6). Another factor 
was “the nature of the economy”, which meant the impact of IPRs protection also varied 
according to different levels of the development in each country (Lall and Albaladejo, 
2002:6). Countries in their early development stages should have weak IPRs protection, 
because weak IPRs could help domestic firms to set up technological capabilities 
through “imitation and reverse engineering” Countries having “little productive 
investment in IPRs sensitive activities” need weaker IPRs protection than those 
countries with these activities, which is also proved through the development 
experience of the Ease Asian “Tigers” (Lall and Albaladejo, 2002:6). 
10) Maskus (1997) considered that the influence of IPRs protection depended on all 
kinds of “market characteristics” of each innovative production, which included 
“prospective demand, potential spillovers, the cost of R&D, impacts on market structure 
and competitive aspects of the economy” (Maskus, 1997:4). Different innovations had 
different characteristics in the market, hence the influence of IPRs protection on 
innovations should be considered accordingly. In addition, the implications of IPRs 
protection also had an indirect relationship with other policies, such as “trade and 
investment policies, industrial policies, including research and production subsidies, 
public-health and environmental regulations, and commercial controls” (Maskus, 
1997:8). For an example, many countries apply price controls on pharmaceutical 
productions. While this policy limits the value of a pharmaceutical patent, it also 
decreases the attraction of the supply of pharmaceutical patents and production in the 
market. It is very important to keep these policies in mind when analysing the influence 
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of IPRs protection. These arguments show that Maskus believed that the different 
market traits of different kinds of innovations and innovative productions played 
important roles in the relation between IPRs protection and technology development. 
Moreover, according to Maskus, other relevant policies also had an impact on the 
relation between IPRs protection and domestic technology development.  
11) Falvey and Foster (2006) also obtained similar results to those of Markus‟. They 
thought that the influence of IPRs protection on domestic innovations depended on 
other factors. They believed that strong IPRs protection could create incentives for 
encouraging more innovations in countries which were comparatively well developed or 
with a relatively well-educated labour force (Falvey and Foster, 2006:x, 20). This 
indicates that, stronger IPRs can bring more benefit for creating incentives for inventive 
activities in countries which have high levels of development, comparative highly 
educated workers and an important domestic capacity for inventing. Countries having 
an important domestic capacity for inventing implies that these countries own abilities 
in resources and “human capital” (Falvey and Foster, 2006:21), which can do innovative 
activities and gain successful innovative technology. Furthermore, Falvey and Foster 
(2005) suggested that strong IPRs protection could bring more domestic innovation in 
comparatively “closed economies” but it could induce “less domestic innovation and 
more international technology diffusion in more open economies” (Falvey and Foster, 
2005:7). This means that these two researchers considered that for countries, which 
were widely open to other countries and the international market, stronger IPRs 
protection could promote more technology transfer from foreign countries than 
domestic innovations, and for countries which were not relatively open to the 
international market, stronger IPRs protection could create incentives for more domestic 
technology than technology transfers from foreign countries. 
In general, from the above explanations and analyses of different views on the 
relationship between IPRs protection and domestic technology development, it is 
obvious that some people held the view that IPRs protection had either positive or 
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negative impact on domestic technology development, and some people thought that the 
impact of IPRs protection on domestic technology development depended on other 
factors, such as different industries, market characteristics and other economic policies. 
It should say that the latter opinion is relative more reasonable because it is wise to 
analyse the impact of IPRs on domestic innovations according to different 
characteristics of innovative productions, market structures and other relevant policies, 
which all have implications on the relations between IPRs protection and the 
development of domestic innovations. The point also provides instructive information 
for the design of fieldwork in this research. However, there is another point that needs to 
be mentioned, which is that the diffusion of technology should pay more attention to the 
commercial use of innovations, rather than making sleeping innovations that is only 
helpful for creating monopoly market power without making technological 
development. 
3.3. IPRs protection and technology transfer from foreign 
countries 
Falvey and Foster (2006:23) summarised that technology transfer from foreign 
countries implied processes through which a country‟s companies could obtain “access 
to” and made use of technology produced in a foreign country. In general, technology 
transfer can take place through voluntary transactions between willing partners, it may 
also occur by “non-market transactions or spillovers” (Falvey and Foster, 2006:23). This 
means that technology transfer usually occurs between two parties, who want to make 
transactions. Sometimes technology transfer may not take place through common 
market transactions, such as contracts and deals but through other methods, such as 
imitation, flow of skilled labours and scientists as well as professionals, and spillovers. 
Channels, which transfer technology from one country to another, can be divided into 
two groups: formal channels and informal channels, depending on whether there is 
“formal compensation” for owners of IPRs (Falvey and Foster, 2006:24). Formal 
channels imply that through these manners bargainers of technology can get formal 
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compensation from the deal of technology transfer and purchasers need to pay to obtain 
the technology. Informal channels mean that through these methods bargainers cannot 
get formal compensation from purchasers of technology and purchasers usually do not 
need to pay for getting technologies transferred from bargainers. Through informal 
channels, even at the occasion that purchasers need to pay for obtaining technology, 
bargainers usually cannot gain anything because the payments received are most likely 
to be spent on things like imitation. Formal channels include international trade, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), licensing, “joint ventures”, foreign patenting, which means 
applying patent rights in a foreign country, and “the movement of skilled workers across 
borders” (Falvey and Foster, 2006:24). International trade includes international “trade 
in goods and services” as well as international “trade in capital and intermediate goods”, 
and the latter may be a comparatively significant way to transfer technology (Falvey 
and Foster, 2006:24). For FDI, inward FDI is likely to be a more important method to 
get technology from foreign countries; moreover, FDI channels are important for the 
operation of the Multinational Companies (MNCs). Informal channels involve imitation, 
“the movement of personnel from one firm to another taking with them specific 
knowledge of their original firm‟s technologies”, patent application data, and temporary 
migration of people, especially scientists and university students (Falvey and Foster, 
2006:24). Amongst these channels, patent application data needs to be further explained. 
According to TRIPS, when one applies for a patent for a kind of technology, sufficient, 
clear and complete information about the innovation must be disclosed in the 
application. Furthermore, the information revealed in application should be enough for a 
skilled person “in the art” to carry out and realize the innovation (WTO, 1995:332). 
Much of the technological information that is involved in patent application data, and 
most countries publish the patent application information on their patent bureau 
websites and therefore everyone can obtain the information. Although no one, except 
the patent holder, can use the whole and core technology information in the patent 
application, people can still get clues and research methods for carrying out relevant 
R&D. Therefore, patent application data can be one of the informal channels for transfer 
technology from foreign countries. 
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This section focuses on the relation between IPRs protection and technology transfer. 
There are some points that need to be explained in advance. Firstly, as for the relation 
between IPRs protection and technology transfer, there are different views from 
different angles. This section introduces some overall standpoints first and then focuses 
on some particular channels. Secondly, not all channels of technology transfer have 
been widely researched and discussed with respect to the relationship between IPRs 
protection and technology transfer from foreign countries. This section only focuses on 
some main channels: international trade, FDI, licensing and imitation, which have been 
widely discussed. Finally, this research explores the impact of IPRs protection reform 
on technology diffusion in China, which is a developing country. Therefore it would be 
helpful and relevant to place emphasis on arguments about the relationship between 
IPRs protection and technology transfer in developing countries. 
3.3.1. The relation between IPRs and overall technology transfer 
Many researchers had investigated the correlation between IPRs protection and the 
overall technology transfer from foreign countries. This section explores some 
important views. 
1) Maskus (1998:134) reckoned that IPRs protection had two different and opposite 
influences on technology transfer. On one hand, IPRs protection facilitated and 
promoted technology transfer, since domestic companies can utilize information in IPRs 
applications to carry out follow-up innovations without infringing the original right on 
patented technology. On the other hand, IPRs protection could also reduce the speed of 
technology transfer and diffusion, as it gave owners of innovations the capability to 
prohibit local firms from using significant technology by adding restrictive articles in 
licensing agreements (Maskus, 1998:134). Bascavusoglu and Zuniga (2006) 
summarised these two opposite impacts by IPRs protection on technology transfer from 
the aspect of innovations‟ owners. IPRs protection could arouse “market expansion 
effect”, which meant that firms of IPRs holders would have an increasing market in 
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which to sell their products and services because of the rise of demand when pirated 
productions had to be replaced by original ones under IPRs protection (Bascavusoglu 
and Zuniga, 2006:4). At the same time, IPRs protection could also bring “market-power 
effect”, which indicated that firms of IPRs holders would decrease their sales of 
productions and service in foreign markets, because without menace from imitation, 
they had more market power under strong IPRs protection (Bascavusoglu and Zuniga, 
2006:4). The first effect could help to facilitate transfer of technology to local firms, as 
there would be more innovative productions in the local market, which might bring 
great spillovers to local firms. The second effect would have a negative influence on 
technology transfer, because it just reinforced the monopoly market power of foreign 
firms with innovations and restricted the flow of technology and information. 
2) Nicholson (2002:20) showed that IPRs protection had impacted on the manner of 
technology transfer from developed countries to developing countries, according to 
different production characteristics of firms. Firms holding products, which were 
complicated or involve sophisticated technology, would have a tendency to transfer their 
production through FDI, while firms, which had low risk of imitation or whose 
productions involved less technological information, would incline to give licensing to 
“on-affiliated” developing countries‟ firms (Nicholson, 2002:20). IPRs protection could 
affect both the level and composition of the transfer of technology from developed 
countries to developing countries (Nicholson, 2002). Stronger IPRs protection would 
result in enhanced transfer of technology; however it could alter the “composition from 
FDI to licensing” (Nicholson, 2002:1). 
3) Shapiro and Hassett (2005:5-7) noticed the important role of knowledge, ideas and 
technologies in improving economic development all over the world. However, they 
believed that technology development was mainly depending on the monetary 
incentives provided for technological innovations. As they summarised, most advanced 
technologies were developed in advanced countries, such as the USA. These advanced 
technologies not only brought great benefit to the countries where they originated but 
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also created economic development in developing countries through technology transfer 
(Shapiro and Hassett, 2005:3). However, in their view, technology transfer from 
developed countries to developing countries greatly depended on whether the 
innovations could receive respect and protection through IPRs system in developing 
countries (Shapiro and Hassett, 2005:3). They indicated that stronger IPRs protection in 
developing countries expanded technology transfer from developed countries. Countries 
with weak IPRs protection could only have very little technology transfer from 
developed countries, especially for sophisticated technologies. Moreover, they 
considered that the reinforcement of IPRs protection in developing countries could also 
help to diffuse technologies in domestic firms (Shapiro and Hassett, 2005:4). 
4) Bascavusoglu and Zuniga (2006) concluded from their research on French 
technology flows to other countries, which the influence of IPRs protection, especially 
patent rights, would reckon on the technological conditions in different countries. 
Furthermore, the influence also changed according to the intensity of technology and 
different sensitivity in different industries. 
5) Falvey and Foster (2005:7) summarised from empirical evidence that the impact of 
IPRs protection on technology transfer relied on other factors. Stronger IPRs protection 
encouraged technology transfer in countries that had good “capacity for innovation or 
imitation”, took open trade policies, and had large market size (Falvey and Foster, 
2005:7). Without these conditions, technology transfer and diffusion would tend to be 
restricted in a country. This implies that there is the possibility of stronger IPRs 
protection to encourage technology transfer from foreign countries through imports, 
FDI, licensing and foreign patenting, but it also depends on other factors. Empirical 
evidence shows that when a country has resources and ability to do innovation or 
imitation, takes an open policy on trade, and has a great market capacity, this possibility 
can be realized. Without these factors, the impact of stronger IPRs protection on 
technology transfer from foreign countries will be very limited. 
6) On the contrary, Mengistie (2003:11) summarised that patents were not helpful for 
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establishing joint ventures or attracting FDI in developing countries. A research done in 
Ghana and Nigeria found that there was only a few technologies transferred effectively 
to middle and low-income developing countries through FDI or joint ventures 
(Mengistie, 2003:11). This was because in these middle and low-income developing 
countries there was a lack of competent licensees to utilize and produce patented 
innovations independently, and that there were many difficulties for owners of patents 
to get hold of capable individuals to use patented innovations (Mengistie, 2003:11). One 
may argue that this is not a problem of IPRs protection. However, this finding shows 
that for the same reason, IPRs protection cannot have a positive impact on encouraging 
technology transfer from developed countries to middle and low-income developing 
countries. Some technology has been applied in developing countries not because of 
patent protection but because these technologies are the main part of the whole 
investment project (Mengistie, 2003:11). Mengistie also believed that under IPRs 
protection, especially patents, foreign technology holders could use unreasonable 
articles in licensing contracts to restrict technology transfer to developing countries, 
such as prohibiting licensees from doing technological development based on licensed 
technology, regulations that licensees had obligation to transfer their improvement 
based on licensed technology to licensers and restricting the use of technology by firms 
of developing countries, even after patents had expired. Moreover, under patent, 
increase in the price of foreign technology and foreign innovative productions also had 
a negative impact on technology transfer to developing countries (Mengistie, 2003:11). 
3.3.2. The relation between IPRs and technology transfer through 
international trade 
International trade is one of the most important channels to realize technology transfer. 
Some people focused their arguments related to IPRs protection and technology transfer 
on international trade. 
1) Smith (1999:158) explored the influence of IPRs protection on the exports from 50 
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states of the USA and “the district of Colombia to 96 countries”. Smith divided samples 
of these 96 importing countries into four categories according to the capability of 
imitation of these importing countries (Smith, 1999:155-156). Smith concluded from 
this research that for countries “where the threat of imitation is weak”, stronger IPRs 
protection had a negative impact on exports of productions from the USA to these 
importing countries (Smith, 1999:170). Whereas for countries that “have a strong threat 
of imitation”, IPRs protection had a positive impact on the trade flow from the USA to 
these importing countries (Smith, 1999:170). This means that IPRs protection in 
importing countries has a great relation with exports of firms in USA, and the relation 
between IPRs protection and trade flow from USA depends on the threat of imitation in 
these importing countries. 
2) Maskus (2000:111) believed that it was empirically difficult to make clear the 
impacts of IPRs protection on international trade. There were three problems in 
identifying the relation between IPRs and international trade. Firstly, IPRs‟ impact was 
“partly embedded in the prices at which goods are traded” (Maskus, 2000:111). It was 
quite difficult to separate IPRs‟ impact “from other components of pricing behaviour” 
(Maskus, 2000:111). Secondly, exports, FDI and licensing were alternative options to 
sell new technologies and new products. International trade maybe just one of the 
choices among these options for a firm holding a new technological product. The impact 
of stronger IPRs protection not only affected international trade but also affected the 
choice among different export options. Finally, IPRs protection also “creates market 
power in the distribution of new goods and technologies” (Maskus, 2000:111). This 
implies that market structure also has relation with the impact of IPRs on international 
trade. Although international trade is one of the channels for transferring technology 
from foreign countries, it is very difficult to identify the impact of IPRs on technology 
transfer through international trade, because the impact of IPRs on international trade is 
not clearly identified. However, Falvey and Foster (2006:27) concluded that there were 
two direct effects of IPRs on international trade, which seemed to be especially 
significant. On one side, with strong IPRs protection, firms holding new goods and 
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technologies “should be encouraged to export their patented goods into foreign 
markets” (Falvey and Foster, 2006:27). This arises because that IPRs protection reduced 
the risk of imitation, which decreased the “profitability of the firms‟ activity in that 
country” (Falvey and Foster, 2006:27). From this point, stronger IPRs could be expected 
to encourage imports to a country. On the other side, stronger IPRs protection also 
increased the market power of firms holding new technologies, because the protection 
“reduces the ability of domestic firms to imitate” (Falvey and Foster, 2005:24). With 
more market power, the exporters might be encouraged in a monopolistic way through 
reducing sales (Falvey and Foster, 2006:27). 
3) Fink and Maskus (2005:7) generalised the relation between IPRs protection and 
technology transfer through international trade. Firstly, multinational trading firms 
seemed not to “base their export decision on IPRs in the poorest countries, where the 
local threat of reverse engineering were weakest” (Fink and Maskus, 2005:7). This 
means that multinational trading firms do not consider IPRs protection when exporting 
to the poorest countries, because there is little risk of imitation in these countries. 
Secondly, in middle-income and large developing countries, patents were an important 
factor that affected the export decision of multinational trading firms, because imitations 
were more likely to occur in these countries. Thus, if these countries implemented 
stronger IPRs protection, which reduced the risk of imitation, foreign trading firms were 
“more likely to expand their volumes of trade accordingly” (Fink and Maskus, 2005:7). 
Thirdly, “the products of many high-technology industries are inherently difficult to 
imitate, so those trade flows are less responsive to IPRs than those in 
medium-technology or mature-technology sectors” (Fink and Maskus, 2005:7). This 
implies that products of some industries containing high-technology, which is difficult 
to copy, are less sensitive to IPRs protection than products of some industries containing 
technology that is easy to copy. This also means that different sectors have different 
sensitivities to IPRs protection. Finally, high-technology firms might select FDI and 
licensing to sell new technologies and new products internationally. Thus, the change of 
IPRs protection seemed to have very limited impact on international trade in these firms 
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(Fink and Maskus, 2005:7). 
4) Fink and Primo-Braga (1999:2-9) found that although strong IPRs protection had a 
positive influence on “trade flows for both total non-fuel imports and exports”, IPRs 
protection had a negative influence on trade flow in high-technology productions. They 
gave some possible reasons for this: for high-technology products “market power 
effects might offset positive market expansion effects” aroused by strong IPRs 
protection; firms with high-technology products preferred to use FDI to replace 
international trade; trade flow of high-technology productions might not be sensitive to 
IPRs protection; moreover, there were other factors that could have impacts on trade of 
high-technology productions (Fink and Primo-Braga 1999:10). 
3.3.3. The relation between IPRs protection and technology transfer 
through FDI 
The channel of FDI in technology transfer is comparatively complex. It has not been 
agreed whether FDI can bring technology transfer or spillovers, however, FDI is at least 
a possible channel that can bring technology transfer from foreign countries. If stronger 
IPRs protection can bring more FDI to a country, then more technology may be carried 
from foreign countries through this channel. If stronger IPRs protection cannot bring 
more FDI to a country, it is impossible to get technology transfer through FDI. 
Therefore, this section introduces different views on the relation between IPRs 
protection and FDI, especially related to technology transfer. 
1) Maskus (1998) indicated that IPRs protection was a significant aspect but not the 
only factor to have influence on FDI. Just increasing IPRs protection alone could not 
help to encourage FDI sufficiently (Maskus, 1998; Fink and Maskus, 2005:54). The 
“general regulatory system”, which included IPRs protection, “taxes, investment 
regulations, production incentives, trade policies and competition rules”, had important 
impacts on FDI (Maskus, 1998:129; Fink and Maskus, 2005:54). Moreover, IPRs 
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protection had a different influence on FDI in different industries. The decision of FDI 
in lower-technology industries, such as textile and electronic assembly, was not 
sensitive to the change of IPRs protection but was depended much on “input costs and 
market opportunities” (Maskus, 1998:131-132; Maskus, 1997:17). Foreign firms with 
productions and technology, which was quite difficult to be copied, also paid less 
attention on IPRs protection when making decision on FDI. Firms that had easily 
imitated goods, such as chemical goods, pharmaceutical goods, and software, would pay 
more attention to IPRs protection when deciding to implement FDI locally (Maskus, 
1998:131-132; Maskus, 1997:17). 
2) Falvey and Foster (2006:33) summarised that for countries that had some technology 
absorptive abilities, inward FDI was a source for technology diffusion. IPRs protection 
could influence technology diffusion through the channel of inward FDI, because the 
change of IPRs protection could affect the flow of FDI. However, the relation between 
IPRs protection and FDI was not straightforward. Stronger IPRs protection encouraged 
FDI in some industries, such as chemical and pharmaceutical industries. The relation 
between IPRs and FDI also depended on the level of production stages. Stronger IPRs 
protection could encourage more FDI in “component manufactures final production and 
R&D facilities” than in other levels of production stages (Falvey and Foster, 2006:33). 
3) Smarzynska (2004:40) explored the impact of IPRs protection on the composition of 
the flow of FDI in 24 economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. She 
found that weak IPRs protection would reduce FDI flow in four high-technology 
industries including “drugs, cosmetics and health care products; chemicals; machinery 
and equipment; and electrical equipment”, where IPRs protection was quite significant 
(Smarzynska, 2004:40). Meanwhile, weak IPRs protection also shifted the emphasis of 
FDI in target countries from “manufacturing to distribution” (Smarzynska, 2004:40). At 
the same time, the impact of weak IPRs protection on the transfer of FDI emphasis was 
important to all kinds of investors, not just FDI in high-technological industrials, which 
were highly sensitive to IPRs protection (Smarzynska, 2004:40). The transfer of FDI 
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emphasis from manufacturing to distribution means that there is less possibility to 
transfer technology through FDI, because technology contained in distribution is far less 
than that contained in manufacturing. 
4) Saggi (2000) obtained the results from surveys of literatures on trade and FDI that 
IPRs protection policy in a country had influence on attracting technology from foreign 
countries in different industries. Firms in industries which were sensitive to IPRs 
protection, such as pharmaceutical industry, would not do direct investment or do 
investment in manufacturing and R&D in countries that had very weak IPRs protection 
(Saggi, 2000:39). This means that the relation between IPRs protection and FDI 
depends on different industries. Moreover, the change on IPRs protection can also have 
impacts on technology transfer through different kinds of channels, such as licensing, 
joint ventures or FDI. 
3.3.4. The relation between IPRs protection and technology transfer 
through licensing 
Licensing is another important formal channel for technology transfer. Through 
licensing, intellectual property owners permit others to use IPRs, especially patented 
technology, under negotiated conditions. Technology transfer mostly involves 
technology licensing, through which the owner of a kind of technology protected by 
IPRs permits others to utilize, modify, and resell this kind of property based on 
negotiated compensation. There are also some particular arguments on the relationship 
between IPRs protection and technology transfer through licensing, which are explored 
in this section. 
1) Maskus (1997:19-20) considered that licensing was very sensitive to the strength of 
IPRs protection, although he concluded that the correlation of IPRs protection and 
licensing also depended on other factors, such as “local supply of technical and 
managerial personnel, market factors and collateral regulation”. Maskus also gave 
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reasons for it: strong IPRs protection would lower the costs of licensing through 
decreasing the expense in prohibiting defection in licensing contracts by licensors; 
stronger IPRs protection also gave more secure guarantee on technological information 
in licensing contracts; and rigorous IPRs protection could also provide capability for 
licensors to control licensing terms (Maskus, 1997:19-20). 
2) Mansfield (1995:9) concluded from research that licensing had great relation with 
IPRs protection in the USA, Germany and Japan. Firms in these countries would not 
undertake licensing under conditions of weak IPRs protection. In addition, the 
relationship between IPRs protection and technology licensing had more significant 
embodiment in chemical and pharmaceutical industries. 
3) However, Falvey and Foster (2005:31) pointed out that although licensing was 
sensitive to IPRs protection, stronger IPRs protection, which gave greater monopoly 
market power to licensors, lowered innovation and then decreased further licensing. 
3.3.5. The relation between IPRs protection and technology transfer 
through imitation 
Imitation is a very significant informal channel that helps to transfer technology 
transferred from foreign countries. Imitation is especially important for most developing 
countries, which do not have the capability to do R&D themselves and cannot afford 
high royalty payments for getting patented technology. This section focuses on 
arguments about the relation between IPRs protection and technology transfer through 
imitation. 
1) Lai (1997; Kanwar and Everson, 2003:239) pointed out that if imitation was the 
channel of technology transfer in developing countries, stronger IPRs protection would 
reduce technology transfer from developed countries. 
2) As Fink and Maskus (2005:61) summarised, Glass and Saggi also believed that if 
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developing countries could only get innovations through imitation from developed 
countries, stronger IPRs protection obtained through adopting minimum standards of 
global IPRs protection systems would bring more difficulties in doing imitation because 
of the force from foreign patent. If there was a reduction in the rate of imitation, there 
would be an expectation by innovative companies in developed countries that their 
losses in “technological advantages” would slow down (Fink and Maskus, 2005:61). As 
a result, these innovative companies in developed countries would try to earn profit as 
much as possible from each of their innovations, which would make their need for 
doing more innovative activities decline. 
3) In the research of “Intellectual property rights, technology and economic 
development: experiences of Asian countries”, Kumar (2002) introduced IPRs 
protection system and its impact on technology and economic development in Asia, 
such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and India. This research showed that Japan, Taiwan 
and South Korea in their early stages, applied weak IPRs protection policy to facilitate 
domestic firms in absorbing foreign technologies through reverse engineering (Kumar, 
2002:4-6). Meanwhile, during the period of weak IPRs protection policy, Japan, Taiwan, 
South Korea also encouraged the development of their domestic technology based on 
the technology absorbed through reverse imitation from foreign advanced countries. 
Therefore, technology obtained fast development in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea 
during their weak IPRs protection period. After Japanese firms gained enough 
technological ability and adequate technological development, the Japanese government 
started to adopt strict IPRs protection policy to prevent technology imitation (Kumar, 
2002:4-6). Taiwan and South Korea were pushed by the USA to adopt stronger IPRs 
protection policy (Kumar, 2002:4-6). However, at the time of applying stronger IPRs 
protection policy, Taiwan and South Korea had obtained enough time to develop their 
technology under their weak IPRs protection through imitating advanced technology 
from foreign countries. These three examples illustrated that weak IPRs protection 
policy, especially permitting technology imitation from advanced countries and the 
policy of encouraging the development of domestic technology strongly promoted 
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technological development and diffusion in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. India had 
to accept a strict IPRs protection policy in 1911 (Kumar, 2002:6). However, under the 
pressure form Indian domestic industry, the Indian government adopted weak IPRs 
protection policy. This weak IPRs protection policy facilitated Indian firms in absorbing 
technology through reverse imitation from advanced countries and in developing their 
technological abilities, especially in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors (Kumar 
2002:6). This example also shows that weak IPRs protection promotes reverse imitation 
and strongly encourages absorbing technology from foreign countries. 
4) Kim (2003:5-6) also found from a research done about the development experience 
of South Korea that “in the early stage of industrialisation”, reverse engineering and 
imitating advanced technological products from foreign countries could help to facilitate 
transferring and absorbing technology from foreign countries and then enhanced the 
technological infrastructure in domestic industries. He mentioned that stronger IPRs 
protection policy, which strictly prevented imitation and reverse engineering, would 
greatly encumber technology transfer. Kim (2003:5-6) concluded that only after 
countries obtained enough “accumulated indigenous capability with extensive science 
and technology infrastructure to undertake creative imitation in the later stage”, IPRs 
protection policy turned out to be an significant factor that influences technology 
transfer. Kim (2003) also indicated that weak IPRs protection together with the 
tolerance of imitation was not useful for South Korea. In other New Industrial 
Economies in Asia, such as “Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines”, imitation and weak IPRs protection also helped to obtain mature 
technology transfer from foreign countries in their early development stage (Kim, 
2003:2). Moreover, Kim (2003:6) considered that without the tolerance of imitation 
under weak IPRs protection in the early stages of development, “Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan” could not have obtained their current levels of technological development. This 
also shows that weak IPRs protection and imitation encourage technology transfer for 
developing countries when they are in early development stage. 
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3.4. Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter introduces and analyses different arguments on the relation 
between IPRs protection and technology diffusion from two aspects—IPRs protection 
and domestic technology development as well as IPRs protection and technology 
transfer from foreign countries. 
Through analysing these different arguments, the following points can be generalised: 1) 
Of different opinions on the relation between IPRs protection and domestic technology 
development, some supported that stronger IPRs protection encouraged domestic 
innovations, some believed that weak IPRs protection was helpful to create incentive for 
innovative activities locally, and others considered that the relation between IPRs 
protection and domestic technology development depended on third factors, including 
other relevant policies and the characteristics of different industries. It is wise to analyse 
the correlation between IPRs protection and domestic technology development 
according to different conditions and traits, because IPRs protection is not the only 
factor that affects domestic innovation. Aggregative conditions, including IPRs 
protection, other relevant policies and characteristics, influence domestic technology 
development greatly. This proves that the relation between IPRs protection and 
domestic technology development varies under different conditions, including different 
industries and other relevant policies. This is very helpful for designing fieldwork and 
analysing fieldwork data for this research, because it urges the researcher to consider the 
characteristics of these conditions when analysing the relationship between IPRs 
protection and domestic technology development. Furthermore, in the relation between 
IPRs protection and domestic technology development, the most important point is to 
make commercial use of innovations and do further developments based on existing 
innovations, rather than letting innovations go to sleep. In addition, more monopoly 
market power induced by stronger IPRs protection can increase the price of innovative 
productions and limit distribution of inventions, which can be harmful for technology 
diffusion. 
Page 71 
2) For the relationship between IPRs protection and technology transfer, there are 
formal and informal channels. This chapter analyses some important 
channels—international trade, FDI, licensing and imitation. Technology diffusion in this 
part is quite complex. 1. There was no consistent opinion about whether FDI was a 
channel for technology transfer, because some believed that FDI could bring technology 
and spillovers while others held the opposite opinion. 2. There was a complicated 
relationship between formal channels and informal channels. Stronger IPRs protection, 
according to some researchers, could promote most formal channels such as 
international trade, FDI and licensing, while it was considered to reduce imitation at the 
same time. 3. Among formal channels, there was still a complex issue: the increase in 
the strength of IPRs protection would be likely to enhance licensing to replace FDI. 
Generally, there was not an agreement on whether IPRs protection or stronger IPRs 
protection could bring more technology transfer. Some people considered that stronger 
IPRs protection could encourage more technology transfer, but some did not. In addition, 
the characteristics of different industries were also considered to have a correlation with 
technology transfer. Therefore, while designing fieldwork and analysis in this research, 
the characteristics of different industries and the characters of the country are taken into 
consideration. Two more additional points are worth mentioning: first is that the cost of 
technology transfer is quite important, because it decides whether a firm or a country 
could afford the technology. If the price is quite high as foreign firms have tighter 
control of their technology given by stronger IPRs protection, technology transfer is 
unlikely to take place because domestic firms cannot afford it. The second one is that 
technology transfer should be helpful in developing domestic innovations. It should not 
produce technological dependency on foreign innovations, which is harmful for 
long-term technology development and diffusion. 
As mentioned before, these different discussions on the relation between IPRs 
protection and technology diffusion in the aspects of domestic technology development 
and technology transfer from foreign countries are very helpful for designing and 
analysing fieldwork for this research. 
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Chapter 4 




Similar to other developing countries, China has a quite short history in the 
development of IPRs protection. However, China has made considerable progress in 
promoting the development of IPRs protection over the past decades. After reviewing 
IPRs theories and arguments related to IPRs and technology diffusion, it is necessary to 
understand the background of IPRs protection development in China for this research. 
The necessity of reviewing China‟s IPRs development embodies the following points. 1) 
There are two basic questions in this research: did China‟s entry to the WTO really lead 
to the fact that the country enforced stronger IPRs protection and when did it start to 
enforce stronger IPRs protection? IPRs development in China can provide information 
for these two questions. 2) The background of China‟s IPRs protection also helps to 
select research methods. IPRs reform in China mainly occurred from the 1980s to the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century. This research explores the impact of IPRs protection 
reform on technology diffusion in China and compares technology diffusion before and 
after IPRs protection reform in China. Thus, necessary methods that can help to recall 
the impact of IPRs on technology diffusion before IPRs protection reform are used in 
this research. 3) The background of China‟s IPRs development is also helpful for 
analysing and understanding the research result. 
This chapter introduces the history and development of IPRs protection in China at 
different stages. Generally, there was no significant development on IPRs before China 
opened its door to the world in 1978. IPRs protection obtained real development after 
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China implemented the “Open Door” policy in the late 1970s. There have been three 
development climaxes on IPRs protection after the 1980s, and there are different causes 
for each it. 
4.2. China’s IPRs development before the “Open Door” policy 
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the People‟s Republic of 
China (P.R.C). Before the establishment of P.R.C, the CCP had abolished all regulations 
and laws, including copyright, patent and trademark law, implemented by Kuomintang 
party, which controlled China from 1911 to 1949 (Yang, 2003; Jin, 2004). During the 
first 30 years of the P.R.C., which was also “a period of extreme economic planning”, 
the government applied “a reward system” for innovations “under the auspices of 
official documents” (Yang, 2003:134). Chinese government implemented strict 
administrative control over innovations and publications. Based on an extremely 
planned economy, “public ownership was advocated”, and the national interest and 
social welfare were superior to individual interest (Bosworth and Yang, 2000:456). IPRs 
protection system was opposite to a planned economy in the view of “Marxism, 
Leninism and Maoism”, because IPRs protection was based on the concept of private 
property and Marxism, Leninism and Maoism advocated public property (Yang, 
2003:134). Therefore, in this period, no formal IPRs protection system was in place 
during the first thirty years of the P.R.C. when Chinese government implemented the 
planned economy (Hong, 2005). 
After the establishment of the P.R.C, the government took the “Soviet model” in IPRs 
area, because it was closer to the “traditional Chinese attitudes toward intellectual 
property” (William, 1995:56). In the traditional Chinese view, intellectual creation and 
innovations should belong to the whole society, because Chinese people believe that 
intellectual inventions are fruits of social activities (Andrew, 2005). The Soviet model 
of intellectual property means a “two-track” system, that the government can give the 
“certificates of invention” or the “certificates of patent” to innovators to protect their 
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rights (William, 1995; Jin, 2004). William (1995) summarised that the preferred track 
was to use the certificates of inventions. With these certificates, inventors are entitled to 
have the rights of being recognized and getting monetary rewards created by their 
innovations. However, these inventors must let the state use and disseminate their 
innovations. In August 1950, the government approved the “Provisional Regulations on 
the Protection of Invention Rights and Patent Rights”, which was taken from the 
“Soviet model” (William, 1995:57). This regulation means that at that time, the 
government recognized patent rights; yet the government had the right to decide 
“whether and how” these innovations “could thereafter be applied by other Chinese 
entities without prior approval or the payment of a licensing fee” (William, 1995:58). 
Therefore, this regulation also meant that the government wanted to transfer to an award 
system on IPRs protection (Andrew, 2005:80). In May 1954, the government 
promulgated the “Provisional implementation regulations of rewards on industrial 
inventions, innovation and rationalisation proposals”, which changed the rights of 
innovations “from private ownership” to be fully controlled by the state (Yang, 
2003:134). According to this regulation, innovators can get “bonuses, medals, 
certificates” “honorary degrees” in term of innovation ownership, which was “set 
between three to 15 years” (Yang, 2003:134). However, these regulations could not get 
implemented well because of “the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-58” and “the 
Cultural Revolution” of 1966-77 (Andrew, 2005:81). Thus, relevant policies in that 
period could not encourage innovative activities, and achievement from R&D was at 
quite a low level (Yang, 2003:135). The government only granted “four patent rights 
and five innovations” during the period “between 1950 and 1963” (Bosworth and Yang, 
2000:456), and only registered “7700 items of scientific and technological” fruits from 
1966 to 1978 (Bosworth and Yang, 2000:456). 
For trademarks, the Chinese government promulgated the first trademark statute in 1950, 
which was the “Provisional statute on trademark registration and its implementation 
statute” (Yang, 2003:134). Although this regulation provided 20 years‟ protection for 
trademarks together with indefinite renewal, there were no specific provisions on how 
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to enforce the protection (Yang, 2003:134). In 1963, the Chinese State Council used the 
“Regulations governing the control of trademarks” to replace previous trademark 
regulations (William, 1995:63). The aim of this new regulation was to strengthen “the 
control of trademark” and make “enterprises guarantee and improve the quality of their 
products”, rather than to protect the rights (William, 1995:63). 
For copyright, China implemented a reward system before the “Open Door” policy 
(Yang, 2003). This reward system was not a formal IPRs protection. The social and 
cultural background directly restricted the establishment of formal IPRs protection 
system in the early period of the P.R.C. As Jiang (2007:1) summarized, “family 
thought” shaped Chinese culture. Actually, Chinese people consider the whole of China 
as a kind of “private property of the imperial family”, which leads to the fact that all 
families, except the imperial family, “shared collective property” because they had no 
private properties (Jiang, 2007:1). Moreover, in the traditional Chinese view, a book 
taken from others was not a stolen book and Chinese authors thought that coping of 
their works was a kind of “supreme honor” (Jiang, 2007:1). These traditional views 
could not be changed in short period after the establishment of the P.R.C., so there was 
no formal copyright system, which emphasised private property rather than public 
property in the early period of China. In 1950, the government held the first meeting on 
countrywide publishing. In this meeting, the government passed the Decision on 
improvement and development of publishing, which stipulated the principle for 
copyright (Li, 2005:73). In 1955, the government sketched out the Statute on copyright 
protection for publications, but because of the “Cultural Revolution” this statute was not 
published (Li, 2005:73). As William (1995:59) summaried, during the early period of 
the P.R.C, there were “no comparable provisional regulations” related to copyright. 
Chinese authors and scholars could only receive the “fixed „basic payments‟”, which 
were based on the “number of copies printed”, besides holding the right of preventing 
“unauthorized alteration of their work” (William, 1995:59). According to Jin (2004:188), 
although there were some regulations and governmental documents on copyrights, these 
regulations and documents paid more attention to the benefit of publishing houses, 
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rather than the rights of authors. Moreover, from the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966, the already limited basic payment to authors was reduced 
dramatically. Authors could not even ask for the their works to bear their names, and 
they could only sign “collective creation” on their works. 
There are some reasons for the slow development of IPRs protection in China before the 
“Open Door” policy. The main reasons were internal: the slow development of IPRs 
protection was the result of special political, economic and social conditions in China. 
In the first thirty years, the CCP implemented a strict socialist command economy. This 
economy was thorough the “planning economy” (Li, 2006), which meant that all kinds 
of assets belonged to the commonality or collectivity. This policy believed that 
individual welfare was subordinate to social and national welfare, which resulted in 
despising private property (Bosworth and Yang, 2000:456). Under this policy, any 
technological innovations should belong to the state, and technology innovators could 
only get very limited rewards for their creations. Trademark registration was also a kind 
of method to control all kinds of units and their production (Li, 2006). IPRs for 
individuals did not give protection or development. Secondly, the system of 
policy-making had no participation for individual persons, which was established in 
imperial society and continued for a long period of time in China‟s history. This system 
also set up a hierarchy society and created a “high-level of bureaucracy in China” (Yang, 
2003:135). Thus, different levels of governments in China had powerful impact on “all 
aspects of economic and social activities”, including the control of innovative activities 
and their results (Yang, 2003:135). Moreover, the P.R.C was established on the basis of 
a traditionally feudalistic society and foreign aggression as well as civil wars, which 
pushed the government to pay more attention to the construction of basic infrastructure. 
This left China with little energy to develop science and technology and also restricted 
the development speed of IPRs. Finally, China experienced the 10-year Cultural 
Revolution from the late 1960s. During that period, researchers, teachers, technicians 
and intellectuals received serious persecution. Many researches had to halt. Many books, 
papers and other kinds of works were destroyed. The development of science and 
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technology encountered a great calamity in the country. In the same period, all kinds of 
thought that had connection with capitalism or individualism received criticism. 
Relevant regulations on science and technology, especially IPRs protection, which were 
introduced from western countries, could not develop quickly. For the external reasons, 
although the P.R.C was established in 1949, it was not admitted by many foreign 
countries in the early stage, especially by developed countries. Thus, there was very 
little international trade and communication between China and developed countries, 
which also restricted the introduction and development of IPRs system. 
4.3. China’s IPRs development after the “Open Door” policy 
After China implemented the “Open Door” policy in 1978, Chinese IPRs protection 
achieved tremendous development. It took about 20 years for the government to set up 
comparatively high level of IPRs protection system, which is also consistent with 
international IPRs protection standards (Li, 2005:74). This is also the formal 
establishment of contemporary IPRs protection in China. This rapid development can be 
analysed through three development climaxes. 
4.3.1. The first development climax in the early stage of 1980s 
In the late 1970s, the Chinese government gradually realised the importance of an IPRs 
system. Without IPRs protection foreign companies would not do invest, bringing their 
technologies to China. Moreover, the Chinese government recognised that IPRs 
protection was also an indispensable system to stimulate domestic innovation (OECD, 
2003:118). Just after China opened its door in 1979, the Chinese government came to 
“the Agreement on Trade Relations between the USA and the P.R.C” (“1979 
Agreement”) in September 1979, which provided for the protection of copyrights, 
patents, and trademarks “to the nationals of the other party” (Yu, 2002:8). From that 
time, the Chinese government started to do IPRs protection reform to establish a broad 
IPRs protection system. According to this agreement, the Chinese government 
Page 78 
authorized the National Publishing Institution of the P.R.C to draft the copyright law (Li, 
2005:76). In the beginning of 1980, the government established the State Patent Office 
of the P.R.C to take charge of drafting the first patent law (Li, 2005:76). In the same 
year, China entered the WIPO, according to the requirement of “1979 Agreement” (Yu, 
2004:4). A new trademark law was issued in August 1982. The country promulgated a 
new patent statute in 1984, which was the first integrate patent statute in the P.R.C, and 
joined “the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property” in 1985 (Yu, 
2002:8; Li, 2005:76). In 1985 the government established the National Copyright 
Administration of P.R.C (Yu, 2002:8; Li, 2005:76). Before 1990, China had also signed 
“the Madrid Agreement for the International Registration of Marks” (Zhang, 
2006:64-65) and “became a signatory country for the Integrated Circuits Treaty” (Yang, 
2003:136). Although the Chinese government promulgated some IPRs regulations and 
signed some international agreements during this period, Chinese authors and 
innovators could only receive very limited protection for their works and creations, 
because it was quite difficult for China to introduce the notion of private property, 
which was opposite to “the socialist economic system”, and the government had to put 
“substantial limits” on relevant rights about IPRs protection (Yu, 2002:8). 
4.3.2. The second development climax in the early stage of 1990s 
Although there were some developments on IPRs in China, developed countries, 
especially the USA, was not satisfied with them. In 1989, China was placed on “priority 
watch list” by the “US Trade Representative” under “section 301 of the Trade Act” (Li, 
2005:77;Yu, 2002:.9). The “section 301 of the Trade Act” provided rights of 
investigating and imposing sanctions on relevant countries, which were considered to 
embark on “unfair trade practices” that threatened the USA‟s economic interests, to the 
USA President (Yu, 2002:9). In order to give response to this before the negotiation 
with the USA on IPRs protection, the Chinese government passed the first copyright 
law in 1990 and promulgated a separate regulation on computer software protection in 
1991 (Li, 2005:79). Nevertheless, China was placed as “a priority foreign country” by 
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the USA in 1991 (Yu, 2002:9). In order to avoid a trade war between the two countries 
due to the retaliatory behaviour, China and the USA signed “the Memorandum of 
Understanding Between China and the United States on the Protection of Intellectual 
Property” in 1992 (Wang, 2002:3). China promised in the 1992 Memorandum that it 
would promote its IPRs protection, especially for the protection on “patented 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals and copyrighted materials (including computer software)” 
(Michel, Pitman and William, 1996:7). During this period, China approved “the Statute 
on Computer Software Protection” (Yang, 2003:136). Under the pressure of the 1992 
Memorandum, the Chinese government amended the patent statute and issued “the 
implementation Regulations on the Patent law” (Yang, 2003:136) in 1992, which 
enlarged the scope for patent and prolonged the protective term from 15 years to 20 
years for patents (Li, 2005:79). In 1993, the Chinese government also amended its 
trademark law and announced “the Implementation Regulation on the Trademark Law” 
(Yang, 2003:136). This modification added criminal penalties for trademark 
infringements (Wang, 2002:4). Furthermore, China joined “the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works” (Wang, 2002:2-3) and the World 
Copyright Treaty in 1993 (Yu, 2002:10). The country also became a member of 
“Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against 
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms” and “the Patent Cooperation Treaty” 
(Yu, 2002:9-10; Li, 2005:79). In addition, the government also issued countering unfair 
competition law in 1993 (Li, 2005:79), whose main purpose was to protect “trade 
secrets and know-how” as well as to encourage “fair trade and competition” (Yang, 
2003:136). Meanwhile, China also advanced the enforcement system for IPRs 
protection. The most obvious symbol of this improvement was the “establishment of the 
intellectual property Special Court in 1992”, which assured that all kinds of intellectual 








In 1994, the USA Trade Representative used the “Special 301 Process” to put “China as 
a Priority Foreign Country” again (Hong, 2005:298). Under this situation, the USA 
pushed China to sign “the Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property rights” in 1995 
(Yu, 2002:10-14). Wang (2002) summarises that this also resulted in the second 
memorandum of understanding between China and the USA in 1995. Based on the 1995 
memorandum, China promised to take measures to provide sufficient IPRs protection 
for USA right holders (Wang, 2002). At the same time, the government paid more 
attention on IPRs protection enforcement. China established “an Action Plan for 
Effective Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (“Action Plan”), 
whose main purpose was to improve “the enforcement structure and the legal 
environment” related to IPRs protection (Wang, 2002:5). The “Action Plan” set up “a 
new enforcement structure”, which was the “State Council Working Conference on 
Intellectual Property Right” (Wang, 2002:5). The main aim of this “Working 
Conference” was to make sure that all kinds of regulations and laws relating to IPRs 
protection could be implemented across the whole country to prevent “local 
protectionism and vulnerability of the Chinese judicial system” (Wang, 2002:5). 
In 1995, the USA used the “Special 301 Process” to place China as “a Priority Foreign 
Country” for the third time (Yu, 2001:10). China and the USA had to come to another 
agreement, which “included a Report on Chinese Enforcement Actions” and “Annex on 
Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement and Market Access Accord” in 1996 (Zhang, 
2006:74-75). The 1996 agreement paid more attention to the “administrative 
enforcement of copyright law and market access” for “audio-visual and published 
products as well as computer software” from the USA to China (Zhang, 2006:74-75). 
Under the 1996 agreement, China had to take measures to reinforce IPRs protection. As 
a result, the government promulgated the “Regulations on the Certification and 
Protection of Famous Trademarks” in 1996, which made regulations consistent with the 
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requirements of the TRIPS agreement (Yu, 2001:5-6); the “Regulations on the 
Protection of New Plant Varieties” in 1996 (Yu, 2004:5); a section for “intellectual 
property crimes” in 1997 (Yu, 2001:6). In addition, the government also upgraded the 
“State Patent Bureau” to the “State Intellectual Property Office” in 1998, which was “a 
ministry-level branch of the State Council” (Yu, 2004:5) and whose main functions 
were to improve “trademark, copyright, patent application and management and other 
intellectual property rights aspect” and to cooperate with “the State Administration of 
Industry and Commerce and the State Press and Publication Administration” in order to 
affirm the implementation of “laws and regulations” (Yu, 2001:6). And in 2000, the 
country joined the “International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants” 
(Yu, 2004:5). 
In the same period, China was trying to be accepted by the WTO and made more 
progress on IPRs protection. In 2000, the second amendment for patent law was made. 
The government amended copyright law in 2001, which was the first amendment for the 
copyright law after its implementation (Li, 2005:82). This amendment strengthened 
copyright protection and added computer software as one of the objects for copyright. In 
the same year, the government modified its trademark law and reinforced the strength of 
trademarks protection (Li, 2005:83). In November 2001, China was acceded by the 
WTO and signed the TRIPS agreement, which meant that China must obey the 
minimum protective standards set by TRIPS. Not long after China‟s entry to the WTO, 
the country promulgated relative regulations for copyright and trademark, and issued 
enforcing regulations on “integrated circuits, computer software and pharmaceuticals” 
as well as other steps to develop IPRs protection (Yu, 2004:6). The central government 
together with other relevant departments launched some “large-scale crackdowns on 
pirated and counterfeit productions” in many kinds of sections and productions, which 
obtained remarkable results (Yu, 2004:6). 
Some internal factors for the rapid IPRs development after the „Open Door‟ policy need 
to be analysed. Firstly, after the “Open Door” policy, China entered a new stage for 
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reconstruction and development in all perspectives. The government took a policy of 
market economy, which broke up the “iron rice bowl” system that provided equal 
reward to all kind of labourers without considering the quality of their work (William, 
1995:67). The market economy policy allowed and encouraged individuals to pursue 
their own profits and interests through providing “meaningful material incentives” 
(William, 1995:67). It changed the minds of Chinese people from believing that social 
welfare was above individual interest in accepting that it was reasonable to seek 
individuals‟ proper interest. This had provided a foundation for IPRs establishment in 
ideology. Secondly, under peaceful circumstances, Chinese people and the government 
tried hard to embark on all kinds of production and R&D that were beneficial to 
enhance productivity. Science and technology in China obtained rapid development 
after the “Open Door” policy, which called for relatively systematical IPRs protection to 
safeguard scientific and technological fruits and to encourage more creative productions. 
This new situation created the need for IPRs protection, and the government gradually 
noticed the importance of IPRs. The establishment of IPRs protection satisfied China‟s 
desire to protect China‟s domestic technology (Yang, 2003:136). Last but not the least, 
China wanted to be accepted by the GATT, which was the predecessor of the WTO, to 
enlarge its international trade and promote Chinese economic development from the late 
of 1980s. The GATT, under the control of most developed countries, requested China to 
improve its IPRs protection as one of the terms for entry. After the establishment of the 
WTO, TRIPS became one of the components of the WTO agreements, which meant that 
every WTO member must accept TRIPS as the minimum standard for their IPRs 
protection. Therefore, China had to improve its IPRs protection according to the 
requirements of TRIPS. Under the pressure, IPRs protection in China developed very 
fast after the “Open Door” policy.  
There are also some important external factors for the rapid development on IPRs in this 
period: the pressure from the USA, especially, played a significant role. After China 
opened its door to the world, there was a great increase in the international trade and 
foreign investment in the country. Products in developed countries, which had 
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comparative mature IPRs protection, flowed into China. Foreign countries also invested 
in China to engage production directly, and these countries required IPRs protection for 
their products. International communication augmented dramatically, which let Chinese 
people and their government know and learn about relevant economic and legal system, 
including IPRs protection, from developed countries. Pressure came from developed 
countries, especially the USA, and should be described separately, because it was one of 
the main reasons for the rapid development on IPRs protection in China. As mentioned 
above, the USA used the “301 section” and the “Special 301 section” to place China in 
the “Priority Foreign country” category many times to condemn the poor IPRs 
protection in China. In order to avoid a potential trade war with the USA, China had to 
compromise every time, which became one of the main impetuses to improve Chinese 
IPRs protection. Many IPRs protection reforms in China were made under the pressure 
of the USA. Moreover, the USA was one of the most important countries for China‟s 
entry to the WTO. In order to be acceded by the WTO, China needed the support from 
the USA. And therefore, China needed to satisfy the relevant requirements put forward 
by the USA. As IPRs protection was one of the most significant issues that the USA 
concerned about in China, Chinese government had to improve IPRs protection. 
Moreover, China wanted to obtain new advanced technology from foreign firms in 
developed countries (Yang, 2003:136-137). Without IPRs protection, firms in developed 
countries would not want to transfer their technology to China, because they worried 
that their technology would be imitated at very low cost by other Chinese firms, which 
would reduce their benefit greatly. The establishment of IPRs protection also satisfied 
the need of Chinese government to attract technology transfer from foreign countries. 
4.4. Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter introduced the development history of Chinese IPRs 
protection from different stages, which includes IPRs development before and after the 
“Open Door” policy. Moreover, China‟s IPRs protection development after the “Open 
Door” policy is also divided into three development climaxes. This chapter also 
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analysed the factors of the development progress in different stages. According to this 
analysis, there are internal and external factors for both the slow development on IPRs 
protection before the “Open Door” policy and the rapid improvement on IPRs 
protection after the “Open Door” policy. Internal factors were more significant for slow 
development on IPRs protection before the “Open Door” policy, while external factors, 
especially the pressure from the USA, played a very crucial role in the expeditious 
development on IPRs protection after the “Open Door” policy. The introduction and 
analysis provide very useful backgrounds for doing fieldwork and analysing fieldwork 


















5. 1. Introduction 
This research is about China‟s entrance to the WTO and the influence of IPRs protection 
reform on technology diffusion. This research used fieldwork to collect data and 
information. The review of IPRs theories, arguments related to IPRs and technology 
diffusion and the background of China‟s IPRs development provided useful information 
for fieldwork design in this research. This chapter explores the selection of methods for 
doing fieldwork and collecting data in this research. It begins with the definition and 
explanation of its fieldwork questions, and explains the fieldwork methods, which 
include semi-structured interviews, self-completion questionnaires, and data collection 
from official statistics and other sources. Reasons for using these methods, the 
limitations of them and how to overcome the limitations are analysed. Detailed 
fieldwork plans and difficulties for doing this fieldwork are also provided in this 
chapter. 
5.2. Fieldwork questions 
This research explores the impact of IPRs protection reform obtained in the WTO 
accession on technology diffusion in China. Since there was no relevant data or 
documents available for this research, the best way to collect them is through fieldwork, 
which was then carried out in China. IPRs theories and arguments related to IPRs and 
technology diffusion reviewed separately in chapter two and three provided information 
for how to achieve the research objectives through fieldwork. IPRs theories indicated 
that IPRs establishment might bring both positive and negative impact on technology 
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development. These theories also showed that the current IPRs system had both 
advantages and disadvantages. Arguments related to IPRs and technology diffusion 
demonstrated that the relation between IPRs and technology diffusion in a country was 
not straightforward but dependent on different industries, channels and other policies. 
These factors should be considered while doing fieldwork. With research objectives and 
these important factors, this research defined the following fieldwork questions. 
 Is Chinese IPRs protection reform obtained in the WTO accession detected by 
technological executives of Chinese firms? 
This is a basic question. If IPRs reform could not have been detected by technological 
executives of Chinese firms, it would imply that IPRs reform in China did not have an 
impact on the processes of research, production or application related to technology. 
This would occur if China reformed IPRs regulations without strengthening the 
enforcement of IPRs regulations. Therefore, the first important question in this 
fieldwork should be to identify whether different selected technological executives 
detected the change of IPRs protection policy in China. 
 What are the impacts of IPRs reform on domestic technology development and 
diffusion in China? Are there other factors that have an influence on the relation 
between IPRs and the development and diffusion of China‟s domestic technology? 
Development and diffusion of domestic technology is part of the technology diffusion 
for a country. These questions explored the impact of IPRs protection reform on the 
development and diffusion of domestic technology in China, including positive and 
negative impacts. According to relevant arguments, the relation between IPRs and 
domestic technology development depends on other factors. Thus, whether other factors 
could have some influence and how they influence the relation between IPRs reform 
and the development and diffusion of China‟s domestic technology should be 
investigated in fieldwork. This fieldwork should pay more attention on the detailed 
expression by technological executives in each selected industries about their 
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experience on the impact of IPRs protection reform on domestic technology 
development in China. The general view about whether IPRs protection reform has 
positive or negative impact on domestic technology development in China should be 
collected. More importantly, more detailed examples about the impact of IPRs reform 
on domestic technology development and the reasons behind that should be explored 
and analysed. Previous literature searches found that other factors, such as different 
sectors had different impacts on the relation between IPRs protection and domestic 
technology development. Thus, fieldwork should test it and explore these specific 
factors in China and analyse the reasons for them. 
 What are the impacts of IPRs reform on technology transfer from foreign countries 
to China? Are there other factors that influence the relationship between IPRs and 
technology transfer from foreign countries to China? 
Technology transfer from foreign countries is another part of technology diffusion for a 
country. These questions investigated the positive and negative impact of IPRs reform 
on technology transfer from foreign countries to China as well as exploring whether 
other factors could affect and how they influence the relation between IPRs reform and 
technology transfer to China. This fieldwork should also pay attention to detailed 
impacts of IPRs protection reform on technology transfer in China. In order to achieve it, 
examples and reasons should be obtained from selected executives. It should also be 
valuable to compare the impact of IPRs protection reform on domestic technology 
development with that on technology transfer from foreign countries. This comparison 
could help to investigate which part receives more influence by stronger IPRs protection 
and analyse the reasons for it.  
 Are there other policies that could have an impact on the relationship between IPRs 
protection reform and technology diffusion in China, and if yes, how? 
According to relevant arguments, some researchers believe that other relevant policies 
affect the relation between IPRs protection and technology diffusion for a country. 
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These questions explored whether there are such policies and how these policies 
influence the relation between IPRs reform and technology diffusion in China. This 
question also comes from the previous literature. Obtaining detailed information about 
other policies related to promoting technology diffusion could help to understand the 
general policy background in China. 
 What are the opinions of technological executives in Chinese firms on the current 
IPRs protection? Do they believe that the current IPRs policy is the best method for 
encouraging technology development and diffusion in China? What are the 
advantages and disadvantages of the current IPRs policy related to technology 
diffusion in China in the view of these technological executives? If they believe 
there are some disadvantages of the current IPRs policy, how do they deal with 
these disadvantages? 
These questions were about the opinions of technological executives in Chinese firms 
on the current IPRs policy. Technological executives of Chinese firms involved in R&D, 
commercial production of technology and technology transfer from foreign countries. 
With direct experience of the impact of IPRs reform on technology diffusion in China, 
their opinions on the current IPRs policy are quite valuable and worth being researched. 
The advantages and disadvantages of current IPRs protection policy on technology 
diffusion expressed by technological executives could bring detailed and fire-new 
comprehension about current IPRs protection. If they notice some limitations of current 
IPRs policy, the method they applied to cope with these limitations may provide 
valuable alternative ways to reduce the disadvantages of current IPRs policy. 
 Are there any official statistics or other sources that can provide information about 
the impact of IPRs reform on technology diffusion in China? 
This question is about other sources that can provide information for this research. If 
yes, it would worth finding out and making them complementary to findings obtained 
from those technological executives. Any other sources beyond the design should be 
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valuable, because no one could have a perfect plan to collect all useful information and 
there is always some unexpected material that can provide useful information.  
 Does any special or unique factor exist in China that can have an impact on the 
relation between IPRs reform and technology diffusion? 
The aim of this question is to let the researcher pay more attention to some special and 
unique factors related to this research exist in China. Finding out and analysing these 
special factors would help to understand the impact of IPRs reform on technology 
diffusion in China. Moreover, these special and unique factors are also the important 
parts of the main contributions of this research. 
These questions define purposes and tasks of the fieldwork. They also help to select 
suitable research methods in order to accomplish these purposes and tasks. 
5.3. Research methods 
According to the fieldwork questions, semi-structured interviews and self-completion 
questionnaires were selected as the main methods of the fieldwork. This research also 
collected relevant official statistics and other sources. 
5.3.1. Semi-structured interview 
Interview is a method for data collection in the social research area. The aim of the 
interview is to find out what is in someone else‟s mind (Patton, 1990:278). Interviews 
produce substantive insights into people‟s attitudes, experiences and feelings (May, 
2001:120). There are individual interviews and “group interviews”, and the most 
popular one is “individual, face-to-face verbal interchange”, which is also the most 
familiar individual interviewing (Fontana and Frey, 1998:48). This research used 
semi-structured interviews, which mean that “the researcher has a list of questions or 
fairly specific topics to be covered, often referred to as an interview guide, but the 
interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply” (Bryman, 2004:321). In 
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semi-structured interviews, an interview guide that can cover all necessary specific 
issues is prepared before the interview. During the interviews, the interviewer can 
change the sequence of the specific issues in the interview guide and questions that are 
not involved in the interview guide can be asked according to the situation. 
The semi-structured interview was selected as a method for doing fieldwork for the 
following reasons. Firstly, there were no specific data or documents available on this 
research topic. Specific data needed to be collected from the technological executives of 
Chinese firms, who had experienced the impact of IPRs reform on technology diffusion 
in China directly. Interviews would help to find out their attitudes, experiences and 
feelings about this topic. The most useful information for this research could be 
gathered from individual firms that engaged in doing R&D and using technology. 
Although every one in China might have opinions about the impact of IPRs reform on 
technology diffusion, technological executives working in these firms should be the best 
choice to explore the influence of IPRs protection reform on innovative activities and 
the utilization of technology, as they were directly involved in R&D, commercial 
production of new technology, technology administration and so on, and hence would 
have detailed and direct experience and feelings about IPRs reform and technology 
diffusion in China. One may consider that participant observation is also a method to 
get direct attitudes, experiences and feelings of these technological executives. The aim 
of participant observation is to obtain close comprehension of a given group of 
individuals and their experiences and practices through closely involving in people‟s 
natural circumstances in a short period. It is possible and feasible to find out the 
experience and feelings of technological executives about the influence on activities 
related to technology diffusion in their firms by the change of IPRs protection. However, 
it is impossible to observe the exact behaviour of these technological executives related 
to technology diffusion in their firms and institutions, because technology is always a 
quite important, sensitive and confidential issue for each firm. Since each firm tried to 
keep the commercial negotiation, especially negotiation related to technology, secret, 
“an outsider” would not be allowed to attend the negotiation process. Moreover, the 
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process of technological improvement and diffusion developed by firms would require a 
long period of time and usually a researcher would not be allowed to participate. As a 
result, participant observation is not suitable for this research. Secondly, interviews 
could also help to recall and reconstruct things that occurred in the past (Bryman, 
2004:339). Most Chinese IPRs reforms occurred during the period when China was 
trying to enter the WTO. Previous experience on technology diffusion in China needed 
to be reconstructed for this research. Interview is a suitable method to discover the 
impact of IPRs on technology diffusion before China reformed its IPRs policy. Thirdly, 
the semi-structured interview uses an interview guide to cover all necessary issues 
related to this research. One may suggest that structured interviews have the same 
function. A structured interview often uses very specific questions and provides the 
interviewee with a fixed range of answers. However, specific questions and fixed range 
of answers would limit the data collection of this research. Unknown and unexpected 
things brought up during the interview are valuable for investigation in detail. 
Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to find out unexpected and unknown 
factors through changing the structure, the sequence of sentences and elicit words of 
interview questions (Gerson and Horowitz, 2002:201). In addition, semi-structured 
interviews can include open questions to encourage interviewees to do thick 
descriptions about relevant issues. Moreover, this research emphasizes individual 
interviewee‟s ideas and perspectives about the influence of IPRs reform on technology 
diffusion in China. The answer put forward by different interviewees cannot be 
standardized, thus, the structured interview is not suitable for this fieldwork. Finally, the 
semi-structured interviews are also suitable for different situations by changing the 
sequence and words of interview questions according to different contexts. In practice, 
many interviewees could not follow the original arrangement. Sometimes, interviewees‟ 
responses for one question involve many other important questions, which thoroughly 
broke the sequence of the interview guide. It is preferred to apply semi-structured 
interview, because it can deal with this situation with facility. 
Although the semi-structured interview is suitable for doing this fieldwork, the limits of 
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this method are worthy of mention. Firstly, because the sequence and wording of 
different issues can be changed by the interviewer according to different situations, 
different interviewees may give different responses, which reduce “the comparability of 
responses” (Patton, 1990:288). This can be overcome by covering all issues in the 
interview guide during the interview, and carefully comparing and analysing each 
response. Secondly, with the attendance of researcher, anonymity is also reduced. This 
research involved information on R&D, technology development and diffusion. This 
information was quite sensitive as it was the core secret for these firms. Moreover, 
anonymity was particularly significant for this research as the Chinese government 
supported IPRs reform and the issue was also politically sensitive. This limitation could 
be overcome by promising anonymity before interview. In addition, this research also 
used self-completion questionnaires to collect data. Self-completion questionnaires 
allow selected technological executives to answer questions by themselves without the 
attendance of the researcher. Self-completion questionnaire increased anonymity, and 
data collected through interviews and questionnaires were also compared in this 
research. 
5.3.2. Self-completion questionnaire 
Self-completion questionnaires allow respondents to answer questions through 
accomplishing the questionnaire by themselves. Questionnaires are usually sent out by 
post to respondents. But this research used Internet as the medium to collect 
questionnaire data from respondents. The advantages of using the Internet as a 
questionnaire data collection method is that it can save time and money, reach a large 
number of individuals easily, and collect data quickly without considering the distance 
(Bryman, 2004:470). However, there are also limitations of using the Internet. Firstly, 
not everyone can get access to the Internet all the time. If the selected participants could 
not access the Internet for a certain period of time, they could not complete the 
questionnaire. This limitation was overcome by leaving plenty of time for selected 
technological executives to receive and complete the questionnaire. If there was no 
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response from the participants after the given time, the researcher would try to contact 
and arrange to have face-to-face questionnaire. Secondly, the email containing the 
questionnaire might be mistreated as a nuisance email. This could be avoided by 
providing clear subject for the email. Thirdly, because the researcher was not around to 
explain the meaning of the questions while completing the online questionnaire, some 
questions might not be answered. This could be resolved by carefully designing the 
questionnaire and adding functions to remind the participants when they omitted some 
questions.  
There are some reasons for selecting self-completion questionnaires in this fieldwork. 
Firstly, this method could help to cover a large range of individuals in different 
geographical areas at a low cost. Since interviews could not be done with many people, 
self-completion questionnaires could offset this limit by reaching many individuals in a 
short time. Secondly, respondents completed this questionnaire by themselves with their 
own consideration, which reduced the biases created by the researcher in face-to-face 
interviews (May and Williams, 2001:98). Finally, this method could increase anonymity, 
which was particularly important for this research as the issue of the IPRs reform was 
politically sensitive in China. Considering that technology information was also 
sensitive and confidential to the Chinese firms involved in this research, anonymous 
self-completion questionnaires would be able to provide more real information to this 
research. 
The self-completion questionnaires also have disadvantages. Firstly, if respondents 
experience difficulties while completing the questionnaire, they cannot get any help 
from the researcher. Therefore it is very important for the researcher to make sure that 
each question could be easily understood by respondents. Secondly, the self-completion 
questionnaire tends to have a low response rate (Bryman, 2004:135) and there is no 
control over the selected respondents in answering the questions carefully. Without 
supervision and prompting, some respondents may easily decide not to give answers to 
certain questions or not to answer the whole questionnaire at all. Therefore, it may be 
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necessary to send out the questionnaire again to persuade selected respondents to 
answer the questionnaire carefully. Moreover, if there are a lot of questionnaires that are 
not completed, it is very important to try to make appointments with selected 
respondents. Thirdly, because there is no control over the process, it is possible that the 
person who answered the questionnaire is not the same one that has been selected. 
Technological executives in relevant firms are selected to complete the questionnaire, 
because of their experience and sufficient knowledge about this research topic. But it is 
possible that someone else, who does not have such qualities, would complete the 
questionnaire instead of the executives, and this would reduce the response accuracy. 
The reduction in accuracy could be overcome by comparing the data obtained from 
questionnaire with data obtained from interview and official statistics. 
5.3.3. Official statistics and other sources 
This research also collected data from relevant official statistics. Official statistics 
usually mean “data collected by the state and its agencies” (May, 2001:72). This method 
can reduce the cost and research time, as data is collected by others. (Bryman, 
2004:202). It gives researchers more time to concentrate on the analysis of data. For this 
research, official statistics also allowed the researcher to do comparison between data 
obtained from interviews and questionnaire. 
It was found that there were many different kinds of resource that could provide useful 
information for this research. Besides doing interviews, questionnaires and collecting 
official statistics, other sources, such as television programs, were also used to collect 
information. These different kinds of information were used as complements for 
interviews, questionnaires and the official statistics. 
5.4. Fieldwork plan 
Before going through the detailed fieldwork plan, it is necessary to explain some 
important factors about the field, which were obtained through piloting for interviews 
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and questionnaires. 1) Some technological executives of Chinese firms neither paid 
much attention to research nor wanted to accept interviews. At least, their reluctant 
attitude could be perceived from their manner of speaking. Their replies were either that 
they were busy or that they were not in charge of this issue and told the researcher to 
contact other relevant people. Even if these „relevant people‟ could be reached, the same 
answers were given, and that they do not have the time for interviews. Therefore, it was 
known that they were not willing to be interviewed. Some interviewees were asked 
about reasons for them not willing to accept the interview. According to their answers, 
the main reasons were that they did not care about the research and that they also 
believed that this kind of research could not bring direct benefit to their firms. Some 
technological executives‟ unwillingness to accept research could also be seen from the 
result of questionnaires. At the time, six questionnaires were sent out by email to 
selected Chinese firms for doing piloting, but only one answered questionnaire was 
received. Moreover, this questionnaire was partially completed. Therefore, relevant 
executives were contacted to do piloting for face-to-face questionnaire in order to get 
completed answers to test the questionnaire. After finishing two piloting questionnaires, 
relevant participants were asked about the reasons for not being willing to accept 
interviews or questionnaires. They replied that executives of Chinese firms did not care 
about research, such as interviews and questionnaires. If the questionnaire could be 
completed by clicking from options provided, they might be willing to do it because the 
questions would be easy to answer. They also indicated that open questions in the 
questionnaire might not receive any response, because technological executives would 
not waste their time and energy to write answers. 2) Personal connections were an 
important factor for accomplishing this fieldwork. This was not considered before 
carrying out the fieldwork lest it should affect the objectivity of the research result. 
However, after trying to contact some technological executives for interviews and 
questionnaires as a piloting job, it was found that it would be difficult to be accepted by 
these executives without personal connections. Nevertheless, it also showed that the use 
of personal connections did not affect the objectivity of fieldwork result, because it only 
played the role of an introducer and did not involve the concrete content of this 
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fieldwork. Furthermore, personal connections also helped to establish a good 
atmosphere so that interviews and questionnaires were accomplished smoothly. 3) 
These technological executives did not know detailed IPRs protection policy quite as 
well as expected. People in charge of applying patent, copyright, trademark and other 
kinds of specific items of IPRs protection, comprehended IPRs protection policy 
commendably. However, only these technological executives had the authority to make 
decisions on developing, transferring and purchasing a kind of technology. Moreover, it 
was these technological executives who knew the relation between the cost and the 
benefit of developing a kind of technology, rather than the people who were in charge of 
applying specific items of IPRs protection. These findings could be seen from the 
following which is part of transcription of the 1
st
 interview with a technological 
executive of a stated-owned chemical firm. 
Question: Do you know about IPRs protection policy, especially the 
IPRs protection policy in China? 
Answer: Yes, I know some of it. IPRs protection policy is very important 
for my company. It was introduced from western countries to China. 
China‟s IPRs protection policy is not very good. China‟s IPRs protection 
policy only started from the “Open Door” Policy, especially from the 
1980s-1990s. In China, it has become stronger in these last few years. 
However, it is still not as good as that of western countries. The IPRs 
protection policy in western countries can provide very good protection 
for technology. China‟s IPRs protection policy is waiting for further 
development. Certainly, I only have general knowledge of the policy on 
IPRs protection. My company has a special department that is in charge 
of applying for patents, copyrights and trademarks. Staffs in that 
department know the IPRs protection policy very well, because it is their 
job. If you want to have detailed information, I can introduce you to one 
of these staffs. 
Question: Thank you very much. Can you tell me whether these staffs in 
charge of applying for patents, copyrights and trademarks, can also get 
involved in the decision-making about technology in your firms? 
Answer: These staffs do not take part in the decision-making about the 
company‟s important issues, such as developing a particular technology. 
But they can report some important changes on IPRs policy to the 
manager. The important issues in this company are decided through 
discussion among managers and executives of different departments. The 
main job of these specialist staffs is to apply for patents and so on. 
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This part of an interview transcription shows that staff in charge of applying patent and 
copyright, grasped detailed information about IPRs protection policy. They had the 
responsibility to report important changes on IPRs protection policy, but do not directly 
participated in the decision-making on developing technology. Technological executives 
took part in the decision-making about developing technology but they only had some 
general knowledge of IPRs policy in China. Considering this finding, it was better to 
ask these executives questions about the detailed impact of IPRs reform on technology 
development and diffusion in their firms, rather than particular questions about detailed 
IPRs protection policy. 4) Because this research project involved questions about a 
firm‟s basic conditions, technology, patent, and even the attitude of a firm‟s 
technological executive on IPRs protection policy, which were most sensitive, 
participants, sometimes, gave very blurry answers. For instance, when the researcher 
asked about the number of patents held by the firms, some participants only gave a 
rough number rather than a precise number. Thus, the researcher needed to probe more 
response when doing interviews. The fieldwork summary and detailed fieldwork 
process are shown in Appendix three and four.  
5.4.1. Semi-structured interview 
This research did interviews with the technological executives of some Chinese firms. 
These firms has a long enough history to cover the period before and after the change of 
IPRs protection in China. This research applied “purposive sampling” strategy (Patton 
1990:181). Purposive sampling means selecting “information-rich cases”, which refer to 
cases from which one can get a lot of information about his/her research issues (Patton 
1990:169). There are many different strategies for purposive sampling. As discussed 
earlier, many researchers found that the relation between IPRs protection and 
technology diffusion depended on other factors. Among these other factors, the most 
important one is the difference in industries. For example, Mansfield (1986) found that 
the pharmaceutical and chemical industries were most sensitive to patents; petroleum, 
machinery and fabricated metal products and most engineering industries were 
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moderately sensitive to patent protection; and office equipment, motor vehicles, rubber 
and textiles industries were quite a lot less sensitive to patent protection. For copyright, 
the software and publishing industries were the main areas to be influenced by IPRs 
protection. According to this analysis, this research used stratified purposive sampling, 
which means selecting “above average, average and below average cases” (Patton 
1990:174). For patents, samples for semi-structured interviews were stratified. This 
research selected firms from pharmaceuticals and chemicals industries that had above 
average sensitive relations with patents. It also selected firms from the petroleum, 
electronic, machinery, transportation equipment and primary metal industries that had 
average sensitivity toward patents. This research originally planed to select firms from 
rubber and textiles industries that had below average sensitivity toward patents. 
However, it was quite difficult to find technological executive in rubber firms to accept 
an interview. During interviews, I asked some selected technological executives about 
how to cope with this difficulty. Some technological executives said that there ere two 
types of food firms in China, one used many chemical factors in manufacturing, and 
another did not use chemical factors. Firms that produced milk powder and beverage are 
the former type. Because the main manufacturing process of this type of food firms was 
analysing and synthesizing chemical ingredients, these firms should be classified as 
chemical firms. Food firms producing cake, cooked food, and traditional snacks, which 
were also called the traditional food firms, were the latter type. These traditional food 
firms did not have a lot of technology therefore were not sensitive to patents. These 
traditional food firms, together with firms from the textile industry, which also had 
below average sensitivity to patents, were selected to replace the firms from rubber 
industry. And for copyright, the initial plan was to select firms from software and 
publishing industries. But when selected technological executives in publishing firms 
were contacted for interviews, the managers of these firms said that although the firms 
could obtain profit from publications, most of the profit from selling publications went 
to the authors themselves, and when pirated copies appeared in the market, the authors 
would lose more than the firms, and therefore, these authors paid more attention to IPRs 
protection than the firms. Since publishing firms paid less attention to IPRs protection 
Page 99 
than authors, it was more suitable to interview authors to get information for this 
research. However, many famous authors were difficult to contact for interviews. Some 
managers of publishing firms suggested that government officials in departments that 
were in charge of the publishing industry would have more detailed information about 
IPRs protection and its relation with the diffusion of intellectual works in the publishing 
sector, as most authors turned to these departments for help when they encounter 
problems related to IPRs protection and these departments also supervised the transfer 
of publications from foreign countries to China. Thus, this fieldwork interviewed 
relevant government officials for information about IPRs protection and the diffusion of 
intellectual works in the publishing sector. For each selected interview industry, 
personal connection was used to introduce the researcher to a technological executive of 
one Chinese firm. Then the researcher asked the selected technological executives, who 
had accepted the interview, to introduce more relevant Chinese firms in their industries 
to the researcher to do more interviews in selected industries. 
Semi-structured interviews are not suitable for large sizes of samples because of time 
and cost restrictions. In the practice, this fieldwork tried to take interviews with 
technological executives of all kinds of firms, including state-owned, private, big and 
small firms. The researcher did not stop interviewing technological executives until no 
new information appeared in each selected industry in order to be certain to get enough 
information about each selected industry. 
This fieldwork used the general interview guide for semi-structured interviews. The 
general interview guide refers to setting up a series of topics, which will be mentioned 
to each interviewee, before interviews (Patton, 1990:280). Researchers do not need to 
make predetermined orders and elicit words for the listed topics and issues. The aim of 
the interview guide is to make sure that interviews cover all the necessary issues. 
Interviewers can change the sequence and words for each issue in the guide according to 
specific situation (Patton, 1990:280). It also leaves room for researchers to probe and 
ask follow-up questions during interviews (Patton, 1990:283). This fieldwork carefully 
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designed and explained the interview guide, which is shown in Appendix One. 
Most semi-structured interviews were done through contact with selected individuals 
and face-to-face interviews. The use of a recorder was allowed in some interviews. But 
because there were questions about technology of individual firms, some interviewees 
did not agree to use a recorder. In addition, some selected individuals had no time for a 
face-to-face interview but accepted a telephone interview. Telephone interviews are 
cheaper than face-to-face interviews, and save the travelling time (Bryman, 
2004:114-116). However, telephone interviews also have some limitations. 1) People 
who do not have telephones or are not contacted by telephone cannot be interviewed by 
telephone (Bryman, 2004:114-116). 2) The interviewees with hearing impairments will 
have difficulties in doing telephone interviews (Bryman, 2004:114-116). These did not 
apply to this research, because the interviewees were contacted in advance to make sure 
they could be interviewed by telephone in a certain period. 3) It may be more difficult to 
make sure whether it is the selected individual to answering the questions in the 
telephone interview, because the researcher cannot see the interviewees during the 
telephone interview (Bryman, 2004:114-116). Selected individuals were contacted in 
advance and met face to face through personal connections, before telephone interviews 
were carried out, to make sure that they would answer the questions during the 
interviews. These measures helped to make sure that the selected individual to answer 
the questions was doing the telephone interview. 4) The length of telephone interview is 
much shorter than a personal interview (Bryman, 2004:114-116). The interviewer of this 
research arranged the telephone interviews in the time when the interviewees were free 
for a long period to leave enough time for the telephone interview but these were still 
shorter than personal interviews. Therefore, the interviewer put extra effort on probing 
more answers in the telephone interview. 5) Telephone interviewers sometimes have 
difficulties in coping with signs of puzzlement and unease, which cannot be seen over 
the telephone. (Bryman, 2004:114-116). The interviewer of this research announced that 
the interviewees were free to tell their puzzlements and difficulties on the telephone 
before doing telephone interviews. Moreover, the interviewer paid more attention on the 
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tone of interviewees in order to judge whether interviewees faced puzzlements and 
difficulties during telephone interviews. The detailed interview list is shown in 
Appendix five. 
Table 1 Summary of interviews 
Industrial sectors 
Number of interviews: total 38 
Big firm Medium firm Small firm Total 
Pharmaceutical sector 1 1 1 3 
Chemical sector 1 1 2 4 
Petroleum sector 3 0 0 3 
Electronic sector 1 0 2 3 
Machinery sector 1 1 2 4 
Primary metal sector 2 0 2 4 
Transportation equipment sector 2 0 1 3 
Traditional food sector 0 0 4 4 
Textile sector 0 0 5 5 
Software sector 1 1 1 3 
Publishing sector 2 interviews with 2 governmental officers 2 
5.4.2. Self-completion questionnaire 
These self-completion questionnaires also used stratified purposive sampling. For 
patents, this research selected firms from pharmaceuticals and chemicals industries that 
had above average sensitivity toward patents, firms from electronic, machinery, 
transportation equipment and primary metal industries that had average sensitivity 
toward patents, and firms from traditional food and textiles industries that had below 
average sensitivity. Questionnaires were not given to the petroleum sector. There were 
only three big state-owned firms in this sector and other firms were subsidiary 
companies of them. Enough and detailed information had been obtained from 
interviews with technological executives in the petroleum sector, so questionnaires were 
Page 102 
not necessary. For copyright, firms from the software industry were selected. Because 
enough information had been obtained from interviews with government officials who 
were in charge of publishing sectors and it was very difficult to get feedback from 
famous authors for questionnaire, this research did not do questionnaires in publishing 
sectors. 
The sample size was comparatively large for questionnaires. However, because the low 
feedback rate of the self-completion questionnaire in this research, some questionnaires 
were done face-to-face. So, the sample size of this research was not very large 
considering the workload. This research planed to collect a minimum of 12 
questionnaires in 9 different industries. Questionnaires in each selected industry also 
covered firms of different legal status and size. The researcher did not stop doing 
questionnaires until the planed minimum questionnaires were reached. It should be 
mentioned that the technological executives did questionnaires were totally different 
with those that received interviews in this research to avoid double counting of data. 
The self-completion questionnaires were designed carefully, and are shown in Appendix 
Two. Doing piloting for this designed self-completion questionnaire was also quite 
significant. Doing pilot means to find out a sample related to this research to complete a 
questionnaire before sending the questionnaire to the whole sample. It is quite important 
for self-completion questionnaire to make sure all the questions work well, because 
there is no researcher to explain any confusion that appears in the questionnaire 
(Bryman, 2004:159). After piloting, if it was necessary, some of the questions in 
questionnaire were revised according to best practice.  
Because this research used the Internet as the medium to collect questionnaire data from 
selected firms, the questionnaire was transferred into an electronic format. These 
questionnaires were sent out to selected firms by e-mail. The selected participants were 
provided with a couple of weeks of time to respond. After the given deadline, the same 
questionnaires were sent out again to those who had not responded, as a reminder. 
However, a couple of weeks after the questionnaires being sent out the second time, 
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there were only a few completed online questionnaires were received. Not surprisingly, 
according to the information obtained from piloting, it was shown that some of these 
technological executives do not want to waste their time to fill in questionnaires. Since 
it was difficult to get enough information by sending questionnaires by emails, there 
was a need to contact the selected technological executives and make appointment for 
face-to-face questionnaires in order to get enough response. This had undoubtedly 
increased the workload. 
Table 2 Summary of questionnaires 
I: Internet Questionnaire; F: Face-to-face Questionnaire 
Industrial sectors 
Number of questionnaires: total 108 
Big firm Medium firm Small firm 
Total 
I F I F I F 
Pharmaceutical sector 3 1 2 2 0 4 12 
Chemical sector 3 1 1 3 0 4 12 
Electronic sector 6 0   1 5 12 
Machinery sector 1 3 1 3 1 3 12 
Primary metal sector 2 4   0 6 12 
Transportation equipment sector 3 3   2 4 12 
Traditional food sector     1 11 12 
Textile sector     0 12 12 
Software sector 4 0 4 0 1 3 12 
5.4.3. Official statistics and other sources 
This research also planed to get some official statistics from relevant departments of the 
Chinese government. These relevant departments are located in Beijing, and the most 
important one is the National Bureau of Statistics of China. This fieldwork obtained the 
following official statistics. 
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 Research and development expenditure 
Research and development expenditure helped to show whether IPRs protection reform 
in China had influence on the expenditure on R&D. Because R&D is closely related to 
technological development, the expenditure on R&D is quite important for this research. 
 Patent applications by residents and non-residents 
Patent applications by residents and non-residents were used to indicate whether IPRs 
protection reform had an impact on patent applications by Chinese residents and by 
foreigners in China. 
 Royalty and license fees payments and receipts 
This research originally planed to get official statistics about the amount of technology 
transferred from foreign countries and the data about the cost of Chinese firms of 
getting technology from foreign countries, because these would prove whether IPRs 
reform could encourage more technology transfer to China and whether IPRs reform 
could lead to the increase of the price of foreign technology for China. But these were 
not available. However, there was the data about royalty and license fees payments and 
receipts in China in recent years. Although this could not show the number of 
technologies transferred from foreign countries, they illustrated whether China received 
more or paid more for royalty and license fees in recent years. Therefore, this data was 
collected. 
During this fieldwork, the researcher also paid attention to all kinds of other sources. 
This research also collected information from television programmes and interviews 
with two government officials. 
5.5. Difficulties in doing fieldwork  
There were some difficulties for doing fieldwork in this research. 
Page 105 
Firstly, this fieldwork was done in China. It was necessary to translate the interview 
guide and questionnaires into Chinese and then translate the response as well as data 
from official statistics and other sources into English. This caused some difficulties, 
because it was time-consuming and there were some words that could not be translated 
precisely.  
Secondly, as discussed earlier, the topic of this research was comparatively politically 
sensitive. Some response might be influenced by the current political issues, and this 
reduced the accuracy of the data. This difficulty could be mitigated through probing 
during interviews. Allowing interviewees to explain more about their answers could 
help to find out their true opinions. Moreover, providing enough explanation about 
keeping anonymous was another method of getting true opinion from interviewees. This 
research also used self-completion questionnaire as a method to collect data, which 
could increase anonymity. Comparing interview data with questionnaire data could also 
reduce the inaccuracy. 
Thirdly, this research included some questions that involved technological development 
and protection of each selected firm. This topic was very sensitive for all firms, because 
executives of these firms were concerned that their answers might give away their 
technological secret and trade secret. Although questions in this research did not involve 
specific technology of these firms or their secrets, some executives of these firms still 
did not want to accept interviews or to fill in questionnaires. This difficulty was 
mitigated through providing enough explanation about the interview questions and 
questionnaires. Keeping anonymity for each selected firm also helped to reduce this 
difficulty. 
Fourthly, some interviews could not be recorded. Non-verbal signs and body language 
were not recorded. These problems could be resolved through making detailed interview 
notes. Some interviewees just gave very simple answers about questions. This difficulty 
could be reduced through probing more answers. Due to the limit of time and budget, 
interviews were restricted to small size and in a certain limited area. This research also 
Page 106 
used the self-completion questionnaire method, which could offset the limitation created 
by interviews. 
Finally, only a few responses for the Internet questionnaire were obtained. This makes 
face-to-face questionnaires individually necessary, added to the workload and extended 
the time for the fieldwork. 
5.6. Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter introduces methodology and its rationality for this research. 
This research applied fieldwork to collect data. This chapter firstly analyses fieldwork 
questions in this research, then explores research methods selected for doing the 
fieldwork. Semi-structured interviews, self-completion questionnaires, and data 
collection from official statistics and other sources were used in the fieldwork. The 
reasons for using these methods and their limitations are analyzed. This chapter also 
provides a detailed fieldwork plan of this research. How to do interviews and 
questionnaires and how to collect information from official statistics and other sources 
are explained in detail. Finally, this chapter also analysed the difficulties in doing 










Fieldwork data analyses 
 
6.1. Introduction 
After collecting the desired data from the fieldwork using the selected methods, this 
chapter presents the results of analysing different fieldwork data. This chapter 
introduces the process of analysing the semi-structured interview data and the 
self-completion questionnaire data, and summarises the analytical results of that data. 
The detailed data for analysing questionnaires are also provided, which are shown in 
Appendix six. This chapter also explains the analyses of official statistics and other 
material. This chapter only presents the fieldwork results. Theoretical analyses of the 
fieldwork results will be in the following chapter. 
6.2. Analysing semi-structured interview 
This part analyses the data obtained through semi-structured interview. The process of 
how to analyse semi-structured interviews is explained firstly, then the analytical results 
of semi-structured interview data is shown. 
6.2.1. The process of analysing semi-structured interview 
The first step was transcribing the interview into text. Interview record and field notes 
were used. The researcher did full transcriptions for 3 early interviews and did 
appropriate analyses of these early interviews. The researcher then found some guidance 
and important points to do the next transcription of interview records. Later, there was 
no need to do full transcriptions of interview record, and it was only necessary to 
transcribe sentences or words that were relevant to the guidance and important points 
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obtained from early analyses. Although there was no need to transcribe all sentences of 
the next interview record, the researcher still needed to listen to the whole record to 
make sure that the transcriptions covered all new significant points and information 
appeared in a later interview record. The second step was obtaining the main points and 
useful information through analysing each interview transcription. The third step was 
analysing interviews in each selected industry. In this step, the analytical results of each 
interview in one selected industry were compared to generalise the main points and 
useful information of each selected industry. The last step was comparing the 
similarities and differences among different selected industries to summarise the main 
points of different selected industries. The similarities were put together and differences 
were discussed separately. 
6.2.2. Analytical results for semi-structured interview 
Through analysing and comparing the semi-structured interviews in different selected 
industries, some main points were generalised: (a) feel of IPRs protection reform (b) 
sensitivity to IPRs protection policy; (c) positive impact of IPRs protection reform; (d) 
negative impact of IPRs protection reform; (e) impact of imitation on technology 
diffusion; (f) impact of other policies on technology diffusion; (g) opinions on IPRs 
protection reform. 
Feel of IPRs protection reform 
A technological executive of the 2
nd
 interview with a big pharmaceutical firm said: 
Certainly, we are aware of the changes in IPRs protection policy. IPRs 
protection policy is quite important for our production. We have a 
special department that deals with IPRs protection. The main work of its 
staff is to pay attention to the change of IPRs protection policy in order 
to provide guides for our production and planning. 
A technological executive of the 24
th
 interview with a medium chemical firm said: 
We have been concerned about IPRs protection for quite long time. We 
knew about IPRs protection even before there was good IPRs protection 
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in our country. This was because we had contacts with foreign 
corporations before there is good IPRs protection in our country. At that 
time, our firm needed to obtain some foreign technology and foreign 
corporations that held the technology asked to us to accept their IPRs 
protection system in order to secure the benefit from their technologies. 
We could not have the technology we needed from them if we did not 
accept their conditions about IPRs protection. These foreign 
corporations were greatly concerned about IPRs protection, which led 
us to pay attention to this policy. Our firms set up a group to explore 
relevant policies on IPRs protection from that time. So, we paid attention 
to IPRs policy in China too. This let us know that China really made 
stronger IPRs protection in these years.  
A technological executive of the 12
th
 interview with a big petroleum firm said: 
We did not realize that IPRs protection reform in China during the early 
period was making China‟s IPRs protection policy stronger. Because of 
in attention to this policy, our firm did something wrong, which led to us 
break of some Chinese IPRs protection regulations at that time. Our firm 
is a big state-owned firm in China. This had a very bad impact on our 
firm and even on our government. So, from that time, we paid more 
attention to IPRs protection policy in China. We know that IPRs 
protection in China has become better than before, although the 
enforcement is still not as good as that in the developed countries. 
A technological executive of the 11
th
 interview with a small electronic firm said: 
We know that China reformed its IPRs protection policy during these 
years. Our industry is a technology-intensive industry in China. Our 
firm‟s products have a great need of good IPRs protection. We have to be 
concerned about it.  
A technological executive of the 16
th
 interview with a big machinery firm said: 
We know about the reform of IPRs protection in China. This information 
could be obtained from newspapers, TV programs and websites, 
especially during the period of China‟s accession to the WTO and its 
negotiations with the USA. Moreover, this policy is important our firm. 
So, we are watching carefully changes in it. 
A technological executive of the 34
th
 interview with a big primary metal firm said: 
We know that China implemented stronger IPRs protection policy in 
these years. Although our industry is not a technology-intensive industry, 
it is still very important to learn and know about the changes in IPRs 
protection policy in China. If you do not know about it, maybe someday 
you will break the law, which can bring great trouble to your firm. I have 
heard that this has happened in other firms in China. I do not want it to 
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happen to my firm.  
A technological executive of the 19
th
 interview with a small primary metal firm said: 
We know about the reform of IPRs protection in China. Although there 
are just a few impacts on our firm by IPRs protection reform, we still 
know about the change, because the government has paid attention to it. 
The local government arranged managers and executives of different 
firms to learn about the change of IPRs protection in China in order to 
provide some guides for the operation of all kinds of firms. But I think it 
is quite useful for our firm, and it is worthy of being learned. At least, 
this knowledge can help our firm to avoid unnecessary losses.  
A technological executive of the 37
th
 interview with a small transportation equipment 
firm said: 
We know that China‟s IPRs protection has improved during these years. 
No only IPRs protection but also other regulations related to firm‟s 
operations in China have all become stricter and better. We have legal 
advisers in our firm to deal with all kinds of legal regulations related to 
the operation of our firm, such as contract terms and the protecting of 
our technology and advanced products. We have very good system in our 
firm to deal with these issues. 
A technological executive of the 26
th
 interview with a small traditional food firm said: 
Our industry has almost no need for IPRs protection policy. Our firm 
never uses it. We do not have significant technology to protect. But I 
know about the change. I care about political things and news. It is easy 
to get this kind of information from newspapers. 
A technological executive of the 31
st
 interview with a small textile firm said: 
We do not use IPRs protection. We do not have special technology; we 
just use handiwork for our production. We take little interest in the 
reform of IPRs in China. But I know about it; I know about it from 
China‟s Central Television program.  
A technological executive of the 22
nd
 interview with a small software firm said: 
We certainly know about the reform of IPRs protection policy in China. 
Every person who works in the software industry knows that the 
development of China‟s software industry is based on better protection 
for software. Without IPRs protection, software firms in China cannot 
get benefits from developing their software, because their products will 
be imitated by other firms too easily. 
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These interviews indicated that technological executives of many kinds of Chinese 
firms in different selected sectors except the traditional food and the textile sectors felt 
that China had enforced stronger IPRs protection policy since the country tried to enter 
the WTO through their experience from their daily work. However, technological 
executives in the traditional food and the textile sectors could not perceive IPRs 
protection reform in their daily production. These sectors contained very limited 
technological factors. Firms in these two sectors mainly used handiwork for production, 
and as a result, technological executives of these firms did not feel the change of IPRs 
policy in their daily production. However, they learnt this from other channels, such as 
relevant policies published by the government. 
Sensitivity to IPRs protection 
A technological executive of the 3
rd
 interview with a medium pharmaceutical firm said: 
The technology applied in pharmaceutical firms, especially technology 
applied in western medicine, can be obtained easily through reverse 
engineering and research. Some western medicine made in foreign 
countries can be produced in Chinese pharmaceutical firms. Thus, if 
there are no restrictions through IPRs protection policy, our firm can 
imitate some technology easily. Similarly, technology held by our firm 
can also be imitated by other firms. Therefore, we pay more attention to 
IPRs protection. 
A technological executive of the 7
th
 interview with a small chemical firm said: 
IPRs protection is very important for the chemical industry. Each update 
of a chemical product can have its IPRs protection. It is easy to get the 
technology through analysing the products. If there is no IPRs protection, 
the technology developed by a firm can be easily obtained by its 
competitors. So, IPRs protection is very important for us. Our firm is a 
small firm and holds limited technology. Sometimes, our firm can still 
obtain technology from big firms through imitation. Certainly, we need 
to do it in very secret way to avoid being noticed by big firms with 
stronger IPRs protection. Big firms hold many technologies, and they do 
not want other firms to get their technology. So, they pay more attention 
on IPRs. 
A technological executive of the 27
th
 interview with a big petroleum firm said: 
Our firm is a state-owned firm and we have to implement the policies 
and regulations published by the government. There are three petroleum 
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firms and all of us are state-owned firms. But we have separate 
administrative systems and technology is quite important for all of us. 
The one that obtains the technology first can get patent protection for 
the technology and can use the technology exclusively. Only if the 
technology is crucial for the government, will the government let these 
three firms share the technology. Otherwise, we can have our own 
technology. The one who owns the technology can take advantage of it 
and earn profit from it. Moreover, our industry is a technology-intensive 
industry. So, technology is very important for us and the protection of 
technology is also important for us.  
A technological executive of the 28
th
 interview with a big electronic firm said: 
The electronic industry is a relatively new industry in China and 
electronic productions are updated quickly through the development of 
new technologies. Technology plays a very important role in this sector. 
IPRs protection provides direct protection of technology, so it has a 
significant impact for this sector. 
A technological executive of the 25
th
 interview with a small machinery firm said: 
Our industry is not a technology-intensive industry. Not all new products 
in our industry can get IPRs protection. So, IPRs protection is not as 
important for us as for technology-intensive industries, such as the 
chemical industry. But IPRs protection, especially patents is not 
especially useful for our industry, but it is still useful. IPRs protection is 
especially useful for big firms in our industry, because they have more 
technology than small firms like us. 
A technological executive of the 21
st
 interview with a big primary metal firm said: 
IPRs protection policy is useful for our industry, especially for the big 
firms in it. More technology means more competitive abilities. Our firm 
is also trying to develop new technology. However, our industry contains 
fewer technologies compared with technology-intensive industries, such 
as the pharmaceutical and electronic industries.  
A technological executive of the 37
th
 interview with a small transportation equipment 
firm said: 
IPRs protection policy has important of our firm‟s production. To be 
honest, our firm is a small firm. We do not have many technologies. Most 
of our technologies are obtained by absorbing or imitating technologies 
from big firms. Since the government improved IPRs protection 
regulation, we have not dared to direct copy technology from big firms, 
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because we worry about being sued by the government and being 
punished by fines. We have to imitate in a very secret way in order to 
avoid being found by big firms and the government. So, although our 
industry does not contain many technologies, IPRs protection is still 
important for the production in our industry. 
A technological executive of the 29
th
 interview with a small traditional food firm said: 
IPRs protection, especially patent has no relation with our firm. Our 
firms just used trademark in IPRs protection. The production process is 
kept in secret and it is not useful to apply patent.  
A technological executive of the 38
th
 interview with a small textile firm said: 
Our industry is a labour-intensive industry. There is few technology in 
our industry. IPRs protection is not useful in our firm. 
A government official of the 14
th
 interview said: 
In the publishing sector, authors of all kinds of publications now pay 
more attention to copyright protection. Authors care about two parts 
related to copyrights protection. The first one is their reputation, which 
is related to the onymous right in copyright. The second one is the 
benefit earned from their publications, which is guaranteed by copyright 
and earned through the sale of original publications. However, in recent 
years, there have been some authors, who just wanted to get a good 
reputation. They did not care about their benefits, and some of them even 
publish their works at their own cost. These authors do not care whether 
the copies sold on the market are original or pirated. The only concern 
for them is to make their names famous. Managers of publishing firms 
also know that China has reformed its IPRs protection. These managers 
mostly care more about the financial return from their publications. Our 
department also did investigations on the impact of IPRs protection on 
consumers of all kinds of publications. According to them, consumers 
know that China has reformed its IPRs protection through government 
propaganda and the relevant measures taken by the government to stop 
pirating. However, most consumers care more about the price of 
publications. As long as the quality of publication does not change 
greatly, consumers will buy the cheaper product and they will not care 
whether the product is original or pirated. 
A technological executive of the 17
th
 interview with a medium software firm said: 
IPRs protection, especially copyright, is very important for our industry. 
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The change of IPRs protection has a direct impact on the production 
plan of our firm. So, we take this policy very seriously. 
These interviews showed that different industries had different sensitivities to IPRs 
protection. Firms in pharmaceutical, chemical, petroleum and electronic sectors were 
highly sensitive to IPRs protection, while firms in machinery, primary metals and 
transportation equipment sectors were less so sensitive to IPRs protection, and firms in 
the traditional food and the textile sectors took little interest. The publishing and the 
software sectors had involvement with copyright in IPRs protection. Moreover, IPRs 
reform had great significance for technology development and diffusion in software 
firms. 
Technological executives of selected Chinese firms explained the reasons for their 
different sensitivities to IPRs protection. Pharmaceutical, chemical, petroleum and 
electronic sectors contained relative high degree of scientific and technological factors. 
Technology in these sectors was easier to copy compared to other sectors. Moreover, 
almost every new product in these sectors contained special technology that could 
justify a patent. Therefore, these sectors were quite sensitive to IPRs protection. 
Machinery, the primary metals and the transportation equipment sectors were medium 
sensitive to IPRs policy. Because these sectors did not contain quite as many scientific 
and technological factors, the change of IPRs protection had less impact on technology 
development and diffusion in these sectors. This did not mean that technological 
executives of these three sectors considered that their firms did not contain any 
technological factors nor did they believe that the change of IPRs protection had no 
impact on technology development or diffusion in these sectors. This only meant that 
these sectors had comparatively less scientific and technological factors compared to the 
pharmaceutical, chemical, petroleum and electronic sectors; and technological 
executives of these sectors considered that IPRs reform had relatively less influence on 
technology development and diffusion in their firms. This was generalized through 
comparing interview transcriptions of technological executives in the first group of 
sectors with that of in the second group of sectors. During interviews almost all the 
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technological executives from the pharmaceutical, chemical, petroleum and electronic 
sectors said that these sectors were high technological industrial sectors and IPRs 
protection, especially patent, was quite important to these sectors. Whereas, most of the 
technological executives in the machinery, primary metals and transportation equipment 
sectors said that these sectors contained some technologies but not with high 
technological density. They also believed that China‟s IPRs reform did have impacts on 
technology diffusion in these sectors, but the impact was comparatively less than it was 
in the pharmaceutical, chemical, petroleum and electronic sectors. Some of them 
explained the reasons for this difference. Almost every new product in pharmaceutical, 
chemical, petroleum and electronic sectors had its own special technology, which could 
be protected by a patent. However, only very important products and crucial 
technological improvement in machinery, primary metals and transportation equipment 
sectors contain technology that could be protected by patent, and most products in 
machinery, primary metals and transportation equipment sectors only contained very 
limited technological improvement, which could not obtain patent protection. The 
manufacturing level of mechanics played very important role in machinery, primary 
metals and transportation equipment sectors. This was different from those in developed 
countries, because the technological level of these sectors in China was quite a lot lower 
than that of developed counties. The traditional food and the textile sectors hold very 
limited technology, thus these two sectors are least sensitive to IPRs policy.  
Moreover, big and state-owned firms were more sensitive to IPRs policy than small and 
private firms in China. State-owned firms were controlled by the government and big 
firms drew a lot of attention from the government. Therefore, these firms did not dare to 
break IPRs regulations published by the government. Interview data also showed that 
most of the big firms were state-owned firms. Small and private firms did not receive as 
much attention as big and state-owned firms, and these firms might break IPRs 
regulation without being noticed by the government. Interview data indicated that most 
small firms were private firms. In addition, since state-owned firms were supported by 
the government and had more resources than small firms, after China reformed its IPRs 
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policy and provided more guarantee for getting profit from new technology, state-owned 
firms and big firms were able to put more into R&D than small and private firms. Just 
as a technological executive in 11
th
 small pharmaceutical firm said: 
I know that stronger IPRs protection can give more opportunities for my 
firm to benefit from new technology. But developing new technology 
requires more resources, and my firm cannot afford it sometimes. My 
firm cannot compete with the state-owned firms. The state-owned firms 
can get money from the government if they find it necessary to develop a 
particular technology. My firm cannot compete with the big firms, 
because they have more money than us. So, I need to think about the 
strength of my firm all along. 
Positive impact of IPRs protection reform 
A technological executive of the 2
nd
 interview with a big pharmaceutical firm said: 
During these years, our firm has spent more on R&D. The technology 
developed by our firm and the number of patents obtained by our firm 
have both increased in these years. The technological capability of our 
firm has increased. I think these are strongly related to the improvement 
of IPRs protection regulations. With IPRs protection becoming better, we 
gradually notice that developing new technology can bring great benefit 
for our firms.  
Certainly, the contact between our firm and foreign firms has also 
increased during these years. However, because we had contacts with 
foreign firms long before and the foreign firms always asked for IPRs 
protection for their products, there is no obvious impact by IPRs 
protection reform on the contact between our firm with foreign firms. 
Foreign firms always pay attention to IPRs protection. Technology in 
Chinese firms is quite compared to that in foreign firms and foreign 
firms can use the contract terms to ask for IPRs protection for their 
technology, so although IPRs protection in our country was not good 
before, foreign firms still had business with firms in our country. 
Certainly, foreign firms hope there is good IPRs protection in our 
country. But earning money is most important for foreign firms, and if 
the business can earn money for foreign firms, they will do it. Our 
country has a very big market, and foreign firms will earn money here, 
so they want to do business in our country, 
A technological executive of the 1
st
 interview with a big chemical firm said: 
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For technology development in our country, I think the reform of IPRs 
protection has had a positive impact. During these years, we developed 
more and more technology. If there is no IPRs protection, the benefit of 
developing new technology cannot be ensured. Our firm is unwilling to 
do things that only have inputs but do not give back some benefit.  
For obtaining technology from foreign firms, IPRs protection has some 
positive impacts. Because IPRs protection policy is a fact of the 
investment environment in our country, good IPRs protection means a 
good investment environment. Foreign firms are more willing to have 
contact with us, through FDI, selling equipments and high-tech products, 
selling technology to us, and so on. But the impact on obtaining 
technology from foreign firms is not particularly obvious, because we 
had contact with foreign firms long ago and our firm started to accept 
the IPRs protection required by foreign firms ago. We had to follow the 
requirements on IPRs protection put forward by foreign firms when we 
negotiated technology transfers with them even before China reinforced 
its IPRs protection. If we did not accept their requirements, we then 
could not get their technologies. We had no other choice, because they 
had the technologies we needed and they had the right to make their 
decisions. 
A technological executive of the 13
th
 interview with a big petroleum firm said: 
I believe that China‟s IPRs protection policy developed very fast and 
faster than any other country in the world. I am the person who deals 
with IPRs protection in our firm, so I know it very well. Stronger IPRs 
protection directly encouraged technology development in our industry. 
There is a great positive impact by stronger IPRs protection on 
technology development in our industry and also in the whole country, I 
think. The protective awareness of firms in our industry has been 
increased in these years. In the past, there were great losses because of 
we did not have IPRs protection. But now, things are better, and we can 
get great benefit from developing technology because we have an IPRs 
protection policy. So, R&D input in our firm has gradually increased 
during these years. But, as for obtain technology from foreign countries, 
IPRs protection does not have positive impact. Foreign firms and 
government always try to control and block petroleum technology in 
China, because petroleum is a very important and limited energy 
product. So, I think the fact that foreign countries do not want to transfer 
their technology to China is not due to IPRs protection, but due to some 
political reasons, such as foreign countries do not want to see that China 
could have competitive abilities in this sector. So, whether China has 
good IPRs protection or not, foreign countries still do not want to 
transfer technology to China.  
A technological executive of the 35
th
 interview with a small electronic firm said: 
I think IPRs protection is useful and has a positive impact on technology 
development in our firm and even in our country. This because of 
Page 118 
relevant IPRs regulations, firms can get benefits from developing new 
technology. In the past, without IPRs protection, all kinds of innovations 
belonged to the government, so the person or the firm who developed the 
technology could not get any benefit except limited rewards from the 
government. Now, things are quite different. We can get great benefits 
from R&D. So, our firm is putting more money on R&D and the training 
of its staffs. Our firm also uses a lot of money to hire persons with 
high-tech ability. But I think better IPRs protection has limited positive 
impact on obtaining technology from foreign firms, except that it has 
improved the investment condition in our country. This is because those 
foreign firms always pay attention to IPRs protection and they asked for 
IPRs protection through terms in contracts with firms in our country 
even before China had better IPRs protection.  
A technological executive of the 32
nd
 interview with a small machinery firm said: 
I think that IPRs improvement has had a positive impact on technology 
development in our industry and in our country. Our firm also realises 
that based on stronger IPRs protection, great benefit can be obtained 
from doing R&D and new technology. However, our firm is a small-sized 
firm in this sector and it does not have ability to do R&D. Our firm tried 
to develop new technology the year before last, but we failed to do it, 
because it needed so much money that we could not afford it. So, the 
positive impact of IPRs protection in our firm is not obvious. Production 
in our firm mostly uses old technology or imitates some technology from 
big firms in our sector. But we now have to make the imitation very 
secretly to avoid being found out by big firms or being fined by the 
government. 
A technological executive of the 20
th
 interview with a small primary metal firm said: 
I think IPRs protection has had a positive impact on technology 
development in our country. In the past, whether you held new 
technology or not, you obtained similar benefits from production, 
because most technologies were not protected by IPRs and many firms 
used imitated technology. Now, with better IPRs protection, if one firm 
has new technology, this firm can get much more benefit than firms that 
do not have that technology. The reason for the slow development of our 
firm is that our firm did not grasp the opportunity to develop new 
technology. Certainly, lacking enough money is another important 
reason. Although the level of production in our firm is higher than that 
in the past, in general, our firm mostly uses old or imitated technology 
obtained from big firms and the increase in the productive level is due 
the improvement in productive level in the whole industry. Some firms in 
our industry grasped the opportunity and they input money to develop 
new technology and new projects, so these firms developed very fast.  
Page 119 
A technological executive of the 4
th
 interview with a big transportation equipment firm 
said: 
Better IPRs protection has had a great positive impact on technology 
development. In the past, we could obtain technologies through imitation 
from others and even some foreign countries. Moreover, our firm had to 
share our technology with other firms in our industry. Our firm even 
needed to help other firms to set up their production lines through 
providing them our technology and our technicians. So, in the past, 
developing technology could not bring direct benefit for a firm. Now, 
owing technology means owning a great competitive ability and earning 
great benefit. So we input more on R&D. 
I think better IPRs protection does not have an obviously positive impact 
on obtaining technology from foreign firms, because our firm could 
obtain technology from foreign firms before there was good IPRs 
protection if we accepted their requirements. Foreign firms listed IPRs 
protection in their contracts with our firm. We had to accept that.  
Big firms and state-owned firms like our firm dare not imitate any more. 
If we imitate again, we will infringe the IPRs of other firms. The 
compensation in this kind of cases is very big and the government will 
also make us to pay the fine for it. Certainly, some small and private 
firms still dare to imitate technology because they want to earn money in 
a short period without great inputs. Some of our technology was imitated 
by some small firms in the past. We did not ask for compensation from 
these small firms, because they are quite small and the impact of this 
imitation was not great for our firm.  
A technological executive of the 4
th
 interview with a small traditional food firm said: 
Our firm does not use IPRs protection. Our firm uses secrecy. Some 
important technology is strictly controlled by some important staff 
members. The technology is obtained through the accumulation of 
productive experience over very long time. So, the change of IPRs 
protection has not had any impact on our firm. 
A technological executive of the 5
th
 interview with a small textile firm said: 
Our firm does use IPRs protection. Our firm does not have special 
technology. Our sector is a labour-intensive sector. All firms in our 
sector use similar productive handiwork. The only difference among 
different firms in our sector is the application of different machines. If 
you use good machines, you can produce high-grade products. Our firm 
can produce any textile products that appear in the market, if it is 
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possible with our machines. There is no special technology in our sector. 
So, IPRs protection does not have any impact on our firm.  
A government official of the 15
th
 interview said: 
Although the enforcement of IPRs protection policy in China is not as 
good as that in foreign countries, there is great reduction in copied 
publications in our country. In general, with the improvement in IPRs 
protection policy in our country, original publications produced by 
Chinese residents and transferred from foreign countries has increased 
and pirated publications appearing in market is decreasing. 
A technological executive of the 18
th
 interview with a big software firm said: 
The IPRs protection policy is very important for our sector. Without IPRs 
protection and great improvements in IPRs protection policy, the 
software industry cannot achieve fast development in our country. Our 
firm pays close attention to using IPRs to protect our software. Certainly, 
the input on R&D in our firm is increasing now. And we are obtaining 
more technology in these years. 
These interviews showed that domestic technologies developed by Chinese firms 
increased in pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic, machinery, primary metals, 
transportation equipment and software sectors, after China reformed its IPRs policy. 
This was indicated by the increase of investment on R&D by Chinese firms in these 
sectors and the increase in the amount of technology developed by Chinese firms in 
these sectors. 
According to the selected technological executives in the pharmaceutical, chemical, 
electronic, machinery, primary metals, transportation equipment and software sectors, 
the legal channels of technology transfer included international trade, FDI, licensing and 
cooperation in R&D with foreign firms. In the interviews, these executives said that 
international trade, especially inward international trade in high technology products did 
bring foreign technology to China. They said that after advanced machines were 
purchased from foreign firms, a couple of staff was usually sent from these firms to help 
Chinese workers to learn how to use and maintain the machines. In this process, 
Chinese workers would grasp some technological information, which was key to 
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learning about the technology held in these machines. FDI could also transfer 
technology from foreign countries to China. Some foreign firms directly invested in 
China and set up a separate foreign capital firm. In this process, Chinese workers hired 
by the separate foreign capital firm could also gain technological knowledge from their 
daily work. Some foreign firms directly invested in a Chinese firm through cooperation. 
During this process, their Chinese partners could obtain technologies brought by these 
foreign firms. However, the increase of technology transfer from foreign countries 
through legal channels was less than that of domestic technology development by local 
firms in these sectors. According to the interviewees, stronger IPRs protection policy 
ensured benefit from new technology development. Nevertheless, the number of 
researchers and the capacity of doing R&D in China were both increasing. Under 
stronger IPRs protection, Chinese firms were also more willing to invest in R&D. Thus, 
the technology developed by Chinese firms in these sectors obviously increase after the 
country reformed its IPRs protection. Technological executives said that the increase in 
technology transfer from foreign countries through legal channels in these sectors was 
less than the increase of domestic technology developed by local firms in these sectors. 
The reason for this was that before China reformed IPRs policy, the process of 
technology transfer from foreign countries through legal channels had already followed 
IPRs protection as regulated in foreign countries, especially in the developed countries, 
at the time. Applying IPRs protection as regulated in foreign countries for technology 
transfer through legal channels was required by these foreign firms, technology would 
not be transferred if Chinese firms did not meet this contractual requirement. Due to the 
fact that Chinese firms engaged in transferring foreign technology through legal 
channels started to apply foreign IPRs policy according to the requirements of the 
foreign firms, China‟s IPRs reform had a comparatively low impact on them. However, 
China‟s IPRs reform changed its IPRs protection environment, which still had some 
positive impact on technology transfer through legal channels. Before China reformed 
its IPRs policy, even if Chinese firms had followed foreign IPRs policy for technology 
transfer, foreign firms were still reluctant to transfer technology to Chinese firms 
through legal channels, because the environment for IPRs protection at that time was 
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poor in China. After the country reformed IPRs policy, this had improved. Under the 
better investment environment with good IPRs protection, foreign firms became more 
willing to transfer their technologies to China through legal channels. Therefore, 
technology transfer from foreign countries to China through legal channels in these 
sectors still had some increase, although not as much as that on domestic technology 
developed by local firms in these sectors. 
However, IPRs protection reform brought positive impact in the petroleum sector 
differently. The amount of technology developed by Chinese firms in the petroleum 
sector increased greatly after the country reformed its IPRs policy. It was necessary to 
explain the current situation of petroleum firms in China. According to the technological 
executives in petroleum sector, there were three main petroleum firms in China, which 
were all state-owned firms because petroleum is a very significant product for national 
safety. These three petroleum firms had many different subsidiary companies. In order 
to encourage the development of these three firms, the government encouraged the 
competition among them. Each state-owned petroleum firm had its own self-governing 
administrative system. Therefore, different petroleum firms could keep their own 
technology, except very crucial technology that was needed by the country in a very 
pressing period. Since there was no good protection for new technology before China 
reformed IPRs policy, technology developed by one petroleum firm was soon learnt by 
the other two petroleum firms. After China reformed IPRs policy, petroleum firms could 
get patent protection for their technologies, which could prevent technology sharing by 
other firms and ensured great benefit from developing new technology. Consequently, 
petroleum firms started to input more in R&D and the amount of technology developed 
by Chinese petroleum firms began to increase greatly. However, the stronger IPRs 
protection policy did not influence the technology transfer from foreign countries as 
much in this sector. Technological executives in petroleum said that since petroleum 
was an important and limited energy source and very important for the nation‟s security 
and people‟s livelihood, petroleum technology was strictly controlled by firms and 
governments, as it directly decided whether a firm and a country could own and abstract 
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more petroleum. They also said that China had a different ideology from foreign 
countries, especially the developed countries that hold many petroleum technologies. It 
was very difficult to transfer technology from foreign countries to Chinese petroleum 
firms even after the reform of the IPRs protection. Chinese petroleum firms could only 
get very basic petroleum technology from foreign countries, especially from western 
countries, because crucial technologies were kept secret by foreign firms and their 
governments and sometimes these firms did not apply for patent protection for their 
petroleum technologies. 
The amount of technology developed by Chinese firms and the amount of technology 
transferred from foreign countries in the traditional food and the textile sectors did not 
increase greatly after the country reformed IPRs policy, because the density of 
technology in these two sectors was quite low. 
In the publishing sector, the number of original publications increased and the number 
of pirated publications decreased in China after the reform of the IPRs policy. In 
addition, the number of all kinds of publications from foreign countries rose. 
Different kinds of Chinese firms acted differently after China reformed its IPRs policy. 
Before the reform, most big firms and state-owned firms obtained technology mainly 
through their own research, licensing and imitation. After the reform, these firms did not 
obtain technology through imitation any more. Before the reform, most of the medium 
and small firms, which were mainly private firms, did not carry out their own R&D. 
Imitation was the main method for these firms to get new technology at the time. After 
the reform, these firms started R&D by cooperating with colleges and institutes, since 
they did not have the facility to carry out R&D on their own. Subsequently, the rate of 
imitation by most of these medium and small private firms decreased, although some of 
medium and small private firms still acquire technology through imitation. IPRs reform 
did not cause firms in the traditional food and the textile sectors to change their methods 
of obtaining technology. For firms in the traditional food sector, some of them had their 
own secrets in production, which were kept strictly by managers or executives or 
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owners of these firms. These firms did not rely on IPRs protection to protect their 
secrets. Some firms had their patented technology, but the number of patents held was 
quite small. Most of these food firms only hold one or two patented technologies. Even 
if some of the firms gained patents for their main technologies, they still treated it as 
strict secret in order to protect their technologies, because once these secrets were 
imitated by other firms, profits would be taken away greatly, which might threaten a 
firm‟s survival. Since these secrets were mainly gained from accumulation of productive 
experience, this was the main channel of getting productive secrets for the traditional 
food firms, regardless of China‟s reform of IPRs policy. For the textile sector, almost all 
firms use the same productive handiwork. The only difference among them was the 
application of different machines. Generally, firms in the textile sector did not have 
special technology. As long as a marketable product could be produced using their 
machines, firms could embark on producing it. If a new product was produced in one 
textile firm and came on the market, competitors could discover how to produce it by 
purchasing a sample product and embark on producing the same products. Therefore, 
whether China reformed IPRs protection or not, firms in this sector gained production 
methods mainly through this channel. 
Negative impact of IPRs protection reform 
A technological executive of the 2
nd
 interview with a big pharmaceutical firm said: 
My firm uses some patented technologies for commercial. But some 
owners of the patented technologies do not allow commercial production. 
Sometimes, even if owners of the patented technologies permitted the 
commercial production, the prices were so high that we could not afford 
it. We have to wait for the patents on the technologies to expire. 
Question: Did these phenomena occur before China implemented its 
stronger IPRs policy. 
Answer: No. Before the IPRs policy became stronger, no one wanted to 
obtain technology through legal methods, such as purchasing. Most 
firms tried to imitate new technology. Thus, if a firm wanted to buy a 
new innovation, the owner was very willing to sell it and the price was 
quite low. So, before China implemented stronger IPRs policy, 
technology was cheap. 
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A technological executive of the 23
rd
 interview with a small chemical firm said: 
Some important technologies in our firm are kept secret now. These are 
held by a very limited number of staff, who are highly paid. Sometimes, 
when these staffs retire; our firm gives them large pensions in order to 
keep our technologies in secret. 
A technological executive of the 27
th
 interview with a big petroleum firm said: 
The effort devoted to preventing imitation by other firms in our firm is 
increasing gradually each year. Our firm has a well designed system to 
prevent technology imitation. We also have special software to 
administer all important information in our firm to prevent technology 
imitation. 
A technological executive of the 36
th
 interview with a medium machinery firm said: 
In the past, visiting and learning from one another were common and 
familiar activities among Chinese firms. Every Chinese firm was very 
willing to welcome personnel from other firms to visit and learn their 
advanced technology and administration. Nowadays, it is very difficult 
to visit other firms. Without permission, non-workers cannot enter the 
plant of other firms. Some firms have strict administrative regulations so 
that staff can only enter their owner‟s workshops. Our firm has this 
regulation. And the main purpose of it is to prevent technology from 
being copied by other firms. This kind of protective regulation is very 
useful. Some parts of our technologies indeed were imitated by another 
small firm, when the small firm hired one of our technicians using high 
salary 2 years ago. But because our firm had these protective 
regulations, this technician only know some small parts of our 
technology and this imitation did not cause great loss for our firm. 
A technological executive of the 10
th
 interview with a big transportation equipment firm 
said: 
Now, foreign firms put forward some strict terms when signing licensing 
contracts with our firm. Foreign firms ask us to use their raw materials 
and their special machines. If our firm wants to make improvement 
based on foreign technology, we must ask for engineers of the foreign 
firm to come to our plant and we must get permission from the foreign 
firm. Sometimes, we try to do some improvements on foreign technology 
without being noticed by foreign firms. But now, it is very difficult and 
we have to do it in very secret way, otherwise it can be noticed by the 
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foreign firm and it can ask for great amount of compensation.   
A government official of the 15
th
 interview said: 
Most ordinary people do not care whether the publications are original 
or pirated. They just care about the price and the quality of the 
publications. If the quality of copied publications is not too bad, they 
prefer to buy the pirated publications, because these are cheaper than 
the original publications. Sometimes, people cannot afford the price of 
original publications. 
A technological executive of the 18
th
 interview with a big software firm said: 
One of the characteristics of the software sector is that the speed of 
software update is very fast and almost all new software is developed 
from previous software. It was difficult to get current core software. 
Foreign software developers did not allow Chinese firms to develop new 
software based on their software. This has a great negative impact on the 
development of new software products. 
IPRs reform also had some negative impact for technology development and diffusion 
in China. Most technological executives, especially technological executives in big and 
state-owned firms, considered that stronger IPRs protection prevented technology 
diffusion through imitation. They said that it was difficult to imitate technology after 
China implemented stronger IPRs protection, and that big and state-owned firms did not 
dare to do imitation anymore. 
Stronger IPRs protection ensured benefit from developing new technology, which 
encouraged many firms to use IPRs to protect their technology and made the importance 
of IPRs in protecting technology known. However, as discussed earlier, small and 
private firms could still get technology through imitation, because the government could 
not supervise all these firms. In order to preserve the benefit from developing new 
technology, many firms tried to get IPRs protection for their technology and took 
measures to prevent their patented technology from being imitated. Thus, Chinese firms 
in selected sectors also took measures and put more money into protecting their 
technology from pirating. 
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Some technological executives expressed a view that stronger IPRs protection provided 
the chance for their firms to delay the commercial production with the new technology 
and wait for better market conditions, as this may prevent the imitation of their new 
technology by other small firms. But they also pointed out that this delay also had a 
negative impact on technology diffusion, as their firms could not obtain relevant 
technological information from technological productions. 
Some interviewees indicated that stronger IPRs protection also had a negative impact on 
developing new technologies and applying patented technology to commercial 
production. They said that sometimes their firms could do improvements based on 
patented technology. But the owners of the technologies did not want to sell the 
patented technologies or the prices were not affordable, then the improvements could 
not be accomplished.  
Some interviewees said that nowadays important technologies, which could bring great 
profit, were strictly controlled by the firms that owned them. Although more 
technologies were transferred from foreign countries to China after its IPRs policy 
reform, most of these were basic technologies, whose development depended on further 
technology transfer from foreign firms, or were technologies which could not bring 
great benefit. Some technological executives said that their firms could not get the core 
technology transferred from foreign firms through different channels. They also 
expressed a view that without the core technology, even if the patent duration expires, 
their firms could not obtain the technology or do improvements based on the technology. 
Moreover, the price of obtaining technologies from their owners had been increased 
based on better IPRs protection. Some interviewees said that some foreign firms used 
some restrictive articles in the contracts, such as articles preventing technology 
development based on foreign technology, to protect their technology when transferring 
technology to China.  
For the publishing and the software sectors, because Chinese people had low living 
standards and not every one could afford original publications or software, stronger 
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IPRs protection encumbered technology diffusion for ordinary people.  
Impact of imitation on technology diffusion 
A technological executive of the 6
th
 interview with a small pharmaceutical firm said: 
Even if our technology is obtained by other firms, our firm can still 
obtain benefit because we can put our products into the market earlier 
than other firms. But, our benefit will be reduced. In general, in most 
cases, we can get benefit from our new technology even if it is imitated 
by other firms. 
If there is no good IPRs protection, foreign firms will worry about the 
investment environment in our country. This may have some negative 
impact on obtaining technology from foreign firms. But foreign firms 
will consider the benefit first. If foreign firms can earn money, they will 
do business with our firm. 
A technological executive of the 1
st
 interview with a big chemical firm said: 
No new technology or no new product means no market for us. We have 
to develop new technology.  
But if there is no IPRs protection, our firm will only develop very 
important technology for our own production. The enthusiasm for doing 
R&D will decrease, because we cannot expect as much benefit as we can 
get now.  
A technological executive of the 12
th
 interview with a big petroleum firm said: 
I think there will be a negative impact on technology development in our 
firm if there is no IPRs protection, because we cannot have great 
benefits from new technology. But our firm is a state-owned firm, so the 
government has support and guide for us. If there is no IPRs protection, 
we still need to do R&D just like what happened before China 
implemented its new IPRs protection. Whether there is IPRs protection 
or not, we cannot get important technology from foreign countries.  
A technological executive of the 11
th
 interview with a small electronic firm said: 
If the technology of our firm is imitated by other competitors, our firm 
will suffer great losses. Our firm is a small-sized firm in our sector. The 
cost of building a production line like our firm is not very high in the 
electronic sector. It is easy to set up another firm like us in a short 
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period of time. So, if our technology is imitated by others, the 
competitive advantage will be reduced greatly and the other firms will 
sell similar products at lower prices to occupy the market because the 
imitation costs is much lower than doing the R&D. So, if there is no 
IPRs protection, our firm will do not want to develop technology by 
ourselves. Our firm will also try to imitate technology from other firms. 
This can reduce the cost.  
A technological executive of the 16
th
 interview with a big machinery firm said: 
Although imitation can bring some losses of benefit for our firm, the 
negative impact is not very big. Our firm is one of the biggest firms in 
our sector in our country. Only one production line in our firm needs a 
great amount of money. Other firms cannot get it. Even if other firms 
imitate our technology, without the production line they cannot produce 
products. We have our own technicians and systems of raw material 
supply, which is difficult to set up by other firms. Certainly, we do not 
want to see the imitation of our technology and we control our 
technology very strictly. But if there is imitation, other firms cannot 
achieve commercial production of the technology. But, imitation indeed 
reduces the profit of our firm.  
Without IPRs protection, we still want to do R&D, because new 
technology means more competitive ability for our firm. But if anyone 
else can imitate our technology freely, we will do not do research on 
long-term technology, because the input is large and it takes long time to 
get a profit from it. Foreign firms will also worry about their technology 
if there is no IPRs protection. But earning money is very important for 
them and China has a great market, so foreign firms will want to do 
business and have their technology used by firms in our country because 
they can earn money here. 
A technological executive of the 30
th
 interview with a small traditional food firm said: 
Our secrets are obtained from a long period of production experience. 
This is quite important for our firm. We protect and control it in strict 
secrecy. If this secret becomes known to other firms, there will be very 
great losses for our firm. I heard about this case in another traditional 
food firm. That firm cannot survive any more. Firms in our sector are 
almost small-sized firms. Firms in this sector mainly depend on different 
secrets. No secrets equals no competitive ability. 
A government official of the 14
th
 interview said: 
If the publication is pirated by others, there will be money lost for the 
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authors and the publishing firms. But sometimes, the authors will lose 
more than publishing firms. Now, some publishing firms ask the authors 
to buy all the leftover publications in order to make sure that the 
publishing firms will not lose if publications cannot be sold out. This 
requirement sometimes is listed in the publishing contract. But, there are 
still some authors, who do not want to earn money but want to become 
famous. So, these authors sometimes use their own money to publish 
their works. These authors do not care whether their publications are 
pirated or not. Some of them think that the pirating of their publications 
can also help them to become famous. But in general, if there is no IPRs 
protection, the number of publications by residents and foreigners will 
be reduced. This is easy to explain. In the past, when China did not have 
IPRs protection, the number of publications by Chinese residents and by 
foreigners was much less than that in the present period when IPRs 
protection has improved.  
A technological executive of the 17
th
 interview with a medium software firm said: 
Pirating in software in our country is still serious. So, our firm tries our 
best to protect our software through using IPRs protection and some 
coding technology. If our software is pirated by others, we will suffer 
great losses. The production or reproduction of software is very cheap, 
so if our software is copied by others, sometimes, we cannot earn any 
profit. No one wants to buy original software, if the function of pirated 
software is the same that of the original. So, there will be great negative 
impact on developing software if there is no IPRs protection. Foreign 
software firms will not want to sell their software in our country. 
Foreign software firms still complain about the bad enforcement of IPRs 
protection on software in our country even though the enforcement has 
been improved. So, without IPRs protection, foreign firms will control 
their software more strictly in our country.   
According to technological executives in the pharmaceutical and the chemical sectors, 
even if imitation occurred, firms could still get financial returns to cover their costs in 
R&D since their products could enter the market earlier than competitors with the 
existing production capability, but their profit would be reduced. Moreover, executives 
in the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors also believed that even if there was no IPRs 
protection, their firms would still do R&D, although the number of technologies 
developed by their firms would be reduced. According to some pharmaceutical and 
chemical executives, without IPRs, the amount of technology developed by Chinese 
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firms and transferred from foreign countries in these sectors would be reduced. 
Although there was some negative impact on the development of technology by 
Chinese petroleum firms without IPRs protection, with the support of the Chinese 
government, these firms would still do R&D. Technology transfer in this sector were not 
affected much by the change of IPRs policy. 
Technological executives of most big firms in the electronic, machinery, primary metals 
and transportation equipment sectors considered that their firms could still make profit 
by new technologies even if imitation occurs, because it was difficult for other firms to 
compete with their productivity in a short time and their new products could enter the 
market sooner than those of others. These firms had their own comparatively large 
workshops, advanced or improved equipment that could only be afforded by rich firms, 
skilled workers who could operate this equipment, and the administrative system of 
purchasing and sales. These were quite difficult to copy for small firms or other big 
electronic firms in a short period of time. Thus, even if the technology of these firms got 
copied by competitors, they could not do commercial production using this kind of 
technology in a short time without having the same production capability. Technological 
executives of these big firms said that their firms could sell technological products at 
high prices during the short period of time to make profit, which could cover the cost of 
R&D. Executives of small firms in these sectors believed that if there was imitation of 
their technology, their firms could not get financial return to cover the costs of R&D, 
because their production capability could be easily matched by other firms. Most small 
firms did not have special workshops or administrative systems for purchasing and sales. 
The equipment of most small firms in these sectors could be easily set up by their 
competitors. The flow of skilled workers among small firms was relatively frequent. 
Thus, it was easy to get similar production capabilities for these firms. Technological 
executives of these firms said that if their technology was copied by other firms, it 
would be easy for the competitors to produce similar product in a short period of time 
and to sell at lower prices to gain more market share, because the cost of obtaining these 
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technologies was much less than developing them. Therefore, firms could not get 
enough financial return to cover their cost of R&D. Without IPRs protection, although 
there was some negative impacts on the enthusiasm of doing R&D, big firms and 
state-owned firms in electronic, machinery, primary metals and transportation 
equipment sectors would still invest in R&D, because there was limited impact on their 
benefit from developing technology. However, small firms and most private firms in the 
same sectors would not want to do R&D or to get new technology through other 
reasonable and legal methods, instead, they would prefer to get technology through 
imitation to keep the costs low. According to some executives, although there was a 
negative influence on technology transfer from foreign countries without IPRs 
protection, some foreign firms would still want to transfer their technology to Chinese 
firms in these sectors, because China‟s big market had great attraction for foreign firms. 
For the traditional food sector, if traditional secrets were imitated by other firms, benefit 
would be reduced greatly. As some executives said, the reasons for this were that firms 
in the traditional food sector were relatively small and their production lines were easy 
to copy. Therefore, if a firm‟s technology and secrets were imitated by others, this firm‟s 
benefit would decrease dramatically and might even lead to the bankruptcy of the firm. 
However, for most firms in this sector that had no special technology and secrets, 
imitation had no impact on their production. 
For the publishing sector, interviewees said that according to their investigation, when 
pirated publications appeared in the market, sometimes publishing companies could not 
get a financial return to cover their costs on producing the original publications. The 
interviewees said that the monetary benefit of authors would reduce dramatically and 
their losses would be bigger than the publishing firms, if pirated copies of their 
publications were available in the market. Without IPRs protection, many publishing 
companies did not want to produce original publications, as it was not profitable, but 
some authors still wanted to publish their works, because they cared more about their 
reputation than the monetary gain. Interviewees also believed that if there was no IPRs 
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protection available, the numbers of publications transferred from foreign countries 
would fall greatly, because foreign publishing companies were afraid of piracy of their 
intellectual works. 
For the software sector, if there was imitation of their technology, the executives 
considered that their benefit obtaining from new technologies would reduce 
dramatically. The reasons for this were that the cost of imitation in this sector was quite 
low and productivity was easy to obtain. Thus, without IPRs protection, the number of 
technologies developed by Chinese firms and transferred from foreign countries would 
be reduced, according to the technological executives in the software sector. 
Impact of other policies on technology diffusion 
A technological executive of the 1
st
 interview with a big chemical firm said: 
Before China implemented the “Open Door” policy, it was impossible 
for Chinese firms to have contact with foreign firms. At that time, 
Chinese firms did not have the right of direct imports and exports. If a 
Chinese firm wanted to import some technological products from foreign 
countries, it had to obtain permission from the Chinese government first. 
The procedure for obtaining the permission was very complicated and 
time consuming. Sometimes, when the permission was obtained, the 
technological product needed by a Chinese firm had been replaced by a 
new product. Nowadays, it is easy for Chinese firms to have contact with 
foreign countries. It is easy to get the right of direct imports and exports 
for Chinese firms. Chinese firms have the right to decide which 
technological product is useful for their firms and import directly. It 
used to be very difficult or even impossible for a Chinese firm to get a 
licensing contract with a foreign firm without the permission of the 
Chinese government; this is no long the case. Moreover, Chinese firms 
can also cooperate with foreign firms in R&D, which was impossible 
before China implemented the “Open Door” policy. 
A technological executive of the 28
th
 interview with a big electronic firm said: 
The “Open Door” policy is very important for technology development 
and diffusion in China. Before this policy, the Chinese government would 
not learn contemporary IPRs protection policy from developed countries. 
Without this policy, the Chinese government would not know the 
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importance of new technologies. Even if there was IPRs protection 
policy in China, without the implementation of the “Open Door” policy, 
technologies could not enjoy the current development or diffusion, 
because China did not have much technology. Without learning basic 
technology from foreign countries, firms could not obtain the current 
development or diffusion. 
A technological executive of the 32
nd
 interview with a small machinery firm said: 
Now different municipal governments have their own methods to 
promote technological development. In our city, if a firm gets one patent, 
the municipal government will reward 300 thousand Chinese Yuan to the 
firm. This policy encourages firms to do research and development.  
A technological executive of the 10
th
 interview with a big transportation equipment firm 
said: 
Sometimes, some foreign firms did not care much about IPRs protection 
in China. They paid more attention on China‟s foreign investment policy, 
because it provides many favourable terms for foreign firms to invest in 
China, such as tax reduction and the supply of land for plant. These 
favourable terms sometimes attracted foreign firms to invest with money 
and technologies in China without considering its IPRs protection 
policy. 
A technological executive of the 16
th
 interview with a big machinery firm said: 
Managers of some foreign firms know that Chinese IPRs protection is 
not as good as that in some foreign countries. Managers of these firms 
also know that there are still some imitation risks in China. However, 
they still want to sell their technological products to China and still want 
to use their technologies to invest in China. China has a great market in 
the world, and even though technologies of these foreign firms were 
imitated by some Chinese firms, the big market can still bring great 
benefit for these foreign firms. 
A technological executive of the 22
nd
 interview with a big machinery firm said: 
The software sector is a kind of new and high-tech industrial sector in 
China. The government takes measures to promote the development of 
this sector, such as providing materials and money to software firms. 
These supportive policies are very helpful for the development of 
software technologies. 
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Many interviewees said that the “Open Door” policy implemented in China was very 
helpful for technology diffusion, especially technology transfer from foreign countries 
to China. The implementing of the “Open Door” policy in China allowed Chinese firms 
to have contact with foreign firms. This improved communication on technology and 
technological products, which provided opportunities for Chinese firms to obtain 
technology from foreign countries. Thus, the “Open Door” policy promoted technology 
diffusion in China. Some interviewees also said that policies on encouraging economic 
development also helped technology development and diffusion in China. They said that 
these policies encouraged Chinese firms to pay more attention to their production and 
management. This led to the development of technology, which could bring more new 
technological products and more profits. These interviewees also said that the economic 
development in China also provided money and resources for the Chinese government 
to invest in technology development. Some interviewees considered that the Chinese 
government‟s policy on encouraging R&D also promoted the development and diffusion 
of technology. Some believe that China‟s foreign investment policy also encouraged 
technology transfer from foreign countries to China. Some favourable terms in China‟s 
foreign investment policy promoted foreign investment using money and technology in 
China, which encouraged technology transfer from foreign countries to China. China‟s 
big market also encouraged technology diffusion, especially technology transfer from 
foreign countries to China. Moreover, some industrial policies also promoted 
technology development and diffusion in China. 
Opinions on IPRs protection reform 
Almost all interviewees believed that China‟s implementing stronger IPRs protection 
was very needed and good for technology development and technology diffusion. Just 
as a technological executive of the 2
nd
 interview with a big pharmaceutical firm said: 
It is necessary to reinforce IPRs protection in China. The current IPRs 
protection policy is vital to promote technology development and 
diffusion. Chinese IPRs protection has improved recently. However, IPRs 
protection in China is not as strong as that in developed countries. It is 
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necessary to reinforce Chinese IPRs protection policy further in the 
future. I have not found any disadvantage on IPRs protection policy. The 
current IPRs protection is an advanced policy. We need to learn about 
and use it. 
However, when talking about specific impacts of IPRs policy on technology 
development and diffusion, most of interviewees could give some negative impacts of 
current IPRs protection policy on technology development and diffusion. Most of the 
interviewees even did not realize that they mentioned some negative impact of the 
current IPRs protection according to their experience. They just believed that the current 
IPRs protection was very good for technology development and diffusion in China and 
the government needs to reinforce IPRs policy in the future. One reason for this may be 
that there were no other feasible policies available for protecting technology, hence 
people believed that the current IPRs protection was the best policy to protect 
technology and promote technology development and diffusion. Another reason may be 
that government propaganda and conventional ideas stated that the current IPRs policy 
was the best method to protect technology and encourage technology diffusion. The 
government‟s viewpoint and conventional opinion had a great influence on people‟s 
opinions. 
Table 3: The results of analysing semi-structured interviews 
TD: technology diffusion; DT: domestic technology; TT: technology transfer; Ph: pharmaceutical; C: 
chemical; Pe: petroleum; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation equipment; 
Tf: traditional food; T: textile; Pu: publishing; S: software 














Table 3: The results of analysing semi-structured interviews (continued) 
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Took other measures to protect technology, delay of technology‟s commercial 

























still do R&D. 
If imitation 
occurred, big 
firms could get 
benefit, small 
firms could not 
get benefit. Big 
and state-owned 
firms would do 
R&D; small and 
private firms 
would not do 
R&D. There 
would still some 





































Open Door policy, policies on encouraging economic development, policy on 
encouraging R&D, China‟s foreign investment policy, China‟s big market, and some 




All believed that China‟s implementing stronger IPRs policy was very good for TD, 
although they expressed some negative impacts of the current IPRs policy. 
Table 3 summaries the main points of interview data in different industries. It shows that 
interview data presented both similarities and differences related to stronger IPRs 














Some firms still get benefit
Still technology transfer
Chart 1: The diagram of analyzing semi-structured interviews
 
Chart 1 demonstrates the general relation between IPRs protection reform and 
technology diffusion in China obtained from interview data. It can be seen from this 
chart that China reformed its IPRs protection policy since the country tried to join the 
WTO. The relation between IPRs protection and technology diffusion had connections 
with different industrial sectors, different sizes and legal statuses of Chinese firms, and 
other policies in China. Stronger IPRs protection had both positive and negative impacts 
on technology diffusion in China. Without IPRs protection, some firms could still get 
benefits to cover their costs in doing R&D even if imitation occurred. Firms with 
productive capabilities that were difficult to copy in a short time could still get benefit 
from their technologies. Without good IPRs protection, there would still be some 
technologies developed by Chinese firms and transferred from foreign countries to 
China. 
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6.3. Analysing self-completion questionnaire 
This part analyses the data obtained through the self-completion questionnaires. The 
process of analysing questionnaire is explained. The analytical result of the 
self-completion questionnaire data is also shown. 
6.3.1. The process of analysing self-completion questionnaire 
The date collected from questionnaires was analysed through the following procedures. 
Firstly, each answered questionnaire was divided into different categories according to 
different industries, firm sizes, and legal status of these firms (state-owned or private). 
This classification helped to illustrate whether technological executives in firms of 
different industries, sizes and legal status provided different responses to questions 
about the relation between IPRs protection and technology diffusion in China. Secondly, 
answered questionnaires in each selected industry were analysed. These analyses helped 
to find out the main points of each selected industry. Finally, the analytical results for 
different selected industries were compared. This comparison provided the similarities 
and differences among different selected industries, which helped to summarise the 
main points of analytical results for all selected industries. 
6.3.2. Analytical results for self-completion questionnaire 
Through analysing and comparing the self-completion questionnaires in different 
selected industries, some main points were generalised: (a) legal status and size of firms; 
(b) number of patented technologies; (c) feel of stronger IPRs protection; (d) methods of 
acquiring technology; (e) impact of stronger IPRs on technology diffusion in China; (f) 
impact of stronger IPRs on firm‟s technology development; (g) impact of stronger IPRs 
on technology transfer in individual firms; (h) impact on technology diffusion without 
IPRs protection; (i) opinion on the current IPRs policy. This part only presents the 
results of questionnaires. It does not analyse the results. The next chapter focuses on the 
analyses of fieldwork results. 
Page 140 
Legal status and size of firms 
According to the market share of firm‟s leading products in China and the number of 
full-time staff in total, firms were divided into different categories according to the firm 
size. Pharmaceutical, chemical, machinery and software firms were divided into big, 
medium and small firms. Electronic, primary metal and transportation equipment firms 
were divided into big and small firms. For pharmaceutical, chemical, machinery and 
software sectors, big firms were state-owned; small firms were private; and medium 
firms included both state-owned and private. For electronic and primary metal sectors, 
most big firms were state-owned and most small firms were private. For the 
transportation equipment sector, all big firms were state-owned and small firms 
included both state-owned and private firms. The traditional food and the textile sectors 
were all small firms, which included both state-owned firms and private firms. 
Number of patented technologies 
Table 4 Average number of patented technologies held by Chinese firms 
Ph: pharmaceutical; C: chemical; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation 
equipment; Tf: traditional food; T: textile; S: software 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms Average 
Ph 41.5 10.5 9 20.33 
C 21.25 9.25 2.25 10.92 
E 1332.83  27.17 680 
M 12 2 0 4.67 
Pm 21  1.67 11.34 
Tr 38.83  4.67 21.75 
Tf   0.5 0.5 
T   0 0 
S 9.75 4 1.25 5 
Source: obtained from questions T9-T10, which are shown in Appendix 6. 
Table 4 shows that pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic, primary metal and 
transportation equipment firms held comparatively more patented technologies. Each 
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selected pharmaceutical chemical, electronic, primary metal and transportation 
equipment firm had 20.33, 10.92, 680, 11.34 and 21.75 patented technologies on 
average separately. Machinery firms held comparatively fewer patented technologies, 
which were 4.67 on average. Traditional food and textile firms held very limited 
patented technologies, which were 0 and 0.5 on average separately. Each selected 
software firm held 5 technologies protected by copyright on average. Overall, big firms 
held more technology protected by IPRs than small firms. 
Feel of stronger IPRs protection 
Table 5 Opinion on whether China’s entrance to WTO has led to stronger adopting 
of IPRs protection 
Ph: pharmaceutical; C: chemical; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation 
equipment; Tf: traditional food; T: textile; S: software 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Ph All believe that China‟s entrance to WTO has led to stronger adopting of IPRs protection. 
C All believe that China‟s entrance to WTO has led to stronger adopting of IPRs protection. 
E 
All believe that China‟s entrance 
to WTO has led to stronger 
adopting of IPRs protection. 
 
All believe that China‟s entrance to 
WTO has led to stronger adopting of 
IPRs protection. 
M 
All believe that China‟s entrance to WTO has led to 
stronger adopting of IPRs protection. 
50% believe that China‟s entrance to 
WTO has led to stronger adopting of 
IPRs protection, and 50% do not know. 
Pm 
All believe that China‟s entrance 
to WTO has led to stronger 
adopting of IPRs protection. 
 
67% believe that China‟s entrance to 
WTO has led to stronger adopting of 
IPRs protection, and 33% do not know. 
Tr 
All believe that China‟s entrance 
to WTO has led to stronger 
adopting of IPRs protection. 
 
67% believe that China‟s entrance to 
WTO has led to stronger adopting of 
IPRs protection, and 33% do not know. 
Tf   
33% believe that China‟s entrance to 
WTO has led to stronger adopting of 
IPRs protection, and 67% do not know. 
T   
58% believe that China‟s entrance to 
WTO has led to stronger adopting of 
IPRs protection, and 42% do not know. 
S All believed that China‟s entrance to WTO had led to stronger adopting of IPRs protection. 
Source: obtained from question T12, which is shown in Appendix 6. 
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From table 5, it can be seen that all the selected technological executives of firms in the 
pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic and software sectors felt that China had 
implemented stronger IPRs protection. The technological executives of all selected big 
firms and some selected small firms in machinery, primary metal and transportation 
equipment sectors felt that China had implemented stronger IPRs protection. Only some 
technological executives in the traditional food and textile sectors felt that China had 
implemented stronger IPRs protection, since China tried to accede to the WTO. 
Methods of acquiring technology 
Table 6 Methods to acquire technology before China reformed IPRs protection 
Ph: pharmaceutical; C: chemical; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation 
equipment; Tf: traditional food; T: textile; S: software; DT: domestic trade; IT: international trade; DL: 
domestic licensing; IL: international licensing; DI: domestic imitation; II: international imitation 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Ph 
All through R&D, II, sharing 
technology with other 
state-owned firms, 25% through 
IL. 
All through II, 50% through 
R&D, 50% through DI, 25% 
through DL, state-owned medium 
firms through sharing technology 
with other state-owned firms. 
All through DI and II. 
C 
25% through R&D, 75% through 
IT, 25% through DL, 75% 
through IL, and all through II. 
50% through R&D and DI, 25% 
through IT and DL, and 50% 
through II. 
50% through DT, 25% 
through DL, all through DI, 
and 50% through II. 
E 
67% through R&D, 83% through 
IT, 83% through IL, 33% 
through DI, and all through II. 
 
All through DT, 67% through 
IT, 17% through DL, 17% 
through IL, 67% through DI, 
83% through II. 
M 
50% through DT, all through IT, 
50% through DL, 50% through 
DI, and all through II. 
All through DT, 50% through IT, 
25% through DL, 75% through 
DI, and 50% through II. 
All through DI. 
Pm 
83% through R&D, 33% through 
DT, 67% through IT, 17% 
through Dl and IL, 33% through 
DI, and 67% through II. 
 
All through DT and DI, 67% 




Table 6 Methods to acquire technology before China reformed IPRs protection 
(continued) 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Tr 
50% through R&D, all through 
IT,  33% through IL, all through 
II, and 33% through sharing 
technology with other 
state-owned firms. 
 
83% through DT, 67% 
through IT, 83% through DI 
and II. 
    
Tf   
All through traditional 
techniques. 
T   
All through traditional 
techniques. 
S 
All through R&D, 25% through 
DI, 75% through II. 
75% through DT and IT, 50% 
through DI, and 75% through II. 
All through DI and II. 
Source: obtained from question T11, which is shown in Appendix 6. 
From table 6, it is known that before China adopted stronger IPRs protection, most big 
and medium pharmaceutical firms acquired technologies through R&D and sharing 
technologies with other state-owned firms. Before China adopted stronger IPRs 
protection, most selected pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic, primary metals, 
machinery, transportation equipment and software firms acquired technologies through 
imitation. All selected traditional food and textile firms acquired technologies through 
traditional techniques, before China adopted stronger IPRs protection. 
Table 7 Whether firms’ main methods to acquire technology changed after China 
adopted stronger IPRs protection 
Ph: pharmaceutical; C: chemical; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation 
equipment; Tf: traditional food; T: textile; S: software; 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Ph All changed their main methods of acquiring new technology. 
C 
All changed their main methods of acquiring new 
technology. 
50% changed, 50% did not change. 
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Table 7 Whether firm’s main methods to acquire technology changed after China 
adopted stronger IPRs protection (continued) 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
E 
All changed their main 
methods of acquiring 
new technology. 
 67% changed, 33% did not change. 
M 
All changed their main methods of acquiring new 
technology. 
All did not change. 
Pm 
All changed their main 
methods of acquiring 
new technology. 
 50% changed, 50% did not change. 
Tt 
All changed their main 
methods of acquiring 
new technology. 
 67% changed, 33% did not change. 
Tf   
All did not change their main methods 
of acquiring new technology. 
T   
All did not change their main methods 
of acquiring new technology. 
S All changed their main methods of acquiring new technology. 
Source: obtained from question T13, which is shown in Appendix 6. 
Table 7 shows that after China adopted stronger IPRs protection, all selected 
pharmaceutical and software firms changed their main methods of acquiring 
technologies. All the selected big and medium firms and some selected small firms in 
the chemical, electronic, primary metal and transportation equipment sectors changed 
their main methods of acquiring technologies. All the selected big and medium firms in 
the machinery sector changed their main methods of acquiring technologies. But none 
of the small firms in machinery sector changed their main methods of acquiring 
technologies. After China adopted stronger IPRs protection, none of the selected 





Table 8 Methods to acquire technology after China enforced stronger IPRs 
protection 
Ph: pharmaceutical; C: chemical; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation 
equipment; S: software; DT: domestic trade; IT: international trade; DL: domestic licensing; IL: 
international licensing; DI: domestic imitation; II: international imitation 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Ph 
All through R&D, IT, FDI, 
DL and IL, 75% through 
R&D cooperating with 
research institutes, 25% 
through waiting for foreign 
overdue technology. 
All through DL, IL, R&D 
cooperating with research 
institutes, and waiting for 
foreign overdue 
technology, 75% through 
R&D, 25% through IT, and 
FDI. 
All through DI and R&D 
cooperating with research 
institutes, 75% through II, 
50% through waiting for 
foreign overdue technology, 
and 25% through IL. 
C 
All through R&D, IL and 
R&D cooperating with 
research institutes, 25% 
through DT, 50% through IT, 
and 75% through DL. 
All through R&D and 
R&D cooperating with 
research institutes, 25% 
through DT, 50% through 
IT, 25% through FDI, 75% 
through DL, and 50% 
through IL. 
50% changed their methods 
of getting technology, in 
them all through R&D, DT, 
and IT, and 50% through DL. 
E 
All through R&D, 50% 
through DT, 67% through IT, 
33% through FDI, 33% 
through DL, 67% through IL, 
50% through R&D 
cooperating with research 
institutes. 
 
67% changed their methods 
of getting technology, in 
them all through R&D, DT, 
75% through IT, 50% 
through DL, 75% through IL. 
M 
All through R&D, 50% 
through IT, 50% through DL, 
25% through IL, and 25% 
through R&D cooperating 
with research institutes. 
All through R&D, 75% 
through DT, all through IT 
and DL, and 25% through 
DI. 
All did not change their 
methods of getting new 
technology. 
Pm 
All through R&D, 17% 
through DT, 50% through IT, 
17% FDI, 50% through DL, 
83% through IL, and all 
through R&D cooperating 
with research institutes. 
 
50% changed their methods 
of getting technology, in 
them all through R&D, DT, 
and IT, 33% through II and 
67% through R&D 




Table 8 Methods to acquire technology after China enforced stronger IPRs 
protection (continued) 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Tr 
All through R&D, 17% 
through DT, 50% through IT, 
83% FDI, 17% through DL, 
all through IL, and 67% 
through R&D cooperating 
with research institutes. 
 
67% changed their methods 
of getting technology, in 
them all through R&D, 75% 
through DT, 50% through IT, 
25% through DL, 50% 
through IL, and 50% through 
R&D cooperating with 
research institutes. 
S 
All through R&D, and 50% 
through IL. 
All through R&D, 75% 
through DT, 50% through 
IT, and 25% through IL. 
All through R&D, and 50% 
through DI and II. 
Source: obtained from question T14, which is shown in Appendix 6. 
From table 8, it can be seen that after China adopted stronger IPRs protection, big and 
medium firms in the pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic, primary metals, 
transportation equipment and software sectors stopped imitation, and instead used 
legitimate methods to acquire technologies. Although some small firms in these sectors 
still imitated, they also started to do R&D by themselves or cooperating with research 
institutes. After China adopted stronger IPRs protection, all big machinery firms 
stopped imitation. Some medium and small machinery firms continued with imitation. 
It should be mentioned that firms with the right of direct imports and exports could 
acquire technology through international trade, FDI, international licensing. Firms 






Impact of stronger IPRs on technology diffusion in China 
Table 9 Opinions about impact of stronger IPRs on technology diffusion in China 
Ph: pharmaceutical; C: chemical; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation 
equipment; Tf: traditional food; T: textile; S: software; SIP: stronger IPRs protection; DDT: the 
development of domestic technology; TT: technology transfer 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Ph 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DDT and TT. 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DDT, 25% believe that 
SIP strongly encourages 
TT, 75% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages TT. 
All believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DDT, 50% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages TT, 50% consider 
that SIP has no impact on TT. 
C 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DDT; all believe that SIP 
has no impact on TT. 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DDT, 50% believe that 
SIP strongly encourages 
TT, and 50% believe that 
SIP slightly encourages 
TT. 
50% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DDT, 25% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages DDT, 25% believe 
that SIP has no impact on DDT, 25% 
believe that SIP strongly encourages 
TT, and 75% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT. 
E 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DDT; 67% believe that 
SIP strongly encourages 
TT, 33% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages TT. 
 
All believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DDT; 50% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages TT, 50% believe 
that SIP slightly encourages TT. 
M 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DDT, 75% believe that 
SIP strongly encourages 
TT, 25% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages TT. 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DDT, 25% believe that 
SIP strongly encourages 
TT, 75% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages TT. 
75% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DDT, 25% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages DDT, 25% believe 
that SIP slightly encourages TT, 75% 
do not know the impact of SIP on TT. 
Pm 
67% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DDT and TT, and 33% 
believe that SIP slightly 
encourages DDT and TT. 
 
50% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DDT, 50% believe that 
SIP slightly encourages DDT, 17% 
believe that SIP strongly encourages 
TT, 50% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT, 33% believe that SIP 
has no impact on TT. 
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Table 9 Opinions about impact of stronger IPRs on technology diffusion in China 
(continued) 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Tr 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DDT and TT. 
 
67% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DDT, 17% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages DDT, 17% believe 
that SIP has no impact on DDT, 33% 
believe that SIP strongly encourages 
TT, 33% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT, 33% believe that SIP 
has no impact on TT. 
Tf   
25% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DDT, 42% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages DDT, 33% do not 
know the impact of SIP on DDT, all do 
not know the impact of SIP on TT. 
T   
33% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DDT, 8% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages DDT, 58% do not 
know the impact of SIP on DDT, 25% 
believe that SIP strongly encourages 
TT, 75% do not know the impact of 
SIP on TT. 
S 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DDT, 75% believe that 
SIP strongly encourages 
TT, and 25% believe 
that SIP slightly 
encourages TT. 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DDT, 50% believe that 
SIP strongly encourages 
TT, and 50% believe 
that SIP slightly 
encourages TT. 
All believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DDT, 75% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages TT, 25% believe 
that SIP has no impact on TT. 
Source: obtained from questions T15-T16, which are shown in Appendix 6. 
Table 9 demonstrates that most technological executives in pharmaceutical, chemical, 
electronic, primary metals, machinery, transportation equipment and software sectors 
believed that stronger IPRs protection had encouraged the development of domestic 
technology and technology transfer from foreign countries in China. Technological 
executives of most textile firms did not know the impact of stronger IPRs protection on 
domestic technology development or technology transfer in China. Technological 
executives of most traditional food firms considered that stronger IPRs protection had 
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encouraged domestic technology development in China. However, none of them knew 
the impact of stronger IPRs protection on technology transfer in China. 
Impact of stronger IPRs on firm’s technology development 
Table 10 Opinions about impact of stronger IPRs on firm’s technology 
development and technology’s commercial production 
Ph: pharmaceutical; C: chemical; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation 
equipment; Tf: traditional food; T: textile; S: software; SIP: stronger IPRs protection; DFT: the 
development of firm‟s technology; CFT: the commercial production of firm‟s technology 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Ph 
All believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 50% believe 
that SIP strongly encourages 
CFT, 50% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages CFT. 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DFT, 50% believe 
that SIP slightly 
encourages CFT, 
50% believe that 
SIP has no impact 
on CFT. 
25% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 75% believe 
that SIP slightly encourages CFT, 
25% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages CFT, 75% believe 
that SIP has no impact on CFT. 
C 
50% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 50% believe 
that SIP slightly encourages 
DFT, 50% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages CFT, 25% 
believe that SIP slightly 
encourages CFT, and 25% 
believe that SIP has no impact 
on CFT. 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DFT, 50% believe 
that SIP slightly 
encourages CFT, 
50% believe that 
SIP has no impact 
on CFT. 
50% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 50% believe 
that SIP slightly encourages DFT, 
and all believe that SIP has no 
impact on CFT. 
E 
All believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 33% believe 
that SIP strongly encourages 
CFT, 33% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages CFT, 33% 
believe that SIP has no impact 
on CFT. 
 
All believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 50% believe 
that SIP slightly encourages CFT, 
50% believe that SIP has no 




Table 10 Opinions about impact of stronger IPRs on firm’s technology 
development and technology’s commercial production (continued) 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
M 
All believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 50% believe 
that SIP slightly encourages 
CFT, 50% believe that SIP has 
no impact on CFT. 
75% believe that 
SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 
25% believe that 
SIP slightly 
encourages DFT, all 
believe that SIP has 
no impact on CFT. 
25% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages DFT, 75% believe 
that SIP has no impact on DFT, 
50% believe that SIP has no 
impact on CFT, 50% do not 
know. 
Pm 
All believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 50% believe 
that SIP strongly encourages 
CFT, 17% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages CFT, 33% 
believe that SIP has no impact 
on CFT. 
 
50% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 17% believe 
that SIP slightly encourages DFT, 
33% believe that SIP has no 
impact on DFT, 17% believe that 
SIP strongly encourages CFT, 
50% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages CFT, 33% believe 
that SIP has no impact on CFT. 
Tr 
All believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 33% believe 
that SIP slightly encourages 
CFT, 67% believe that SIP has 
no impact on CFT. 
 
50% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 17% believe 
that SIP slightly encourages DFT, 
33% believe that SIP has no 
impact on DFT, 50% believe that 
SIP slightly encourages CFT, 
50% believe that SIP has no 
impact on CFT. 
Tf   
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on DFT and CFT. 
T   
75% believe that SIP has no 
impact on DFT, 25% do not 
know the impact of SIP on DFT, 






Table 10 Opinions about impact of stronger IPRs on firm’s technology 
development and technology’s commercial production (continued) 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
S 
All believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 75% believe 
that SIP strongly encourages 
CFT, 25% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages CFT. 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
DFT, 25% believe 
that SIP strongly 
encourages CFT, 
75% believe that 
SIP slightly 
encourages CFT. 
All believe that SIP strongly 
encourages DFT, 25% believe 
that SIP strongly encourages 
CFT, 25% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages CFT, 50% 
believe that SIP has no impact on 
CFT. 
Source: obtained from questions T17-T18, which are shown in Appendix 6. 
Table 10 shows that most technological executives in the selected pharmaceutical, 
chemical, electronic and software firms considered that stronger IPRs protection had 
strongly encouraged their firm‟s technology development. Most technological 
executives of the selected pharmaceutical and software firms believed that stronger 
IPRs protection had encouraged technology‟s commercial production in their firms. 
Most technological executives of chemical and electronic firms believed that stronger 
IPRs protection had no impact on technology‟s commercial production in their firms. 
Most technological executives in machinery and primary metal firms and half 
technological executives in transportation equipment firms believed that stronger IPRs 
protection had encouraged their firm‟s technology development. Technological 
executives of most machinery and transportation equipment firms believed that stronger 
IPRs protection had no impact on technology‟s commercial production in their firms. 
Technological executives of most primary metal firms believed that stronger IPRs 
protection had encouraged technology‟s commercial production in their firms. 
Technological executives in most selected traditional food and textile firms believed 
that stronger IPRs protection had no impact on technology development or technology‟s 
commercial production in their firms. 
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Impact of stronger IPRs on technology transfer in individual firms 
Table 11 Opinions about impact of stronger IPRs protection on technology transfer 
through different channels 
Ph: pharmaceutical; C: chemical; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation 
equipment; Tf: traditional food; T: textile; S: software; SIP: stronger IPRs protection; TT: technology 
transfer; IT: international trade; L: Licensing; I: imitation 
Industries Channels Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Ph 
IT 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through IT. 
50% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages TT 
through IT, 50% believe 
that SIP has no impact on 
TT through IT. 
75% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through IT, 
25% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through IT. 
FDI 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through FDI. 
50% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages TT 
through FDI, 50% 
believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through 
FDI. 
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through FDI. 
L 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through L. 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages TT 
through L. 
75% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through L, 
25% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through L. 
I All believe that SIP strongly encumbers TT through I. 
C 
IT 
25% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through IT, 75% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through IT. 
50% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages TT 
through IT, 25% believe 
that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through 
IT, 25% believe that SIP 
has no impact on TT 
through IT. 
50% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through IT, 
50% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through IT. 
FDI 
25% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through FDI, 
75% believe that SIP 
has no impact on TT 
through FDI. 
50% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages TT 
through FDI, 50% 
believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through 
FDI. 
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through FDI. 
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Table 11 Opinions about impact of stronger IPRs protection on technology transfer 
through different channels (continued) 
Industries Channels Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
C 
L 
50% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through L, 50% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through L. 
25% believe that 
strongly encourages TT 
through L, 25% believe 
that slightly encourages 
TT through L, 50% 
believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through L. 
25% believe that slightly 
encourages TT through L, 
75% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through L. 
I All believe that SIP strongly encumbers TT through I. 
E 
IT 
83% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through IT, 17% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through IT. 
 
33% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages TT 
through IT, 33% believe that 
SIP slightly encourages TT 
through IT, 33% believe that 
SIP has no impact on TT 
through IT. 
FDI 
33% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through FDI, 33% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through FDI, 33% 
believe that SIP has 
no impact on TT 
through FDI. 
 
67% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through FDI, 
33% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through FDI. 
L 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through L. 
 
50% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages TT 
through L, 17% believe that 
SIP slightly encourages TT 
through L, 33% believe that 
SIP has no impact on TT 
through L. 
I 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encumbers 
TT through I. 
 
33% believe that SIP slightly 
encumbers TT through I, 
67% believe that SIP 




Table 11 Opinions about impact of stronger IPRs protection on technology transfer 
through different channels (continued) 
Industries Channels Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
M 
IT 
75% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through IT, 25% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through IT. 
50% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages TT 
through IT, 50% believe 
that SIP has no impact 
on TT through IT. 
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through IT. 
FDI 
25% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through FDI, 
25% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through FDI, 
50% believe that SIP 
has no impact on TT 
through FDI. 
25% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages TT 
through FDI, 75% 
believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through 
FDI. 
75% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through FDI, 
25% do not know. 
L 
75% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through L, 25% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through L. 
75% believe that SIP 
slightly encourages TT 
through L, 25% believe 
that SIP has no impact 
on TT through L. 
75% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through L, 25% 
do not know. 
I 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encumbers 
TT through I. 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encumbers TT 
through I. 
75% believe that SIP slightly 
encumbers TT through I, 25% 
believe that SIP slightly has 
no impact on TT through I. 
Pm IT 
33% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through IT, 33% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through IT, 33% 
believe that SIP has 
no impact on TT 
through IT. 
 
17% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages TT through IT, 
33% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through IT, 
50% believe that SIP has no 




Table 11 Opinions about impact of stronger IPRs protection on technology transfer 
through different channels (continued) 
Industries Channels Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Pm 
FDI 
17% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through FDI, 33% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through FDI, 50% 
believe that SIP has 
no impact on TT 
through FDI. 
 
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through FDI. 
L 
33% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through L, 33% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through L, 33% 
believe that SIP has 
no impact on TT 
through L. 
 
33% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through L, 67% 
believe that SIP has no impact 
on TT through L. 
I 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encumbers 
TT through I. 
 
17% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through I, 33% 
believe that SIP slightly 
encumbers TT through I, 50% 
believe that SIP strongly 
encumbers TT through I. 
Tr 
IT 
67% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through IT, 33% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through IT. 
 
17% believe that SIP strongly 
encourages TT through IT, 
17% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through IT, 
67% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through IT. 
FDI 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through FDI. 
 
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through FDI. 
L 
50% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages 
TT through L, 50% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through L. 
 
33% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through L, 
67% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through L. 
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Table 11 Opinions about impact of stronger IPRs protection on technology transfer 
through different channels (continued) 
Industries Channels Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Tr I 
All believe that SIP 
strongly encumbers 
TT through I. 
 
33% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through I, 
33% believe that SIP slightly 
encumbers TT through I, 
33% believe that SIP 
strongly encumbers TT 
through I. 
Tf 
IT   
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through IT. 
FDI   
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through FDI. 
L   
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through L. 
I   
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through I. 
T 
IT   
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through IT. 
FDI   
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through FDI. 
L   
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through L. 
I   
All believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through I. 
S 
IT 
50% believe that 
SIP slightly 
encourages TT 
through IT, 50% 
believe that SIP has 
no impact on TT 
through IT. 
50% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages TT 
through IT, 25% believe 
that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through IT, 
25% believe that SIP has 
no impact on TT through 
IT. 
25% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through IT, 
75% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through IT. 
FDI 
50% believe that 
SIP slightly 
encourages TT 
through FDI, 50% 
believe that SIP has 
no impact on TT 
through FDI. 
25% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages TT 
through FDI, 25% believe 
that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through 
FDI, 50% believe that SIP 
has no impact on TT 
through FDI. 
25% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through FDI, 
75% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through FDI. 
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Table 11 Opinions about impact of stronger IPRs protection on technology transfer 
through different channels (continued) 
Industries Channels Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
S 
L 
50% believe that 
SIP strongly 
encourages TT 
through L, 50% 
believe that SIP 
slightly encourages 
TT through L. 
25% believe that SIP 
strongly encourages TT 
through L, 50% believe 
that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through L, 
25% believe that SIP has 
no impact on TT through 
L. 
50% believe that SIP slightly 
encourages TT through L, 
50% believe that SIP has no 
impact on TT through L. 
I All believe that SIP strongly encumbers TT through I. 
Source: obtained from questions T19-T22, which are shown in Appendix 6. 
Table 11 shows that the technological executives of most big and medium firms in 
pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic and software sectors considered that stronger IPRs 
protection had encouraged technology transfer through international trade, FDI and 
licensing in their firms. Some technological executives of small firms in the 
pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic and software sectors also believed that stronger 
IPRs protection had encouraged technology transfer through international trade, FDI 
and licensing in their firms. The technological executives of all the selected 
pharmaceutical, chemical and software firms and most electronic firms believed that 
stronger IPRs protection strongly encumbered technology transfer through imitation in 
their firms. 
The number of technological executives in big and medium machinery, primary metal 
and transportation equipment firms who considered that stronger IPRs protection had 
encouraged technology transfer through international trade, FDI and licensing in their 
firms was less than that of in big and medium pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic and 
software firms. Only a few technological executives in small machinery, primary metal 
and transportation equipment firms considered that stronger IPRs protection had 
encouraged technology transfer through international trade, FDI and licensing in their 
firms. Some technological executives in small machinery, primary metal and 
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transportation equipment firms considered that stronger IPRs protection had no impact 
on technology transfer through imitation in their firms. 
All technological executives in the traditional food and textile sectors believed that 
stronger IPRs protection had no impact on technology transfer through different 
channels in their firms. 
Impact on technology diffusion without IPRs protection 
Table 12 Impact on technology diffusion without IPRs protection 
Ph: pharmaceutical; C: chemical; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation 
equipment; Tf: traditional food; T: textile; S: software 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Ph 
Averagely, 45% technology 
cannot be developed, 20% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
20% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
Averagely, 47.5% 
technology cannot be 
developed, 11.25% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, 
and 20% technology 
cannot be transferred 
from foreign countries. 
Averagely, 22.5% technology 
cannot be developed, 7.5% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
5% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
C 
Averagely, 67.5% technology 
cannot be developed, 10% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
32.5% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
Averagely, 55% 
technology cannot be 
developed, 10% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, 
and 22.5% technology 
cannot be transferred 
from foreign countries. 
Averagely, 32.5% technology 
cannot be developed, 7.5% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
17.5% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
E 
Averagely, 45% technology 
cannot be developed, 16.67% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
21.67% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
 
Averagely, 31.67% technology 
cannot be developed, 9.17% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
8.33% technology cannot be 




Table 12 Impact on technology diffusion without IPRs protection 
Ph: pharmaceutical; C: chemical; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation 
equipment; Tf: traditional food; T: textile; S: software 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
M 
Averagely, 30% technology 
cannot be developed, 2.5% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
12.5% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
Averagely, 22.5% 
technology cannot be 
developed, 0% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, 
and 5% technology 
cannot be transferred 
from foreign countries. 
Averagely, 0% technology 
cannot be developed, 0% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
0% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
Pm 
Averagely, 25% technology 
cannot be developed, 8.33% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
8.33% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
 
Averagely, 13.33% technology 
cannot be developed, 0% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
5% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
Tr 
Averagely, 30% technology 
cannot be developed, 5% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
15% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
 
Averagely, 11.67% technology 
cannot be developed, 2.5% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
6.67% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
Tf   
Averagely, 0% technology 
cannot be developed, 0% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
0% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
T   
Averagely, 0% technology 
cannot be developed, 0% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
0% technology cannot be 




Table 12 Impact on technology diffusion without IPRs protection (continued) 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
S 
Averagely, 45% technology 
cannot be developed, 15% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
5% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
Averagely, 27.5% 
technology cannot be 
developed, 12.5% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, 
and 10% technology 
cannot be transferred 
from foreign countries. 
Averagely, 15% technology 
cannot be developed, 5% 
technology cannot be 
commercially produced, and 
0% technology cannot be 
transferred from foreign 
countries. 
Source: obtained from questions T23-T25, which are shown in Appendix 6. 
From table 12, it can be seen that the percentage of technologies that could not be 
developed, be commercially produced, or be transferred from foreign countries in 
pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic and software firms was more than that in firms of 
other selected sectors. Moreover, the percentage of technologies that could not be 
developed, be commercially produced, or be transferred from foreign countries in big 
pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic and software firms was more than that in firms of 
the same sectors. 
The percentage of technologies that could not be developed, be commercially produced, 
or be transferred from foreign countries in machinery, primary metal and transportation 
equipment firms was less than that in firms of pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic and 
software sectors. Moreover, technology development, technology‟s commercial 
production and technology transfer of some small firms in machinery, primary metal 
and transportation equipment sectors would not be influenced if there was no IPRs 
protection. 
Technology development, technology‟s commercial production and technology transfer 




Opinion on the current IPRs policy 
Table 13 Opinion on whether the current IPRs protection policy is the best method 
to protect technology and encourage technology diffusion 
Ph: pharmaceutical; C: chemical; E: electronic; M: machinery; Pm: primary metals; Tr: transportation 
equipment; Tf: traditional food; T: textile; S: software 
Industries Big firms Medium firms Small firms 
Ph All believe it is best. All believe it is best. All believe it is best. 
C All believe it is best. All believe it is best. All believe it is best. 
E All believe it is best.  All believe it is best. 
M All believe it is best. All believe it is best. 50% believe it is best, 50% do not know. 
Pm All believe it is best.  50% believe it is best, 50% do not know. 
Tr All believe it is best.  All believe it is best. 
Tf   All believe it is best. 
T   All believe it is best. 
S All believe it is best. All believe it is best. All believe it is best. 
Source: obtained from questions T26-T28, which are shown in Appendix 6. 
Table 13 shows that almost all selected technological executives believe that the current 
IPRs protection policy was the best method to protect and encourage technological 
innovations. Only 50% of technological executives of small machinery and primary 
metal firms did not know whether the current IPRs protection policy was the best 
method to protect and encourage technology development and diffusion. 
In summary, firstly, most selected big firms were state-owned firms and most selected 
small firms were private firms. Secondly, pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic, primary 
metal and transportation equipment firms held comparatively more patented 
technologies than firms in other sectors. The number of patented technologies held by 
electronic firms aroused more attention, because it was massive. During the process of 
face-to-face questionnaires, some executives were asked about reasons for the fact that 
their firms held so many patented technologies. They said that electronic industry was a 
kind of new industry in China. This sector had a high density of technologies and 
technologies got updated rapidly, so firms renewed their patented technologies every 
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year. In addition, sometimes one kind of patented technology contained different small 
elements of patented technologies. And these were added to the total amount of patented 
technology, which made the number of patented technologies held by electronic firms 
larger than that in other industrial sectors. Primary metal and transportation equipment 
firms also held many patented technologies. However, according to analytical results of 
interview data, transportation equipment and primary metal sectors were medium 
sensitive to IPRs protection policy. Some executives of these sectors were asked during 
face-to-face questionnaire about this issue. They replied that although they thought that 
the transportation equipment and primary metal industry were not quite as sensitive to 
IPRs protection, these sectors had a long history in China and firms, especially some big 
and state-owned ones, held some patented technologies through the long period of 
development. Thirdly, executives of all selected pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic 
and software firms felt that China enforced stronger IPRs protection. All selected 
pharmaceutical, chemical, software firms, and 83% of selected electronic firms changed 
their main methods of obtaining technologies after China enforced stronger IPRs 
protection. 83% of executives of machinery, primary metal and transportation 
equipment firms felt that China enforced stronger IPRs protection. 67% of machinery 
firms, 75% of primary metal firms and 83% transportation equipment firms changed 
their main methods of obtaining technologies after China enforced stronger IPRs 
protection. 25% of the executives of selected traditional food firms and 33% of the 
executives of selected textile firms felt that China enforced stronger IPRs protection. All 
the selected traditional food and textile firms did not change their main methods of 
obtaining technologies after China enforced stronger IPRs protection. These numbers 
showed that pharmaceutical, chemical, electronic and software sectors were highly 
sensitive to IPRs protection; the machinery, primary metal and transportation equipment 
sectors were medium sensitive to IPRs protection; and traditional food and textile 
sectors were poorly sensitive to IPRs protection. This is consistent with the analytical 
results of the interview data. Fourthly, before China enforced stronger IPRs protection, 
imitation was one of main methods to acquire technologies for most selected firms, and 
most big firms could acquire technologies through doing R&D; but most small firms 
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could not do the same. After China enforced stronger IPRs protection, most big firms 
stopped imitation, but some small firms, still acquired technologies through imitation. 
Most small firms started R&D by themselves or cooperating with research institutes 
after China enforced stronger IPRs protection. Some executives were asked about 
reasons for changing the methods of acquiring technologies during face-to-face 
questionnaire. They replied that big and medium firms drew a lot of attention from the 
Chinese government and state-owned firms were directly controlled by the Chinese 
government, so when China implemented stronger IPRs, these firms did not dare to do 
imitation any more. The Chinese government did not pay enough attention to the actions 
of small firms, so these firms sometimes could get away with imitation. Moreover, 
executives of small firms knew that better IPRs protection had provided more 
guarantees for their benefit from new technologies, so some of them started to do R&D. 
However, they did not always have the capacity to do it on their own and turned to 
cooperate with research institutes for R&D. This is also consistent with analytical 
results of interview data. Fifthly, most executives considered that stronger IPRs 
protection had encouraged domestic technology development in China. A few of them 
considered that stronger IPRs protection had encouraged technology transfer from 
foreign countries to China. These numbers demonstrated that most executives 
considered that stronger IPRs protection had a more invigorative impact on domestic 
technology development than on technology transfer from foreign countries to China. 
Moreover, most executives believed that stronger IPRs policy strongly encumbered 
technology transfer through imitation. These are consistent with analytical results of 
interview data. Sixthly, questionnaire data showed that without IPRs protection, 
although technology development, technology‟s commercial production and technology 
transfer would decrease, there would be still some technologies being developed, being 
commercially produced and being transferred from foreign countries. This is also 
consistent with interview data. Finally, most technological executives believed that the 
current IPRs protection policy was the best method to protect technology and encourage 
technology diffusion. However, most executives felt that stronger IPRs protection 
strongly encumbered technology diffusion through imitation. There were some reasons 
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for the fact that most executives considered the current IPRs protection the best one. 
The Chinese government always propagandized that current IPRs protection was the 
best method to protect technology and encourage technology diffusion for China in 
order to prove that the decision of entering to the WTO and accepting TRIPS was right. 
There was no other policy available to protect technology in China, which meant there 
was no other choice for protecting technology, so most executives considered that the 
current IPRs protection was the best policy to protect technology and promote 
technology diffusion in China. 
6.4. Analysing official statistics 
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Source: Complied from “China Science and Technology Statistics Data Book 1998-2005” of Ministry of 
Science and Technology of P.R.C. 
Chart 2 shows R&D expenditure and the percentage of R&D expenditure in GDP in 
China from 1991 to 2005. This chart demonstrates that R&D expenditure increased 
gradually from 1991 to 2005. R&D expenditure increased sharply from 2001 to 2005. 
Although the percentage of R&D expenditure in GDP decreased from 1992 to 1999, it 
increased from 1999to 2005. It is known from the background of IPRs development in 
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China in chapter four that China started to reform and strengthen its IPRs policy from 
the early stage of 1980s and its IPRs policy obtained substantial development from 
1990s. China acceded to the WTO in 2001 after almost 15 years endeavour. During 
which time, China‟s IPRs policy improved greatly. Thus, the increase on R&D 
expenditure from 1991 to 2005 was consistent with the process that China gradually 
strengthened its IPRs protection policy for WTO accession. The sharp increase in R&D 
expenditure from 2001 to 2005 and the rise of the percentage of R&D expenditure in 
GDP in China from 1999 to 2005 also show that stronger IPRs policy obtained from 
WTO accession caused more R&D expenditure. Since research process is risky, more 
investment in R&D means more likelihood of producing new innovations. Therefore, if 
stronger IPRs protection brings more investment to R&D, it indicates that stronger IPRs 
protection has positive impact on technology development. 

















Source: Complied from “World Development Indicator” by World Bank April 2006. 
Chart 3 shows that the total numbers of patent applications by non-residents and by 
residents in China from 1995 to 2002. It is shown that the total numbers of patent 
applications by non-residents and by residents in China both increased from 1995 to 
2002 except a little decrease in 1999, which occurred while the country was applying 
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stronger IPRs protection policy. This means that based on stronger IPRs policy, there 
were more patented technologies developed by foreigners and Chinese residents in 
China from 1995 to 2002. However, it also demonstrated that the total number of patent 
applications by non-residents in each year from 1995 to 2002 was more than total 
number of patent applications by Chinese residents. This means that foreigners applied 
for more patents than Chinese residents in China from 1995 to 2002 with IPRs 
protection policy improving. These official statistics indicate two aspects. On one hand, 
based on stronger IPRs protection, more foreign innovators applied for patents in China, 
which brought a positive impact on technology development and diffusion in China, 
because the application forms of foreign patents might include some technological 
information that could help technology diffusion in China and when these patents expire, 
Chinese firms could use these technologies free of charge. On the other hand, this 
statistics also showed that the number of foreign patents was much more than that of 
Chinese patents in China. This means that most technologies were controlled by foreign 
innovators. In order to get more technologies, Chinese firms still needed to transfer 
technologies from foreign innovators, who had the right to decide whether or not to 
transfer technology to Chinese firms and the price of their technologies. 



















Source: Complied from “World Development Indicator” by World Bank April 2006. 
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Chart 4 displays royalty and license fees payments and receipts by China from 1997 to 
2004. It is shown that both royalty and license fees payments and receipts increased 
from 1997 to 2004, with a slight decrease in payments in 1998 and a slight decrease in 
receipts in 2003. This increase also occurred when China reinforced its IPRs policy for 
WTO accession. However, it also shows that the total of royalty and license fees receipt 
was far less than royalty and license fees payments for China in each year from 1997 to 
2004. This meant that with Chinese IPRs protection policy improving, China obtained 
more money from royalty and license fees but made losses on royalty and license fee 
payments. The increase in royalty and license fee payments shows two aspects. One was 
that the number of patented foreign technologies increased because of stronger IPRs 
protection. This was good for technology diffusion in China. Another one was that the 
price of patented foreign technologies increased, but the number of patented foreign 
technologies did not increase as much, based on the same IPRs protection. If the 
increase in the price of patented foreign technologies was a result of the fact that 
stronger IPRs protection provided the right for foreign innovators to ask for higher 
prices for their patented technologies, then the increase in the price of patented 
technologies could mean that stronger IPRs protection brought a negative impact on 
technology transfer in China. Because the exact price of each technology transferred 
from foreign countries to China was not available, the increase in royalty and licensee 
fee payments could not show the exact impact of stronger IPRs protection on 
technology transfer in China. However, the statistics of royalty and licence fee 
payments and receipts in China shows that China made more payments than receipts on 
royalty and licensee fees with China‟s IPRs policy becoming stronger. 
6.5. Analysing other sources 
This research also collected information from other sources, including television 
programs and interviews with government officials. These sources were not specifically 
selected from other available ones. These sources used in this section just appeared 
fortuitously. Any unexpected data was only collected, if it was useful for in this research, 
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so, this part summarizes the analytical results for these sources. 
Living History program in Hong Kong Star TV 
On June 6
th
 2007, the program of Living History of the Star TV invited composer 
Haiying Li. During the interview, this composer said that copyright protection in China 
was not very good; however, he would still produce new songs and new music. He also 
said that his work would not be affected by IPRs protection policy. Producing new 
songs and music was one part of his life according to his representation. 
This material showed that some authors and composers do not pay attention to IPRs 
protection and they just want to produce more works, which was an important part 
pursued by them in their whole lives. This information proved that some authors would 
still produce more works without good IPRs policy. 
CCTV News program in China Central Television 1 (CCTV1) 
On June 16
th
 2007, CCTV News introduced that a Chinese firm took about two years to 
learn and absorb all relevant technologies for a gas-fired set from General Electric of the 
USA through using the market to exchange their technology. Although the American 
firm tried to use technologies to control China, the potential large market was one of the 
main factors attracting foreign technologies to China. However, it also showed that 
without IPRs protection reform in China, it was impossible for China to develop 
technological cooperation with foreign companies and transfer technology from foreign 
countries. 
This material provided four important points for this research. Firstly, China‟s enforcing 
stronger IPRs protection gave an opportunity for developing technology cooperating 
with foreign companies and transferring technology from foreign countries. Secondly, 
foreign countries still set many restrictions to prevent Chinese firms from learning their 
technologies, especially the high technologies in order to control Chinese technological 
development. Thirdly, the ability of Chinese firms and people for developing and 
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absorbing new technology was enhanced greatly. And lastly, China‟s big market was 
one of the most important reasons to attract foreign companies to transfer their 
technologies to China. 
The first interview with a government official 
This interviewee worked in the government department, whose main responsibility was 
to promote trade and communications among different kinds of Chinese firms. He 
acknowledged that the “open market” and other policies that promoting foreign trade 
were important points to attract foreign companies to put their products into Chinese 
market, which could also encourage technology transfer to China. Moreover, sometimes 
these policies could had more important effects than IPRs protection. 
The second interview with a government official 
This interviewee worked for the department that was in charge of administrating 
state-owned companies in China. The interviewee said that state-owned firms in China 
paid more attention to IPRs protection, because they had enough capital and the support 
from the Chinese government. Private firms usually could not invest a lot on R&D 
because most Chinese private firms were small-scale firms that did not have enough 
capital for research. Moreover, firms in the electronic sector and the pharmaceutical 
sector paid more attention to IPRs protection, because products in these two sectors 
advanced very quickly. This interviewee also considered that firms in the traditional 
food, textile and rubber sectors did not pay attention to IPRs protection because they 
were high labour intensive rather than high technology firms. 
6.6. Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter provides the analytical results for all kinds of fieldwork data, 
including interview data, questionnaire data, official statistics and information from 
other sources. It shows that China enforced stronger IPRs protection since the country 
tried to accede to the WTO, which were perceived by most technological executives in 
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selected industries except the traditional food and the textile industries. Enforcing 
stronger IPRs protection had both positive and negative impacts on technology diffusion 
in China. The impact of stronger IPRs protection on technology diffusion varied with 
different industries, different sizes, different legal statuses of Chinese firms and other 
relevant policies in China. This chapter has analysed different kinds of data obtained 
from fieldwork. It does not apply relevant arguments to analyse the results. The next 

















Theoretical analyses of fieldwork results 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Based on the analytical results for all kinds of fieldwork data obtained in chapter six, 
this chapter focuses on the theoretical analysis of the fieldwork results. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to apply the relevant theories and arguments related to IPRs 
protection and technology diffusion to analyse the fieldwork results. This chapter 
combines the summary of different fieldwork data in order to compare them and draw 
results for fieldwork analyses, then applies relevant theories and arguments to do 
theoretical analyses of the fieldwork results. It uses arguments about IPRs protection 
and domestic technology development to analyse fieldwork results to show the 
similarities and differences between the fieldwork results and the relevant literature. It 
also explores some arguments about the relationship between IPRs protection and 
technology diffusion in China. Then this chapter applies arguments to the relationship 
between IPRs protection and technology transfer in different aspects to analyse the 
fieldwork results to illustrate the similarities and differences between these research 
results and other relevant arguments.  
7.2. Combination of different analytical results 
Combining the analyses of different data, including interview data, questionnaire data, 
official statistics and other sources, there are some important points that can be 
generalised. 
1) While trying to accede to the WTO, China reinforced its IPRs protection. This change 
was experienced by all kinds of executives in the selected firms except the traditional 
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food and the textile firms. However, executives of these firms also got to know about 
IPRs reform from other channels, such as the promulgation of government regulations. 
This point was gathered from interview and questionnaire data. One may argue that 
China‟s IPRs protection policy, especially the enforcement of IPRs protection in China 
is still weak compared with IPRs protection in developed countries. This is true. China‟s 
IPRs protection policy, especially the enforcement of IPRs, is not as good as that in the 
developed countries. However, the change and improvement of IPRs protection policy 
and its enforcement in China should be noted. The legal regulations and enforcement on 
IPRs protection policy in China turned from none to its current state, which is a great 
enhancement for China. 
2) Firms in different industrial sectors had different sensitivities to IPRs protection. In 
general, firms in the pharmaceutical, chemical, petroleum, electronic and software 
sectors had high sensitivity to IPRs protection; firms in the machinery, primary metal 
and transportation equipment sectors had medium sensitivity to IPRs protection; and 
firms in traditional food and textile sectors had low sensitivity to IPRs protection. This 
was demonstrated from interview and questionnaire data as well as other sources. 
3) Big firms and state-owned firms paid more attention to IPRs protection, while the 
degree of concern to IPRs protection by small firms and most private firms was less in 
comparison. This point was learned from interview, questionnaire data and other 
sources. 
4) Stronger IPRs protection in China pushed different kinds of firms to input more 
money, labour and sources into R&D, which was gathered from interview, questionnaire 
data and official statistics. Stronger IPRs protection also increased the total amount of 
domestic technology being developed, which was learnt from interview and 
questionnaire data as well as official statistics. In fact, stronger IPRs protection had 
encouraged more domestic technology development than technology transfer. 
According to the fieldwork, most technological executives explained that before China 
strengthened its IPRs protection, foreign firms had already required protection of their 
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technologies by applying foreign IPRs protection at the time of negotiating with 
Chinese firms about transferring technology to China through different legal channels. 
Contracts were usually used to ensure that foreign IPRs protection was applied to 
technologies transferred to targeted Chinese firms. Thus, even before the country made 
stronger IPRs protection, Chinese firms still could get some technologies transferred 
from foreign firms. However, at the time, foreign firms could not get good protection 
for their technologies from relevant Chinese firms except those who obtained their 
transferred technologies through legal channels. This showed that the environment of 
IPRs protection in China before the country made stronger IPRs policy was not good. 
After China reinforced stronger IPRs protection, IPRs protection environment in China 
became better. Foreign firms could not only obtain IPRs protection through contract 
terms, but also use existing Chinese IPRs regulations to get protection for their 
technologies from other Chinese firms that did not receive their technologies. It is worth 
mentioning that the amount of technology transferred from foreign countries did not 
increase greatly after China reinforced its IPRs protection, as Chinese firms had already 
had some technologies transferred even before the reinforcement. For domestic 
technology development, technological executives thought that before China made 
stronger IPRs protection, there was no good protection on technologies for Chinese 
firms, which led to the fact that new technologies could not bring great benefit for 
Chinese firms, as a result, firms had no motivation to do R&D. After the country tried to 
join the WTO and made stronger IPRs protection, technology protection improved 
gradually and Chinese firms were able to get benefit from new technologies they 
developed. Moreover, the number of researchers and the capacity of doing R&D in 
China were both increasing. There was a great increase in domestic technology 
development after China tried to accede to the WTO and implemented stronger IPRs 
protection. These could be learnt from interview and questionnaire data. 
5) Stronger IPRs protection also had negative impacts on technology development and 
diffusion. It pushed most firms to invest in preventing pirating of their technologies. It 
also greatly encumbered technology development and diffusion through imitation. 
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Stronger IPRs protection also provided the opportunities for firms to delay the 
commercial production of their new technologies. Moreover, although there were more 
technologies transferred from foreign countries to China based on stronger IPRs policy, 
most of these were either basic technologies, whose development depended on further 
technology transfer from foreign firms, or technologies which could not bring great 
benefit. Chinese firms needed to pay more for technology transfer from foreign 
countries. These points were gathered by interview, questionnaire data and official 
statistics. 
6) Without good IPRs protection and with many imitations, some firms could still 
obtain benefit from their technologies and there was still some technology transfer 
because China‟s big open market and other favourable policies attracted foreign 
companies to transfer their technologies to China. Moreover, without good IPRs 
protection, some authors still wanted to publish their works. These could be found from 
interview, questionnaire data and other sources. 
7) Other policies, including the “Open Door” policy, policies that encouraged economic 
development in China, policies that encouraged R&D, favourable terms in foreign 
investment policies, policies that supported the development of some industries, and 
China‟s big open market, also promoted technology development and diffusion in 
China. 
8) Most of the selected interviewees in this fieldwork considered that the current IPRs 
protection was the best policy to encourage technology development and diffusion. 
Almost all interviewees believed that they were better off with stronger IPRs policy, that 
it was necessary to further reinforce IPRs protection in China, and that there was no 
disadvantage in the current IPRs system. However, when talking about detailed impact 
on technology diffusion by the current IPRs policy, they could also tell that there was a 
negative impact brought by the current IPRs policy on technology diffusion. This 
phenomenon showed that government propaganda and conventional ideas made people 
believe that the current IPRs policy was the best method to protect technology and 
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encourage technology diffusion. Moreover, because there were no other feasible policies 
available, people believed that the current IPRs policy was the best one. 
To sum up, the Chinese government enforced stronger IPRs policy since the country 
tried to enter the WTO. This had encouraged the domestic technology development in 
China more than that of technology transfer. It also had some negative impact on 
technology diffusion in the country. Moreover, the impact of IPRs policy on technology 
diffusion was different in different industries, different size and legal status of firms and 
in different conditions of other relevant policies. 
7.3. Analysing fieldwork results using arguments about IPRs 
and domestic technology development 
Firstly, utilitarians discussed IPRs protection from the economic view. The fieldwork 
results demonstrate both similarities and differences with utilitarian arguments. As 
David (1993) summarised, utilitarians believed that information and knowledge as 
commodities had characteristics like “public good”. Without special measures to protect 
information as a commodity, information itself will be automatically diffused and 
people can know and use it without paying anything, therefore, utilitarians thought that 
it was better to provide a monopoly power obtained from IPRs protection to the creators 
of technologies to help securing their benefit from innovating technological information, 
otherwise innovators of technological information would not want to do R&D any more 
because they could not obtain enough return to cover their cost. This utilitarian 
argument indicates three points. 1. Utilitarians considered that it was easy to obtain 
technology and it costs nothing to know and use technology, if there was no special 
measure to protect the technology, since technological information had characteristics 
like public goods. The fieldwork results show that without special protection, some 
technologies, such as pharmaceutical, chemical and software technology, could be 
obtained easily through reverse engineering. However, not all kinds of technologies 
could be acquired easily. According to fieldwork results, technologies in machinery and 
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transportation equipment sectors were not so easy to obtain. Moreover, it is also known 
from the fieldwork results that there was a cost to know and use technological 
information invented by other people. Imitators still needed to do reverse engineering, 
which incurs costs. Interviewees said that it was needed to do reverse engineering to 
learn and get technologies developed by others even if there was no IPRs protection on 
technology or no restriction on imitation. But they admitted that the cost of reverse 
engineering was lower than the cost of R&D carried out by the inventors. And for this, 
many firms were willing to get technologies through imitation to cut the cost. 2. 
Utilitarians also believed that without the monopoly power of IPRs protection, 
technology innovators could not obtain enough return to cover their cost. These 
fieldwork results demonstrate that without IPRs protection and even if technologies 
were imitated by others, not all firms would lose their benefit to cover their costs in 
doing R&D. If technologies were imitated by others, firms with production capability 
that wass quite difficult to obtain in a short time, could still receive enough financial 
return to cover the cost of R&D. However, firms with production capability that was 
easy to obtain in a short time, such as software companies and small electronic 
companies, might not be able to cover the cost of R&D. 3. Utilitarians also thought that 
without IPRs protection, technology creators would not want to do R&D any more. This 
research obtained different results on this point. Some interviewees considered that their 
firms would still do R&D on new technology even if there was no IPRs policy. And 
some authors, who only wanted to make their names known, would still publish their 
works even when pirated publications appear in the market. In addition, some people 
put forward some questions on the utilitarian view. 1. David (1992:34) summarised that 
IPRs protection policy provided monopoly power to innovators, which caused 
innovators not to worry about the appearance of potential entrants through imitating 
existing innovations. With good IPRs protection, innovators could add additional prices 
to their innovative productions and consumers had to pay higher price on the innovative 
products (McCulloch, Winters and Cirera, 2002:210). This can lead to the fact that 
benefit gained by society and consumers from using innovations will be lower than that 
in competitive markets, which is called the deadweight burden problem (David, 
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1993:34). This fieldwork results found the same problem. It is shown from the 
fieldwork results that if technology was imitated by others, firms with production 
capability that was quite difficult to obtain in a short time, could still have benefit to 
cover the cost of R&D. These firms did not need IPRs protection to ensure their return 
to cover their research costs. However, with monopoly power provided by better IPRs 
protection policy, these firms could increase the price of their technological products to 
obtain more benefit, in which case, IPRs protection policy became a method of earning 
extra profit. 2. David (1993:35) also indicated that many new innovations needed 
previous research results and inventions. If these have been protected by IPRs 
protection, researchers would need to pay royalties, which are not affordable for all 
researchers, and this may slow down development and research (David, 1993:35). This 
problem is the so called intermediate information inputs problem. The fieldwork results 
also prove this problem. Some interviewees said that their firms could implement and 
improve some patented technologies but because the owners of these patented 
technologies did not want to sell and the patent were still up-to-date; these firms had to 
wait until these patents expire. This illuminated the problem of intermediate information 
inputs when using IPRs to protect technology. 
Secondly, some people were against IPRs protection policy. Boldrin and Levine (2005:8) 
believed that the intellectual monopoly brought by IPRs protection policy created 
“many social costs”. They considered that intellectual monopoly was not necessary and 
competition could provide stable growth in innovations. The fieldwork results do not 
fully support this argument. The fieldwork results show that if technology was imitated 
by others, firms whose production capability was quite difficult to obtain in a short time 
could still have benefit to cover the cost of doing R&D. IPRs protection was just used 
by these firms to earn extra profit. By contrast, firms whose production capability was 
easy to obtain in a short time, could not obtain benefits to cover their R&D costs, if their 
technology was imitated by others. If there was no IPRs protection, R&D in these firms 
would reduce greatly and these firms would turn to imitation to cut their costs. IPRs 
protection was therefore necessary for these firms to gain benefit and stimulate 
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innovative activities. Moreover, this fieldwork shows that although the number of 
technologies would reduce without IPRs protection, some technologies would still be 
developed in those firms mentioned in this fieldwork. This means that in competitive 
markets and without IPRs protection, there are still some technologies available. 
Thirdly, Thurow (1997:95-103) believed that a uniform size of IPRs protection system 
could not fit all types of inventions in different industries and conditions. He suggested 
that there should be different types of patents according to different industries, different 
kinds of knowledge and different “types of innovators” (Thurow, 1997:95-103). These 
fieldwork results show that different industries had different sensitivities to IPRs policy 
in China. The IPRs policy had different impacts on technology development and 
diffusion in different industries. For some industries, such as the pharmaceutical, 
chemical, petroleum, electronic and software industries, IPRs protection was widely 
applied and the change of IPRs protection had great impact on technology development 
and diffusion. However, for some industries, such as the traditional food and textile 
industries, IPRs protection was of little use. These fieldwork results show that IPRs 
protection policy had different impacts in firms with different kinds of production 
capability. This fieldwork results also show that the impact of IPRs policy on 
technology diffusion in China was different in different legal statuses and different sizes 
of firms. Moreover, other relevant policies also had influences on the relation between 
IPRs protection and technology diffusion. These fieldwork results support Thurow‟s 
(1997) arguments. It is reasonable to set up an alternative IPRs protection system to 
embody different patents according to different industries, different knowledge, 
different innovators and different conditions of innovations. 
Fourthly, some people found that the relation between IPRs protection and domestic 
technology development depended on other factors, such as different industries and 
other policies. 1. A research done by Levin et al (1987) showed that in pharmaceuticals 
and chemicals industries, R&D executives paid more attention to patents, which meant 
that patents had a crucial effect in encouraging innovative activities in these two 
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industries. In other industries, patents had not been important in protecting productions 
and producing processes (Levin et al, 1987:796-797). Mansfield (1986) found that 
patents were quite significant for the development or commercial introduction of 30% 
or more of innovations in pharmaceuticals and chemicals industries; was important for 
the development and commercial introduction of about 10-20% of innovations in 
industries of “petroleum, machinery and fabricated metal products”; and had only 
limited effect on development and commercial introduction in the “electrical equipment, 
office equipment, motor vehicles, instruments, primary metals, rubber and textiles” 
industries (Mansfield, 1986). For the industries of “office equipment, motor vehicles, 
rubber and textiles”, R&D executives of these firms all agreed that patents were not 
significant for innovation development and their commercial production (Mansfield, 
1986). Taylor and Silberston (1973) found that R&D in the pharmaceutical and 
chemical industries relied on patents, while R&D in mechanical engineering and 
electronics industries did not rely on patents. These fieldwork results show that IPRs 
protection policy had different impacts in different industries, which was similar to 
research done by Levin et al (1987), Mansfield (1986) and Taylor and Siberston (1973). 
However, these fieldwork results indicate that industries‟ sensitivities to IPRs protection 
policy were not exactly the same as the arguments of Levin et al (1987) and Mansfield 
(1986). These fieldwork results show that firms in the pharmaceutical, chemical, 
petroleum and electronic sectors were highly sensitive to IPRs protection; firms in the 
machinery, primary metals and transportation equipment sectors were medium sensitive 
to IPRs protection; firms in traditional food and textile sectors were poorly sensitive to 
IPRs protection policy; and publishing and software sectors had great interest with 
copyright in IPRs protection. The reasons for this difference were the following, 
according to the explanation of technological executives attended the interviews. In 
China, the petroleum sector was considered important to the security for the whole 
nation, and the Chinese government had invested a lot in R&D in this sector, so there 
were a lot of patented technologies in this sector and different kinds of Chinese 
petroleum firms had heated competition in doing R&D. Therefore, these firms cared 
about IPRs protection more and they were quite sensitive to IPRs policy. The electronic 
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sector in China was a relatively new and high-tech industrial sector, and the government 
also encouraged the development of this sector. Moreover, products and technologies in 
this sector updated rapidly. Therefore, this sector held comparatively more technologies 
than other sectors in China. Consequently, Chinese electronic firms paid more attention 
on IPRs protection and were quite sensitive to IPRs protection. Stronger IPRs protection 
brought more technological changes in sectors that were quite sensitive to IPRs 
protection; but less in sectors that were medium sensitive to IPRs protection policy; and 
could not encourage technology development in sectors that were low sensitive to IPRs 
policy. 2. Maskus (1997:8) fiound that the impact of IPRs protection also had indirect 
relationship with other policies, such as “trade and investment policies, industrial 
policies, including research and production subsidies, public-health and environmental 
regulations, and commercial controls”. These fieldwork results also prove this argument. 
This fieldwork finds that other Chinese policies also promoted domestic technology 
development based on stronger IPRs protection. Interviewees said that the “Open Door” 
policy, policies that encouraged economic development, policies that encouraged R&D 
and policies that encouraged some industries‟ development boosted domestic 
technology development. Stronger IPRs protection encouraged domestic technology 
development in China. Moreover, the Chinese government also implemented a policy of 
encouraging R&D, such as providing prizes for innovating firms, which accelerated the 
speed of domestic technology development in China. Interviewees said that industrial 
policies, such as those that encouraged the development of the electronic industry and 
software industry, also promoted technology development and diffusion in relevant 
industries. 
Finally, Bessen and Maskin (2000) indicated that if the innovation was “sequential and 
complementary”, patent rights might decrease “overall innovation”. They believed that 
if the innovations were “sequential and complementary”, imitation would have positive 
impact on encouraging inventions and stronger IPRs protection would restrict 
innovations. This research obtains similar result with this argument. Some interviews 
expressed that because of stronger IPRs protection, many firms tried their best to protect 
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their technologies. It was more difficult to obtain patented technology. Without some 
important information in previous innovations, some improvement and new technology 
based on previous innovations could not be realized. This made the pace of improving 
technology slower than before.  
7.4. Analysing fieldwork results using arguments about IPRs 
and technology transfer 
Firstly, some people put forward some possible problems aroused by IPRs protection 
from the utilitarian view. 1. McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2002:210) generalised, 
based on good IPRs protection, that innovators could add additional prices to their 
innovative productions and consumers had to pay higher prices for the innovative 
productions. These fieldwork results show this problem. Most interviewees stated that 
based on stronger IPRs protection, foreign firms could increase the prices of their 
technologies when transferring their technologies to Chinese firms. 2. David (1993) 
summarised the intermediate information inputs problem. This means that if previous 
research results and inventions have enjoyed IPRs protection, researchers need to pay 
royalties for previous inventions. Some researchers cannot afford the royalty, which can 
lead to slower development of the research process. This fieldwork also detects this 
problem in technology transfer from foreign countries to China. Some interviewees said 
that based on stronger IPRs protection, important technologies, which could bring great 
profit, were strictly controlled by the firms who owned them. Although there were more 
technologies transferred from foreign countries to China after the country reformed its 
IPRs policy, most of these technologies were either basic technologies, whose 
development depended on further technology transfer from foreign firms, or 
technologies that could not bring great benefit. Without further technology transfer from 
foreign countries, Chinese firms could not obtain great benefit, nor could they do further 
R&D. However, sometimes, foreign firms did not want to transfer their important 
technologies to Chinese firms, or set high prices for transferring their important 
technologies, which were not affordable to these Chinese firms. Based on stronger IPRs 
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protection, imitation was no longer an option to obtain these important technologies and 
this delayed the research process of these firms. 
Secondly, Maskus (1998:134) believed that IPRs protection had two different and 
opposite influences on technology transfer. On one hand, IPRs protection can promote 
technology transfer, because domestic companies can utilize information in IPRs 
applications to do follow-up innovations without infringing the original right on 
patented technologies. On the other hand, IPRs protection can also reduce the speed of 
technology transfer and diffusion, because IPRs protection gives owners of innovations 
the capability to prohibit local firms from using significant technologies by adding 
restrictive articles in licensing agreements. This fieldwork also shows that stronger IPRs 
protection had two opposite impacts on technology transfer in China. This fieldwork 
indicated that on one aspect, stronger IPRs protection attracted foreign firms to transfer 
their technologies to Chinese firms, because it provided better protection for their 
technologies. Interviewees expressed another aspect that stronger IPRs protection, 
which offered power to foreign firms to control their technologies through reducing the 
chance of imitation, also gave foreign firms the ability to increase the prices of their 
technologies, and add restrictive articles to preserve their core technologies when 
transferring their technologies to Chinese firms. This brought a negative impact on 
technology transfer and diffusion. 
Thirdly, some people believed that stronger IPRs protection brings negative impacts on 
technology transfer. 1. As Kanwar and Evenson (2003:237) summarised, Roffe deemed 
that IPRs protection, especially patents, could result in patent abuse in developing 
countries. “Inadequate disclose” of patent is a common form of patent abuse, which is 
described in detail in the third Chapter (Kanwar and Evenson, 2003:237). Without 
significant knowledge of the invention, even skilled persons cannot acquire the 
innovation after the patent expires, which prohibits the development of domestic 
technology. This fieldwork result also proves this issue. Some interviewees said that 
their firms could not get the core technologies when transferring technology from 
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foreign firms through different channels. They also expressed that without the core 
technologies, even if the patent expires, their firms could not obtain the technologies or 
do improvements based on the technologies. 2. Mengistie (2003:11-13) considered that 
under IPRs protection, foreign technology holders could use unreasonable articles in 
licensing contracts to restrict technology transfer to developing countries, such as 
prohibiting licensees doing technological development based on licensed technologies, 
regulations that licensees had obligations to transfer their improvements based on 
licensed technologies to licensers and restricting firms of developing countries using 
technology even after the patent expires. Under patent protection, increases in the prices 
of foreign technologies and foreign innovative products also have negative impact on 
technology transfer to developing countries. These phenomena are also shown in this 
research. Most selected interviewees indicated these points during doing interviews. 
Some executives said that foreign firms used restrictive articles to prevent Chinese 
firms from doing technological development based on technologies transferred from 
them. Even after agreeing to transfer their technologies to Chinese firms, foreign firms 
still tried to prevent Chinese firms from learning about their core technologies. 
Although stronger IPRs protection policy gave more power to foreign firms to set 
restrictions and unreasonable articles in transferring their technologies to China, 
Chinese firms have great abilities to learn and absorb new technologies. However, 
stronger IPRs protection made the process of learning and absorbing foreign 
technologies much longer than before. Through the analyses of official statistics, it is 
shown that China spent increasingly more money in royalty and license fees payments 
with Chinese IPRs protection policy turning better. 
Fourthly, some people considered that the relation between IPRs protection and 
technology transfer from foreign countries to China depended on other factors. Falvey 
and Foster (2005:7) believed that stronger IPRs protection encouraged technology 
transfer and diffusion in countries, which had good “capacity for innovation or 
imitation”, take open trade policies, and have large market size. Without these 
conditions, technology transfer and diffusion would tend to be restricted in a country. 
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This means that it is possible that stronger IPRs protection can encourage technology 
transfer and international technology diffusion through the channels of imports, FDI, 
licensing and foreign patenting. However, this is just a possibility and it depends on 
other factors. This fieldwork also proves this argument. Interviewees considered that the 
policies for encouraging foreign investment in China also played an important role in 
promoting technology transfer from foreign countries to China. This fieldwork also 
indicated that China‟s big market also attracted foreign firms to transfer their 
technologies to China through different channels even if China IPRs protection was not 
as good as that of their own countries, because the big market could bring great benefit 
to these firms. China‟s open and big market attracted foreign firms to do different kinds 
of investment in China. Some foreign firms directly invested in China and set up a firm. 
Chinese workers working in the firm could learn some technological information about 
foreign technologies. Some foreign firms used their technologies as investment to 
cooperate with Chinese firms, and these firms could then use these technologies. Other 
foreign firms wanted to sell their technological products in China and the technology 
contained in these products could be learnt by Chinese firms. All of these different kinds 
of activities could bring positive impacts on technology diffusion in China. 
7.5. Arguments about IPRs and technology diffusion in China 
There are some Chinese articles. Although these papers did not aim to investigate the 
general relationship between IPRs protection and technology diffusion in China, they 
involved some useful arguments about this research. The useful arguments in these 
papers can be applied to make comparisons with the results of this research to generalise 
the unique and specific conclusions obtained in this research, which are also the 
contributions of this research. Therefore, these Chinese works are very important 
Some researchers argued that IPRs protection encouraged technology development and 
diffusion in China in different aspects. 
1) Deli Yang (2003) investigated the history of IPRs protection development, including 
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the evolutionary change before and after the “Open Door” policy in China. He also 
analysed the reasons for improving IPRs protection in China. Yang (2003) also explored 
the effect of the change on IPRs protection in China. Yang (2003) summarized that the 
improvement of IPRs protection greatly encouraged the use of the IPRs system, which 
showed the tremendous technological development in China. He mentioned that the 
applications for invention patents by residents and non-residents in China both 
increased from 1990s, although the applications for invention patents by non-residents 
were more than those by residents in China. Moreover, Chinese people “are making 
progress in technology development” during the improving of IPRs protection policy, 
because “the gap between foreign and local invention patent holders is gradually 
narrowing down from 1995” (Yang 2003:139). The lower level of innovative activities 
was also encouraged by the change of IPRs protection policy, because the utility model 
increased dramatically in China during the change of IPRs policy. “Major developed 
countries”, especially the USA, Japan and EU, played an important role in improving 
technology development in China through the data of foreign intellectual property flows 
to China (Yang 2003:139). In addition, with the improvement of IPRs protection policy, 
copyright protection also improved in China. Yang (2003: 141) also demonstrated the 
imperfection of current IPRs protection system in China, including “inadequate 
punishment for counterfeiting and plagiarism, unreasonable restrictions on copyright 
holders‟ rights, limited protection on integrated circuits and lack of the necessary 
control of the abuse of intellectual property”. Thus, he pleaded for constant 
improvement in the legal regulations and enforcement of current IPRs protection system 
in China. 
2) Yueh (2009:304) applied “a simple model of patent production in China” obtained 
from the patent regulation system to explore the impact of patent system and IPRs 
protection on innovation in China while China reformed its IPRs system. Yueh (2009) 
found that innovations protected by patents had increased in China while the reform 
period, although the IPRs system was still imperfect. In spite of the fact that innovation 
was not only determined by IPRs regulation system, but also determined by other 
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factors, such as “R&D personnel” and “provincial traits”, patent regulations in China 
“produced a steady rate of growth of patents across the country” (Yueh 2009:312). This 
shows that the reform of IPRs protection system including the patent system, indeed 
encourages the development of innovations captured by patent in China. 
3) Meyer (2001:140) pointed that China created a favourable environment for 
multinational corporations in developed countries to do business through “transferring 
new technology” in China. The fact that IPRs protection in China was becoming better 
respected plays an important role in creating the favourable environment for transferring 
technology from multinational corporations to China. This implies that Meyer believed 
that better IPRs protection encouraged technology transfer from foreign countries to 
China. 
4) Awokuse and Yin (2010:1) used econometric methods to discuss the influence of 
IPRs protection regulations reform on “bilateral trade flows” in China. They applied 
“trade data for 20 product sectors” from “36 countries, including 21 OECD countries 
and 15 non-OECD countries”, which were “top trading partners with a significant 
number of patent application filings in China” to analyse the impact of IPRs reform in 
China‟s bilateral trade flows (Awokuse and Yin 2010:5). They also divided product 
sectors into two kinds of groups: “knowledge-intensive products (mainly outputs from 
science-based industrial sectors) and non-knowledge-intensive products (mainly outputs 
from traditional or low-tech industrial sectors)” (Awokuse and Yin 2010:5). They found 
that stronger IPRs protection had positive impact on imports from foreign countries to 
China.  
5) Awokuse and Yin (2009:2) used “a panel data from 38 countries” to explore the 
influence of IPRs protection regulation reform on encouraging FDI from 1992-2005 in 
China. They also investigated “the possibility that effect of IPRs protection on FDI may 
vary by the level of economic development in partner countries” (Awokuse and Yin 
2009:2). They found that stricter IPRs protection played a very positive and important 
role in encouraging and attracting FDI, although “market size, regional integration and 
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transportation and trade costs” were also the factors that affect the FDI flows in China 
(Awokuse and Yin 2009:7). 
6) Bosworth and Yang (2000) investigated the relationship between IPRs protection law 
and technology transfer through the channel of licensing activity in China. They 
believed that whether corporations of advanced countries were more willing to 
exchange technology with non-advanced countries greatly relied on the existing IPRs 
protection system that safeguards the benefit of technology holders in non-advanced 
countries. Moreover, they considered that IPRs protection system should be strong 
enough and be enforced efficiently in developing countries to encourage technology 
transfer from developed countries. They explored the important changes of IPRs 
regulation, analysed the internal and external reasons for the change of IPRs policy, and 
discussed the influence of new IPRs regulations on intellectual activities as well as on 
the potential for encouraging licensing in China. More importantly, they investigated the 
impact of IPRs reform on the “flow of patents, designs, trademarks and utility models” 
from other countries to China, as these flows were the “forerunners of technology 
transfer and licensing activities by foreign and Chinese firms” (Bosworth and Yang 
2000: 455). They found that although technology transfer via license from the USA and 
Japan decreased at the beginning of the 1990s because of “political and administrative 
reasons”, with the introduction and improvement of IPRs protection, intellectual 
property flows from developed countries to China were increased in general, which had 
the “potential for licensing” chances (Bosworth and Yang 2000: 476). However, they 
also noticed the weaknesses of current IPRs protection system both in the enforcement 
and in the legal regulations and suggested doing further improvements on China‟s IPRs 
system in order to encourage more technology inflows. 
Some researchers argued that IPRs protection could not have positive impacts on 
technology development and diffusion, especially through FDI. 
1) Lanoszka (2003:186) suggested that developed countries desired high levels of IPRs 
protection in the whole world and developed countries believed that stronger IPRs 
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protection could bring benefits for economic development in developing countries. 
Lanoszka (2003) pointed that in the view of developed countries, stronger IPRs 
protection in developing countries established by TRIPS ensured the benefit for 
innovators in developed countries, which created a good investment background for 
corporations in developed countries for FDI in developing countries. Thus, in the view 
of developed countries, stronger IPRs protection would bring more FDI in developing 
countries. However, Lanoszka (2003) demonstrated that there was no evidence to 
support this. Lanoszka (2003) pointed that in the past 20 years, China did not have good 
IPRs protection, however, the flow of FDI in China had increased dramatically. This 
means that according to Lanoszka，there was no evidence to prove that stronger IPRs 
protection in developing countries, such as China, encouraged FDI from developed 
countries. 
2) Yu (2007) indicated in his research on the relationship between IPRs protection and 
FDI that stronger IPRs protection obtained from IPRs protection reform in China did 
not attract FDI in China. He found that although IPRs protection in China remained 
inadequate and the enforcement of IPRs protection in China was not effective compared 
with that in developed countries, there is still much FDI flowing into China. He (2007:1) 
explained that the fact that foreign investors were attracted to invest in China was not 
because of the reform of IPRs protection policy, but because they wanted to take 
advantage of the lower costs, China‟ big market, China‟s “inefficient economic system” 
and the favourable policies for foreign firms in China. This means that Yu did not 
believe that stronger IPRs protection could encourage FDI in China. 
In general, most researchers supported the idea that IPRs protection reform had 
encouraged domestic technology development and technology transfer through different 
channels. However, some researchers pointed out that IPRs protection did not have 
positive impacts on the flow of FDI to China. FDI is another possible channel to bring 
technology from foreign countries to China. According to these researchers, IPRs 
protection did not encourage FDI flows into China, which means that IPRs protection 
Page 189 
could not have positive impacts on technology transfer through FDI.  
7.6. Unique results obtained in this research 
Through comparing this research with previous literatures and arguments, especially the 
arguments about the relationship between IPRs protection and technology diffusion in 
China, there are some special unique points generalised from this research. This section 
explores these unique results summarised from this research. 
There are some special results about the relationship between IPRs protection reform 
and domestic technology development in China. 1. Without IPRs protection, many 
Chinese firms would still do R&D. Most interviewees considered that new technologies 
were very important to their firms, and even if there was no IPRs protection available, 
they would still do R&D. Although in theory, innovators are likely to go on R&D 
without IPRs protection, previous work has not investigated the change of innovative 
activities if there is no IPRs protection available, especially in China. This research 
covered this information both from interviews and questionnaires. 2. For Chinese firms 
whose production capability was quite difficult to copy in a short period, cost of R&D 
could be cover from profits, even if their technologies were copied by competitors. But 
for firms whose production capability was quite easy to be copied in a short period, this 
was not the case. This means that IPRs protection was only useful for the latter firms to 
protect their technology from being copied. But for the former, IPRs protection was a 
method of getting extra benefit by ensuring protection period for their technology and 
therefore not useful for promoting technology diffusion in these firms. This information 
was about the impact of imitation, which was obtained from interviews. Previous 
arguments neither covered this information nor the detailed reasons for the major loss or 
minor loss of different firms if imitation occurs. 3. In China, the relation between IPRs 
policy and domestic technology development not only varied with different industrial 
sectors, but also depended on the size and the legal statuses of Chinese firms. In general, 
big firms and state-owned firms paid more attention to IPRs protection policy, so they 
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were comparatively more sensitive to IPRs protection policy. Small firms and private 
firms did not care about IPRs protection as much, so they were comparatively less 
sensitive to IPRs protection. The reasons were that big firms drew a lot of attention from 
the Chinese government and state-owned firms were directly controlled by the 
government, so these firms had to comply with government‟s IPRs protection policy 
strictly. Most of the big firms in China were state-owned firms. The government 
sometimes did not watch closely the actions of small firms and private firms, so these 
firms sometimes did not follow government‟s IPRs policy. Most of the small firms in 
China were private firms. Some of them still imitated even after China reinforced its 
IPRs policy. Thus, the change on IPRs protection had obvious impacts on big firms and 
state-owned firms but not on small or private firms. This point was not demonstrated in 
other relevant literature or arguments. 4. Although stronger IPRs protection urged big 
and state-owned firms not to use imitation to get new technologies, many small private 
Chinese firms still continued with imitation as it played a very important role in 
promoting technology development and diffusion. The reasons for this were that the 
enforcement of IPRs protection in China was not as strict as that in developed countries 
and the consciousness of protecting technology through IPRs legal regulations among 
different Chinese firms was not as strong as that in developed countries. The Chinese 
government paid more attention to the supervision of big, famous and state-owned firms. 
If these firms imitated technologies from other firms, the government would pose large 
fines on them. For small and private firms, Chinese government could not look upon 
them and provide strict supervision over them. Moreover, some Chinese firms would 
not ask for IPRs compensation through legal methods, if imitation did not create great 
loss for them. Only if imitation brought a great mount of loss or induces the bankruptcy 
of Chinese firms, would they pay attention to obtaining compensation from the imitative 
competitors. Thus, this lead to the fact that small and private firm still dared to imitate 
in China.  
There are also some special results about the relation between IPRs protection reform 
and technology transfer from foreign countries to China. 1. Generally, stronger IPRs 
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protection increased technology transfer from foreign countries to China through legal 
and formal channels, such as international trade, FDI, and licensing. Stronger IPRs 
protection greatly reduced technology transfer from foreign countries to China through 
imitation. This is quite different from the results obtained by Lanoszka (2003) and Yu 
(2007), which suggested that IPRs protection had not brought positive impacts on FDI. 
The interviews and questionnaires obtained in this research proved that all kinds of legal 
channels of technology transfer, including FDI had been encouraged by stronger IPRs 
protection in China. The reason was that stronger IPRs protection improved the 
investment environment in China, which was similar to the argument put forward by 
Meyer (2001). The improved investment environment attracted foreign firms to invest 
in China through different channels. 2. Without IPRs protection, some technologies 
would still be transferred from foreign countries. Even before China made stronger IPRs 
protection, Chinese firms could get technologies from foreign countries through legal 
and formal channels. The reason was that before the country implemented stronger IPRs 
protection, the process of technology transfer from foreign countries had already 
followed foreign IPRs protection standards at the time. Foreign firms required the 
application of foreign IPRs protection standards for technology transfer. Therefore, if 
Chinese firms accepted the need to give IPRs protection to foreign technology using 
foreign IPRs protection standards at the time, they could get technologies transferred 
through legal and formal channels from foreign firms. 3. Domestic technology increased 
faster than that of technology transfer from foreign countries. The reasons were the 
followings. According to interviewees, stronger IPRs protection policy ensured benefit 
of developing new technologies. Moreover, the number of researchers and the capacity 
for doing research and development in China were both increasing. Under stronger IPRs 
protection, firms were more willing to do R&D, and hence domestic technology 
developed by Chinese firms showed obvious increases after the reinforcement of IPRs 
protection. Interviewees indicated that the increase of technology transfer from foreign 
countries was less than that of domestic technology development in China. 4. The 
relationship between IPRs protection and technology transfer in China also depended on 
different industries. Stronger IPRs protection induced more technology transfer in 
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industrial sectors with high sensitivity to IPRs protection, such as the pharmaceutical, 
chemical, petroleum, electronic and software sectors. However, it did not have much 
impact on technology transfer in industrial sectors with low sensitivity to IPRs 
protection, such as the traditional food and the textile sectors. Moreover, the relation 
between IPRs protection and technology transfer also depended on the size and legal 
statuses of Chinese firms. Big firms and state-owned firms were comparatively more 
sensitive to IPRs protection. Small firms and private firms were comparatively less 
sensitive to IPRs protection policy. Pervious studies, especially those on the relation 
between IPRs and technology development in China, did not investigate these factors. 5. 
Stronger IPRs protection did not influence technology transfer from foreign countries in 
the petroleum sector as much. This fieldwork shows that because petroleum was a very 
important product for a nation‟s security, petroleum technology was strictly controlled 
by firms and even the government. According to technological executives in the 
petroleum sector, even after the Chinese government made stronger IPRs protection 
policy, firms could not obtain significant petroleum technology from foreign countries, 
since very important technologies were strictly controlled by foreign firms and their 
governments as well. This point was not found in previous studies. 
7.7. Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter combines analytical results of different fieldwork data and 
then did theoretical analyses of those results using relevant theories and arguments. It 
shows through combining different fieldwork data that China‟s trying to accede to the 
WTO caused China to enforce stronger IPRs protection. Enforcing stronger IPRs 
protection had both positive and negative influences on technology diffusion in China. 
Moreover, different sectors, sizes and legal statuses of firms, and other relevant policies 
also had different impacts on the relation between IPRs protection and technology 
diffusion in China. This theoretical analysis of fieldwork results embodied both 
similarities and differences with relevant literatures. It shows some similar points with 
the Utilitarian view and proved some problems aroused by the utilitarian view, such as 
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the deadweight burden problem and the intermediate information inputs problem. This 
fieldwork also proved some points put forward by Boldrin and Levine‟s against 
intellectual property argument and Thurow‟s differentiate patent argument. It also 
embodies both similarities and differences with relevant literatures on the relationship 
between IPRs protection and technology diffusion. This chapter also explores some 
arguments about the relationship between IPRs protection and technology development 
and diffusion in China. Then, it compares the results obtained from this research with 
previous studies. These similarities and differences obtained through comparison are the 
main finding and conclusion for this research. The differences show the unique 
characteristics related to IPRs protection reform and technology diffusion in China, 
















After explaining the main research processes and content, this final chapter states the 
conclusion of this research. This chapter has three sections. The first section 
summarizes the whole research. It includes the research question, the purpose of this 
research, and the processes and a summary of each chapter. The second section explains 
the main conclusions of this research. The third section is recommendations for future 
work. 
8.1. Research summary 
8.1.1. Research question 
After almost fifteen years‟ effort, China acceded to the WTO in 2001. China‟s entrance 
to the WTO had brought and continues to bring comprehensive influences on the 
country, in which the impact on IPRs protection draws many concerns. China reformed 
and strengthened its IPRs policy in order to join the WTO under pressure from the 
developed countries, especially the USA. Moreover, according to the requirement of the 
WTO, China had to accept TRIPS, which also meant that the country had to enhance its 
IPRs policy, because the standards acquired by TRIPS were higher than those of China‟s 
IPRs protection. However, whether stronger IPRs protection policy has had positive 
impact on technology diffusion is still an issue. Therefore, this research explores the 
impact of IPRs reform on technology diffusion in China. 
8.1.2. Purpose of this research 
The main purpose of this research is to explore whether stronger IPRs protection gained 
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from WTO accession can have positive or negative impacts on technology development 
and diffusion in China. This research concentrates on patent and copyright protection, 
because these are the most important parts in IPRs protection and they have a direct 
relationship with technology development and diffusion. 
8.1.3. Research processes 
In order to accomplish this research, a clear and systematical research process was 
framed. Theoretical analyses of IPRs protection were basic knowledge, because they 
could clarify concepts and their characteristics for this research. Thus, this research 
explored this kind of information first. Arguments about the relation between IPRs 
protection and technology diffusion were also significant, since these could provide 
concepts and properties of technology diffusion. Hence, this research reviewed the 
literature on these arguments. After that, development of IPRs protection in China was 
investigated, because it could provide the necessary background for this research. 
Research methodology was then explored. Fieldwork was applied in this research. 
Semi-structured interviews and self-completion questionnaires were the main parts of 
this fieldwork. Interviews and questionnaires were accomplished with technological 
executives of selected Chinese firms. Some official statistics and other sources, such as 
television programs and interviews with relevant government officials were also 
collected for comparison with data obtained from the main fieldwork methods. Personal 
connections were a significant factor for accomplishing this fieldwork. Without 
recommendation through personal connections, these executives were unwilling to 
accept interviews and questionnaires. It did not affect the objectivity of fieldwork data, 
because it only played an introductory role. After finishing the fieldwork, the huge 
amount of fieldwork data collected from the semi-structured interviews and 
self-completion questionnaires was analysed. Official statistics and other sources were 
also analyzed. This research then combined the analytical results from different data and 
drew fieldwork results. Finally, this research also did a theoretical analysis between the 
fieldwork results and relevant literature to expose similarities and differences between 
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this research and other relevant literature. 
8.2. Main conclusions of this research 
1) During the processes of trying to accede to the WTO and under pressure from the 
USA, China strengthened its IPRs protection gradually. Most interviewees, except those 
from the traditional food and the textile sectors, were aware of this change. And most 
interviewees experienced the change of IPRs protection through their production, except 
those from the traditional food and the textile sectors. 
2) The relation between IPRs protection and technology diffusion had connections with 
the sensitivities of different industries to IPRs protection. The pharmaceutical, chemical, 
petroleum, electronic and software sectors had high sensitivities to IPRs protection; the 
machinery, primary metal and transportation equipment sectors had medium 
sensitivities to IPRs protection; and the traditional food and the textile sectors had low 
sensitivities to IPRs protection. Stronger IPRs protection policy had more obvious 
impacts on sectors with high sensitivities to IPRs protection than sectors with medium 
and low sensitivities to IPRs protection.  
3) The relationship between IPRs protection and technology diffusion in China also had 
connections with the size and legal status of Chinese firms. Big firms and state-owned 
firms paid more attention to IPRs protection policy, while the degree of concern to IPRs 
protection policy of small firms and most private firms was less than that of big and 
state-owned firms. Therefore, stronger IPRs protection had more significant impacts on 
big firms and state-owned firms than on small and private firms. 
4) Generally, stronger IPRs protection made Chinese firms input more on R&D. It also 
increased the total number of domestic technologies. Meanwhile, better IPRs protection 
also promoted some technology transfer from foreign countries to China. However, 
enforcing stronger IPRs protection encouraged domestic technology development more 
than technology transfer. 
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5) Although stronger IPRs protection had positive impacts on technology diffusion, it 
also had some negative impacts on technology diffusion in China. Better IPRs 
protection urged most Chinese firms to invest on protecting their technologies from 
pirating, especially by small firms. It also had a great negative impact on technology 
diffusion through imitation. Furthermore, stronger IPRs protection provided more 
power for foreign firms to control their technologies. Most foreign firms increased the 
prices of their technologies and set up restrictive articles in transferring technologies to 
Chinese firms based on better protection. Although there were more technologies 
transferred from foreign countries to China after the country reformed IPRs policy, most 
of these technologies were basic technologies, whose development depended on further 
technology transfer from foreign firms. The prices of obtaining technologies from their 
owners had been increased based on better IPRs protection. Moreover, better IPRs 
protection also provided power for technology owners to hold their technologies and 
delay the commercial production of them. This also constrained technology 
development and diffusion in China. 
6) Without better IPRs protection, some technology would still be developed by Chinese 
firms and transferred from foreign countries to China. Moreover, if imitation occurred, 
firms with production capability that was difficult to obtain in a short time, could still 
obtain benefit from developing new technologies. Without better IPRs protection policy, 
some authors would still publish their works. 
7) The relationship between IPRs protection and technology diffusion in China also had 
connections with other relevant policies, such as the “Open Door” policy, policies that 
encouraged economic development and R&D, policies that supported some industries 
and encouraged foreign investment in China and China‟s big open market. These 
policies also encouraged technology development and diffusion in China, based on 
stronger IPRs protection. 
8) Because of government propaganda and the fact that there was no other technology 
protection policy available, most interviewees believed that the current IPRs protection 
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policy was the best, regardless of some restrictions set up by the current IPRs protection 
policy. 
To conclude, China reinforced its IPRs protection policy while trying to accede to the 
WTO. Stronger IPRs protection has had both positive and negative impacts on 
technology diffusion in China. The relationship between IPRs protection reform and 
technology diffusion in China also related to different industries, the size and legal 
statuses of firms, and other relevant policies. 
8.3. The strength of this research 
This research is the first research applying fieldwork to investigate the impact of IPRs 
protection reform on technology diffusion in China. Although there were many studies 
that investigated the relationship between IPRs protection and technology development, 
no research has been done to find out the impact of IPRs reform on technology diffusion 
in a comparatively comprehensive aspect, which includes domestic technology 
development and technology transfer from foreign countries in a special 
country—China. Yang (2003) and Yueh (2009) found that stronger IPRs protection 
encouraged the use of IPRs protection, especially the use of patents, copyrights and 
trademarks in China. Meyer (2001) and Awokuse and Yin (2009 and 2010) obtained that 
better IPRs protection had positive impacts on imports and FDI, which were important 
channels of transferring technology from foreign countries to China. Bosworth and 
Yang (2000) also concluded that stronger IPRs protection encouraged technology 
transfer through licensing in China. Certainly, there were some articles discussing that 
stronger IPRs did not encourage technology diffusion in some channels in China. 
Lanoszka (2000) and Yu (2007) concluded that stronger IPRs did not promote FDI, 
which was an important channel of transferring technology from foreign countries to 
China. These articles did not investigate the full scale relationship between stronger 
IPRs protection and technology diffusion. This research explored the full scale 
relationship between stronger IPRs protection and technology diffusion, including 
Page 199 
domestic technology development and technology transfer through important channels 
such as international trade, FDI, licensing and imitation. Thus, it is the first research 
about the impact of IPRs protection reform on technology diffusion in China. Moreover, 
none of those previous researches in China were done through doing fieldwork, 
including interviews and questionnaires in China. Doing fieldwork was the most 
important part in this research. Fieldwork including interviews and questionnaires 
provided fresh and detailed information about the research questions. Fieldwork also 
provided information in a more intuitional and direct way than results obtained through 
applying economic models, which made the results of this research easy to understand. 
The process of doing fieldwork was quite interesting and also helped to obtain many 
cultural backgrounds and information for this research. Thus, applying fieldwork to 
investigate the impact of IPRs protection reform on technology diffusion in China is one 
of the most important contributions of this research. In addition, none of those previous 
articles involved investigating the relationship between IPRs protection and technology 
development and diffusion in different specific industries. This research explored the 
impact of IPRs protection reform on technology diffusion in different specific Chinese 
industries. This research also explored the impact of IPRs protection reform on 
technology diffusion in firms with different legal status and sizes in China, which, to 
date, has not been done by any others. This research also aimed to gather important and 
unique information about the impact of IPRs protection reform on technology diffusion 
in China, which cannot be obtained from previous literatures. It found that stronger 
IPRs protection encouraged more domestic technology development than technology 
transfer from foreign countries in China. Without a good IPRs policy, Chinese firms 
with production capability that was difficult to build in a short time could still obtain 
benefit to cover their cost in doing R&D; and some technology would still be 
transferred from foreign countries to China because China was a big open market and 
other favourable policies attracted foreign companies. IPRs protection reform did not 
have a great influence on technology transfer from foreign countries in the petroleum 
sector, because petroleum was a very important product for a nation‟s security and 
people‟s livelihood, technologies in this sector was strictly controlled by firms and 
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governments. This research is also very significant for future IPRs policy decision in 
China. Currently, few of the policy-makers thought about the disadvantages of the 
current IPRs protection system. The Chinese government considers stronger IPRs 
protection to be an advantage, which encourages the government to enforce more strict 
IPRs protection. This research brings the limitations of the current IPRs protection 
system to the policy-makers‟ attention, which might help with their future policy 
decisions. Finally, this research would be very useful for considering alternative IPRs 
protection systems. Because the current IPRs protection system also had negative 
impacts on technology diffusion, it is valuable to think about other alternatives, which 
may also help the future theoretical development. 
8.4. Recommendations for future work 
The last part concludes the discussions for this research with some recommendations for 
the future work. 
Firstly, this research only explored the impact of IPRs protection reform on technology 
diffusion in some main industrial sectors, including the pharmaceutical, chemical, 
petroleum, electronic, machinery, primary metal, transportation equipment, traditional 
food, textile, publishing and software sectors. It is valuable to explore the impact of 
IPRs protection reform on technology diffusion in more industries, because it can help 
to generalise the characteristics of different industries on the issue of IPRs protection 
and technology diffusion. This will provide useful information for policy-makers in 
China. 
Secondly, it is also valuable to explore the impact of IPRs protection reform on 
technology diffusion in other countries, especially other developing countries that have 
or will reform their IPRs protection. This may be helpful to their further policy 
decisions. 
Thirdly, it is very important and significant to consider other kinds of policy systems of 
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IPRs protection in the whole world. According to the analyses and discussions in this 
research, the relation between IPRs protection policy and technology diffusion was 
different according to different industrial sectors, sizes, legal status of firms, and 
production capability, as well as other relevant policies. Thus, one standard IPRs 
protection system cannot be suitable for all kinds of technologies or innovations in 
different countries. Moreover, according to this research, the current IPRs protection 
system was not the best system to protect technologies or promote technology diffusion 
in China, because it also set up some restrictions on technology development and 
diffusion. Therefore, it is valuable to think about designing a new IPRs protection 
system to facilitate technology development and diffusion in all kinds of countries, 
which can accommodate the characteristics of all kinds of technologies and innovations 














Interview guide design 
 
1. Introduce research topic and objectives, the aim of interview, the use of recorder 
and the promise for keeping anonymous of interviewees. 
This part is an introduction to the interview, which can help respondents to understand 
what will be carried through in the interview and how it will process. 
2. Questions related to individual firm 
● The characteristics of individual firm 
Legal organisation 
History 
Main areas of activity 
Firm size 
● Feeling about IPRs protection reform 
Whether technological executives feel that China has reformed its IPRs 
protection? 
● The use of IPRs protection, especially patent and copyright during the period of 
China‟s reforming IPRs protection. 
● The method of obtaining technology in individual firms and its change during 
China‟s reformation of its IPRs protection. 
● The impact of IPRs protection reform on technology development in an individual 
firm 
Input on R&D 
The amount of technology 
Cost of technology development 
Benefits obtained from technology 
The situation of putting technology into commercial production 
Restrictions on technology diffusion 
What can happen if IPRs protection is unavailable and imitation occurs? 
● The impact of IPRs protection reform on technology transfer from foreign countries 
in individual firm 
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Channels of technology transfer 
The amount of technology transfer 
Cost of technology transfer 
Restrictions on technology diffusion 
What can happen if IPRs protection is unavailable and imitation occurs? 
The aim of this part is to find out the influence of IPRs reform on technology diffusion 
in different firms. Firstly, this part includes background questions, including the 
characteristics of the individual firm, feelings about the change of IPRs protection 
policy, the use of IPRs, and the structure of technology. The characteristics of individual 
firm can be used to divide firms into different categories to check whether the relation 
between IPRs protection and technology diffusion varies in different kinds of firms. The 
question about the feeling of the change of IPRs protection and the use of IPRs 
protection can be used to find out the sensitivity of individual firm to IPRs protection. 
The question about the method of obtaining technology in individual firm can be used 
to see whether IPRs reform has impacted on the methods of obtaining technology for 
different firms. Secondly, this part includes questions about the impact of IPRs reform 
on technology development in the individual firm. These questions can help to find out 
the exact influence of IPRs reform on technology development in each firm. Thirdly, 
this part includes questions about the impact of IPRs reform on technology transfer in 
the individual firm. These questions can help to find out the detailed influence of IPRs 
reform on technology transfer by each firm. 
3. Questions on the current IPRs protection system 
● The impact of the current IPRs protection system on technology diffusion in China 
● The advantages and disadvantages of the current IPRs protection system 
This part of the questionings can help to understand the opinions of interviewees on 
whether the current IPRs system is the best system and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the current IPRs system, based on their experience. 
4. Questions about whether other policies can influence the relationship between 
IPRs protection and technology diffusion in China 
● Policies on R&D 
● Policies on encouraging a certain industry‟s development 
● Other relevant policies 
This part is helpful for understanding whether other policies in China can influence the 
relation between IPRs protection and technology diffusion. 






This questionnaire is part of a study about China‟s entrance to the WTO, the influence 
of intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection reform on technology diffusion. The aim 
of this research is to reveal the impact of IPRs protection reform on technology 
diffusion in China. This study is predominantly concerned with firms that are involved 
with technological activities or technology diffusion in China. This questionnaire should 
be answered by the persons who normally represent the firms when dealing with 
questions about technology diffusion. But this research also welcomes response from all 
kinds of persons who wish to give relevant information. 
The information collected in this questionnaire provides the researcher with detailed 
opinion about whether IPRs reform can bring benefit on China‟s technology diffusion. 
The information collected through this questionnaire is held confidentially. 
The questionnaire will take about 10 to 15 minutes to answer. For any further 
information, please contact Wei Meng (menggaowei@yahoo.com.cn). 
The main part of questionnaire 




Q [T2]. What is the legal status of this firm? 
a. Private firm 
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b. State-owned firm 
c. Other (specify) ______ 
d. Don‟t know 
Q [T3]. How would you best describe your firm‟s main area of activity? 
a. Pharmaceuticals industry 
b. Chemicals industry 
c. Machinery industry 
d. Primary metals industry 
e. Electronic industry 
f. Transportation equipment industry 
g. Traditional food industry 
h. Textile industry 
i. Software industry 
j. Other industry (specify) ______ 
Q [T4]. Please specify your firm‟s leading products______ 
Q [T5]. Please specify the market share of your firm‟s leading products in China. 
______% 










i. 2000 or more 







f. 200 or more 
g. Don‟t know 




C. Don‟t know 
Q [T8]. How long has your firm been established? 
a. 5 years or less 
b. 6-9 years 
c. 10-19 years 
d. 20 years or more 
e. Don‟t know 
Q [T9]. Has your firm held any technology until now? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don‟t know 
Q [T10]. If your answer in Q[T9] is Yes, please specify the number of your firms 
technology.______ 
Q [T11]. How did your firm normally acquire new technology before China reformed 
IPRs protection? (Multiple selection) 
a. Acquired through own research and development 
b. Transferred through domestic trade 
c. Transferred through international trade 
d. Transferred through foreign direct investment 
e. Acquired through domestic licensing 
f. Acquired through international licensing 
g. Acquired through imitation domestically 
h. Acquired through imitation internationally 
i. Others (please specify) ______ 




c. Don‟t know 
Q [T13]. Has your firm‟s main channel to acquire new technology changed since the 




c. Don‟t know 
Q [T14]. If your answer in Q [T13] is Yes, please select the new channels that your firm 
acquires new technology after the adoption of stronger IPRs protection. (Multiple 
selection) 
a. Acquired through own research and development 
b. Transferred through domestic trade 
c. Transferred through international trade 
d. Transferred through foreign direct investment 
e. Acquired through domestic licensing 
f. Acquired through international licensing 
g. Acquired through imitation domestically 
h. Acquired through imitation internationally 
i. Others (please specify) ______ 
Q [T15]. What do you think is the influence of stronger IPRs protection on domestic 
technology development in China? 
a. Strongly encourage 
b. Slightly encourage 
c. Neither encourage nor encumber 
d. Slightly encumber 
e. Strongly encumber 
f. Don‟t know 
Q [T16]. What do you think is the influence of stronger IPRs protection on technology 
transfer from foreign countries in China? 
a. Strongly encourage 
b. Slightly encourage 
c. Neither encourage nor encumber 
d. Slightly encumber 
e. Strongly encumber 
f. Don‟t know 
Q [T17]. What is the influence of stronger IPRs protection on the development of your 
firm‟s technology? 
a. Strongly encourage 
b. Slightly encourage 
c. Neither encourage nor encumber 
d. Slightly encumber 
e. Strongly encumber 
Page 208 
f. Don‟t know 
Q [T18]. What is the influence of stronger IPRs protection on the commercial 
production of your firm‟s technology? 
a. Strongly encourage 
b. Slightly encourage 
c. Neither encourage nor encumber 
d. Slightly encumber 
e. Strongly encumber 
f. Don‟t know 
Q [T19]. What is the influence of stronger IPRs protection on your firm‟s technology 
transfer from foreign countries through international trade? 
a. Strongly encourage 
b. Slightly encourage 
c. Neither encourage nor encumber 
d. Slightly encumber 
e. Strongly encumber 
f. Don‟t know 
Q [T20]. What is the influence of stronger IPRs protection on your firm‟s technology 
transfer from foreign countries through FDI? 
a. Strongly encourage 
b. Slightly encourage 
c. Neither encourage nor encumber 
d. Slightly encumber 
e. Strongly encumber 
f. Don‟t know 
Q [T21]. What is the influence of stronger IPRs protection on your firm‟s technology 
transfer from foreign countries through licensing? 
a. Strongly encourage 
b. Slightly encourage 
c. Neither encourage nor encumber 
d. Slightly encumber 
e. Strongly encumber 
f. Don‟t know 
Q [T22]. What is the influence of stronger IPRs protection on your firm‟s technology 
transfer from foreign countries through imitation? 
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a. Strongly encourage 
b. Slightly encourage 
c. Neither encourage nor encumber 
d. Slightly encumber 
e. Strongly encumber 
f. Don‟t know 
Q [T23]. How many percentage of your firm‟s technology cannot be developed without 
IPRs protection? ___% 
Q [T24]. How many percentage of your firm‟s technology cannot be commercially 
produced without IPRs protection? ___% 
Q [T25]. How many percentage of technology cannot be transferred from foreign 
countries to your firms without IPRs protection? ___% 
Q [T26]. Do you think that the current IPRs protection is the best method to protect and 
encourage technology development and diffusion?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don‟t know 
Q [T27]. If your answer in Q [26] is No, please specify the disadvantages of the current 
IPRs protection. 
Q [T28]. If your answer in Q [26] is No, please give some alternative policies that you 
think can deal with the negative effects caused by the current IPRs protection. 
Explanations for questionnaire design 
Q [T1] is the question which can help to find out whether the respondent is the desired 
technological executive. If the respondent is not the desired technological executive, his 
or her answer may not reflect the true situation about the selective firm. This question is 
helpful for choosing valid feedback. 
Q [T2] and Q [T3] are the questions used to put individual firms into different legal 
statuses and different industries. These questions can help to make clear whether the 
relation between IPRs protection policy and technology diffusion is different according 
to different properties of firms and different industries. 
Q [T4], Q [T5], Q [T6] and Q [T7] can help to find out the size of individual firm. 
These questions are helpful to check whether the relation between IPRs protection and 
technology diffusion is different according to different size of firms. 
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Q [T7] has great relation with technology transfer. If the firm has the right of direct 
imports and exports, it is easy to transfer technology from foreign countries. 
Q [T8] tests the history of individual firm. This question can help to find out whether 
the selected firm has enough history to cover the period before China made stronger 
IPRs protection. Only if the firm‟s history is long enough to cover the period before 
China made stronger IPRs protection, the technological executive of this firm can do 
comparison between the current situation and former situation about IPRs protection. 
Q [T9] and Q [T10] are questions about the technology of selected firms. These 
questions can help to select which firm has high technological density and check 
whether technological density has relation with the impact of IPRs protection. 
Q [T11], Q [T12], Q [T13] and Q [T14] are questions that used to test whether the 
selected firm can feel that China has reinforced stronger IPRs protection and whether 
the methods of getting new technology of selected firm has changed since China made 
stronger IPRs protection. These questions are very helpful to check the sensitivity to 
IPRs protection policy of selected firm. 
Q [T15] and Q [T16] test the general opinions of selected technological executives 
about the impact of stronger IPRs protection on domestic technology development and 
technology transfer in China. 
Q [T17], Q [T18], Q [T19], Q [T20], Q [T21] and Q [T22] are questions that applied to 
find out selected technological executives‟ opinions about the impact of stronger IPRs 
protection on technology development by their firms and technology transfer through 
different channels for their firms. 
Q [T23], Q [T24] and Q [T25] are used to let selected technological executives to 
forecast what will happen if there is not IPRs protection available. 
Q [T26], Q [T27], and Q [T28] are questions that applied to find out the advantages and 
disadvantages of the current IPRs protection on technology diffusion in China as well as 









Doing fieldwork in China was the most important and interesting part of this research. 
This section summarizes the process and significant factors of doing fieldwork in China 
in this research.  
I entered the field in China in May of 2007. It was intended to finish the pilot job by the 
end of May, because I only planned to do two pilots for each of interview and 
questionnaire and I thought it was easy to obtain these pilots. However, when I tried to 
contact the selected interviewees, I was very disappointed with the results. No one 
wanted to accept the pilot interviews, although I had tried my best. By the end of May 
2007, no pilot jobs were finished. In the beginning of June 2007, I sent out the original 
questionnaires to some selected firms. However, only one partially completed response 
for the pilot questionnaires was received by the end of June, although I sent out them for 
the second time in the middle of June. This result pushed me to do use personal 
connections to contact technological executives in selected industries for pilot 
interviews and face-to-face pilot questionnaires. Although the pilot job was 
accomplished with some incomplete aspects, the pilot job was very useful for revising 
the interview guide and the original questionnaire. After finishing the pilot job, I 
reflected on the reasons for the reluctance of technological executive in Chinese firms to 
accept interviews or fill in questionnaires. The reasons came from two factors. Firstly, 
the Chinese government did not have a systematic framework for making policies and 
obtaining feedback on policy implementation from individuals. Thus, there was little 
published research giving feedback from individuals about the policies of Chinese 
government. Chinese people and firms seldom received this kind of investigation, which 
means that Chinese people and firms were not familiar with and were reluctant to 
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participate in this kind of research and investigation. Secondly, the atmosphere in 
Chinese society on doing research and investigation was not as good as that in advanced 
society, which left the Chinese people and firms without an interest in research and 
investigation. Chinese firms just wanted to develop their productive capability and 
create more profit. They had not arranged spare time or energy to embark on research or 
investigation, especially researches for providing suggestions or feedback for policies 
put forward by the government. Because of these two factors, technological executives 
of Chinese firms did not want to give interviews or complete questionnaires.  
As I am Chinese, I know that personal connections are very important in China. 
However, I did not realize that personal connections are so important that they are 
indispensable for doing anything in China. Chinese people try to develop their personal 
connections every day and they are also good at using them. In China, using personal 
connections are quite normal. Without knowing this, the fieldwork faced many 
difficulties in the early stages. However, having sensed the importance of personal 
connections and using them in the fieldwork allowed it to progress smoothly in the later 
period. Thus, in each of the selected sectors, I used personal connections to introduce 
myself to one technological executive and then let the executive to introduce me to 
other firms in each sector. I used personal connections from my classmates, my friends, 
and even the friends of my parents and my relatives. This method helped me to 
accomplish my interviews.  
Entering each Chinese firm to do interviews and face-to-face questionnaires also 
brought some important information about this research. I could feel the strict 
management of each Chinese firm, especially the strict control of their technologies and 
plants. I could not be permitted to enter the plant before some managers confirmed my 
status. I also needed to leave my personal information in the reception of almost all 
firms. Some departments and rooms of some firms were locked and had notices 
prohibiting entry by visitors and any photography. Moreover, because this research 
involved some issues of technological development in individual firms, some executives 
Page 213 
emphasized that it was absolutely not permitted to make recordings of the interviews.  
After entering each firm and meeting a technological executive, I began with 
conversation. Some interviewees talked very little. I had to try to probe more 
explanations from them and pay more attention to keep friendly atmosphere to make the 
interview goes well. However, there were some other cases, which I found more 
difficult to control. Some interviewees talked a lot during the interview. Moreover, some 
interviewees quickly strayed from the point. I had to draw them back without letting 
them feel that I was impolite or un friendly. This was more difficult than trying to probe 
their responses, because the limits of proper courtesy were uncertain and sometimes I 
had to keep talking with the interviewees about irrelevant matters for quite long time. 
This also increased the difficulties in picking out the important information from the 
interview records. 
The information obtained from interviews showed that many interviewees knew that 
China implemented stronger IPRs protection when it tried to accede to the WTO. 
China‟s entry to the WTO was a very important issue for the Chinese people similar to 
Beijing becoming the host city for the 2008 Olympic Games. Most Chinese people 
cared about whether China would be accepted by the WTO while China negotiated with 
other WTO members. China‟s entrance to the WTO brought many different impacts in 
China; IPRs protection reform is one of the most important. Many Chinese newspapers 
and websites reported the IPRs requirements put forward by WTO members, especially 
by the USA and the reform process of IPRs protection in China. In China, the executive 
of a state-owned firm works for the government, and is just like a government official 
receiving similar treatment. Thus, grasping relevant policies is particularly important for 
managers and executives in state-owned Chinese firms. Thus, most executives in 
state-owned firms know the change of IPRs protection well in China. Executives of 
private firms also started to pay more attention to the change of Chinese policies in 
order to make the policies better serve the development of their firms. Moreover, 
because IPRs protection also has a direct relation with the operation of Chinese firms, 
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different local governments also trained executives of Chinese firms in their regions. 
Thus, more and more executives pay attention to relevant policy changes, including 
IPRs protection reform in China.  
Another significant finding obtained from the interviews and questionnaires was that 
almost all executives in Chinese firms consider that current IPRs protection is the best 
method for protecting technology and promoting technology diffusion. One possible 
reason is that there is no other policy available for protecting technology in China. 
Another possible reason is that Chinese people just accept the policies issued by the 
government without questioning their problems or limitations. This is a kind of Chinese 
tradition. Chinese people always believe that the right of government is superior to the 
rights of individual persons. Sometimes, Chinese people prefer to scarify personal 
interests to realize the state‟s interests. Usually, Chinese people do not ask questions 
about policies issued by the government, but just believe that these policies are very 
good. Thus, most Chinese people do not pay attention to the disadvantages of China‟s 
policies. This came out clearly in the interviews in this research. Many executives 
mentioned some points of the limitations of the current IPRs protection on technology 
diffusion in China, but without realizing that they had done so. Base on these two 
reasons, the current IPRs protection policy was considered by many executives to be the 












16: Entered the field in China 
18: Went to the first selected Chinese chemical firm to do a pilot interview in Beijing. 
The researcher was not permitted to enter the firm. 
21: Went to the second selected Chinese chemical firm to do a pilot interview in Beijing. 
The researcher was not permitted to enter the firm. 
23: Went to the third selected Chinese chemical firm to do a pilot interview in Beijing. 
The researcher was not permitted to interview the selected technological executive.  
28: Went to the fourth selected Chinese pharmaceutical firm to do a pilot interview in 
Beijing. The researcher was not permitted to interview the selected technological 
executive again. 
29: Went to the fifth selected Chinese pharmaceutical firm to do a pilot interview in 
Beijing. The researcher was not permitted to interview the selected technological 
executive. The lady in the reception office gave the researcher the office line number of 
a member of the staff in the firm and let the researcher contact him in advance to make 
sure that he could accept the interview. The researcher called as advised, but no one 
answered the phone that time.  
30: The researcher called designated person in the fifth Chinese pharmaceutical firm. A 
lady answered the phone and told the researcher that the person was on business trip and 
would back in the next week. 
June 2007  
1: Transferred the original designed questionnaires into Chinese and website versions. 
4: Sent out the original designed questionnaires to six selected Chinese firms, which in 
the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors. The researcher waited for 10 days to get the 
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feedback from the technological executives in the selected Chinese firms.  
5: Went to the sixth selected Chinese pharmaceutical firm to do pilot a interview in 
Shijiazhuang. The researcher was not permitted to interview the selected technological 
executive. 
7: Went back to Beijing and contacted the staff member in the fifth selected Chinese 
pharmaceutical firm. The man answered the phone, but he did not want to do the 
interview. He said he did not have the time to do it and that accepting interview was 
very important and his manager would not allow him to accept the interview. 
8: Tried to contact friends to use personal connections for introductions to selected 
Chinese firms for pilot interviews. 
13: There was no response to the questionnaires. The researcher had written a detailed 
introduction and explanation of the original designed questionnaires. 
14:  Sent out the original questionnaires together with the detailed introduction and 
explanation to selected six Chinese firms, which are in the pharmaceutical and chemical 
sectors. The researcher planned to wait for another 10 days for responses from the 
technological executives in selected Chinese firms. 
15: Did the first pilot interview with a Chinese chemical firm in Beijing. 
19: Did the second pilot interview with a pharmaceutical firm in Shijiazhuang. 
20-23: Analysed these two pilot interviews and revised the original interview guide. 
25: Only one partially completed questionnaire was received. The researcher felt very 
disappointed about it.  
26: Contacted friends to use personal connections to introduce me for pilot 
questionnaires in order to test the original designed questionnaires. 
28:  Did the first pilot face-to-face questionnaire with a Chinese pharmaceutical firm in 
Tangshan. 
29: Did the first pilot face-to-face questionnaire with a Chinese chemical firm in 
Beijing. 
30: Analysed the pilot questionnaires and revised the original questionnaire. 
July 2007 
1-2: Analysed the pilot questionnaires and revised the original questionnaire. 
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4: Did the first interview with a Chinese chemical firm in Beijing. 
6: Did the second interview with a Chinese pharmaceutical firm in Beijing. 
7-9: Revised the original questionnaire and sent the revised questionnaire to all selected 
Chinese firms. The researcher planed to wait for 10 days to get responses. 
11: Did the third interview with a Chinese pharmaceutical firm in Tianjin. 
14: Did the fourth interview with a Chinese transportation equipment firm in Shenyang. 
16: Did the fifth interview with a Chinese textile firm in Shenyang. 
18: 14 useful responses to the internet questionnaires were received. 
19: Did the sixth interview with a Chinese pharmaceutical firm in Tangshan. 
20: Did the seventh interview with a Chinese chemical firm in Tangshan. 
23: Did the eighth interview with a Chinese textile firm in Tangshan. 
25: Did the ninth interview with a Chinese textile firm in Tangshan. 
26: Did the 10
th
 interview with a Chinese transportation equipment firm in Tangshan. 
27: Did the 11
th
 interview with a Chinese electronic firm in Tangshan. 
28: 3 more useful responses to the internet questionnaires were received. Sent out the 
questionnaire to all selected Chinese firms for the second time. The researcher planed to 
wait for 10 days for responses. 
31: Did the 12
th
 interview with a Chinese petroleum firm in Beijing. 
August 2007 
2: Did the 13
th
 interview with a Chinese petroleum firm in Beijing. 
3: Interviewed two government officials in Beijing. 
6: Interviewed a manager at a publishing firm in Beijing, but did not get enough good 
information from him. He helped me to contact government officials who worked for 
the departments that are in charge of the publishing sector in Beijing. 




 interviews with government officials who worked for the 
departments in charge of publishing sector in Beijing. 
9: 12 more useful responses to the internet questionnaires were received. 
10: Did the 16
th
 interview with a Chinese machinery firm in Beijing. 
13: Did the 17
th
 interview with a Chinese software firm in Beijing. 
15: Did the 18
th
 interview with a Chinese software firm in Beijing. 
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 interviews with two Chinese primary metals firms in Tangshan. 
17: Did the 21
st
 interview with a Chinese primary metals firm in Tangshan. 
18: Did the 22
nd
 interview with a Chinese software firm in Tangshan. Did the 23
rd
 
interview with a Chinese chemical firm in Tangshan.  
19: Did the 24
th
 interview with a Chinese chemical firm in Tangshan. Did the 25
th
 
interview with a Chinese machinery firm in Tangshan. Did the 26
th
 interview with a 
Chinese traditional firm in Tangshan. 
24: Did the 27
th
 telephone interview with a Chinese petroleum firm in Beijing. 6 more 
useful responses to the internet questionnaires were received. 
25: Did the 28
th
 telephone interview with a Chinese electronic firm in Beijing. 




 interviews with two Chinese traditional food firms in Tangshan. 
One more useful response to the internet questionnaire was received. The researcher 
decided to do face-to-face questionnaires to get enough feedback. 
28: Did the 31
st
 interview with a Chinese textile firm in Tangshan. Did 2 questionnaires 
with Chinese software firms in Tangshan.  
29: Did the 32
nd
 interview with a Chinese machinery firm in Tangshan. Did the 33
rd
 
interview with a Chinese traditional food firm in Tangshan. 
30: Did the 34
th
 interview with a Chinese primary metals firm in Qinhuangdao.  
31: Did the 35
th
 interview with a Chinese electronic firm in Beijing. Visited a 
government official working in the Statistics Bureau of China and obtained some 
official statistics. 
September 2007 
3: Did the 36
th
 interview with a Chinese machinery firm in Tianjin. Did the 37
th
 
interview with a Chinese transportation equipment firm in Tianjin. 
4: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese software firm in Tianjin. Did 3 questionnaires 
with Chinese textile firms in Tianjin. 
5: Did 3 questionnaires with Chinese traditional food firms in Tianjin. 
6: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese machinery firms in Tianjin. Did 2 questionnaires 
with a Chinese transportation equipment firms in Tianjin. 
7: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese pharmaceutical firms in Tianjin. Did 2 
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questionnaires with Chinese chemical firms in Tianjin. 
8: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese electronic firm in Tianjin. 
11: Did the 38
th
 interview with a Chinese textile firm in Shijiazhuang. Did 3 
questionnaires with Chinese pharmaceutical firms in Shijiazhuang. 
12: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese electronic firm in Shijiazhuang. 
13: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese machinery firm in Shijiazhuang. 
14: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese machinery firms in Shijiazhuang. 
17: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese chemical firms in Shijiazhuang. 
19: Did 3 questionnaires with Chinese textile firms in Shijiazhuang. 
20: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese traditional food firm in Shijiazhuang. 
24: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese pharmaceutical firms in Tangshan. 
26: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese electronic firms in Tangshan. 
27: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese chemical firms in Tangshan. 
28: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese chemical firm in Tangshan. 
October 2007 
8: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese chemical firm in Qinhuangdao. 
9: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese chemical firms in Qinhuangdao. 
11: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese traditional food firms in Qinhuangdao. 
12: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese primary metals firms in Qinhuangdao. 
13: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese machinery firm in Qinhuangdao. 
16: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese electronic firm in Tangshan. 
18: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese machinery firm in Shenyang. 
19: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese textile firm in Shenyang. 
20: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese textile firm in Shenyang. Did 1 questionnaire 
with a Chinese transportation equipment firm in Shenyang. 
23: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese traditional food firm in Shenyang. 
24: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese primary metals firm in Shenyang. 
25: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese primary metals firms in Jinzhou. 
29: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese machinery firms in Tangshan. 
30: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese transportation equipment firms in Tangshan. 
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November 2007 
2: Did 2 questionnaires with Chinese primary metals firms in Handan. 
5: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese transportation equipment firm in Handan. 
6: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese traditional food firm in Handan. 
9: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese primary metals firm in Tangshan. 
14: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese primary metals firm in Beijing. 
16: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese traditional food firm in Beijing. 
20: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese traditional food firm in Tangshan. 
22: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese textile firm in Tangshan. 
26: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese textile firm in Tangshan. 
 
December 2007 
5: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese primary metals firm in Xuanhua. 
12: Did 1 questionnaire with a Chinese transportation equipment firm in Beijing. 



















No. Date Industries Size Location 
1 4 July 2007  chemical  big Beijing 
2 6 July 2007 pharmaceutical  big  Beijing 
3 11 July 2007 pharmaceutical  medium Tianjin 
4 14 July 2007 transportation equipment  big Shenyang 
5 16 July 2007 Textile small Shenyang 
6 19 July 2007 pharmaceutical  small Tangshan 
7 20 July 2007 chemical  small Tangshan 
8 23 July 2007 Textile small Tangshan 
9 25 July 2007 Textile small Tangshan 
10 26 July 2007 transportation equipment  big Tangshan 
11 27 July 2007 Electronic small Tangshan 
12 31 July 2007 Petroleum big Beijing 
13 2 August 2007 Petroleum big Beijing 
14 8 August 2007 publishing    Beijing 
15 8 August 2007 publishing    Beijing 
16 10 August 2007 Machinery big Beijing 
17 13 August 2007 Software medium Beijing 
18 15 August 2007 Software big Beijing 
19 16 August 2007 primary metals small Tangshan 
20 16 August 2007 primary metals small Tangshan 
21 17 August 2007 primary metals big Tangshan 
22 18 August 2007 Software small Tangshan 
23 18 August 2007 chemical  small Tangshan 
24 19 August 2007 chemical  medium Tangshan 
25 19 August 2007 Machinery small Tangshan 
26 19 August 2007 traditional food small Tangshan 
27 24 August 2007 Petroleum big telephone interview 
28 25 August 2007 Electronic big telephone interview 
29 27 August 2007 traditional food small Tangshan 
30 27 August 2007 traditional food small Tangshan 
31 28 August 2007 Textile small Tangshan 
32 29 August 2007 Machinery small Tangshan 
33 29 August 2007 traditional food small Tangshan 
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continued 
No. Date Industries Size Location 
34 30 August 2007 primary metals big Qinhuangdao 
35 31 August 2007 Electronic small Beijing 
36 3 September 2007 Machinery medium Tianjin 
37 3 September 2007 transportation equipment  small Tianjin 
38 11 September 2007 Textile small Shijiazhuang 
Size classification:  
Big: The number of full-time employees is more than 2000 (including 2000) or the 
market share of the firm‟s leading products in China is more than 10% (including 10%). 
Medium: The number of full-time employees is more than 200 (including 200) but less 
than 2000 (not including 2000) and the market share of the firm‟s leading products in 
China is more than 0.5% (including 0.5%) but less than 10% (not including 10%). 
Small: The number of full-time employees is less than 200 (not including 200) or the 














List of abbreviations 
A: Alkali 
AL:  Aluminum 
AP: aluminum polychloride 
BE: bicycle equipment 
C: Chemicals 
CE: car equipment 
CEF: computer electronic fitting 
CFP: cooked farm produce 
CM: cooked meat 
CM1: centrifugal machine 
CM2: chemical machine 
CM3: cement machine 
CM4: ceramic machine 
CP: chemical paper 
CW: R&D cooperating with research institutes 
C1: Cake 
C2: Chestnut 
EBE: electric bicycle equipment 
EF: electronic fitting 
EM: engine machine 
FC1: fine chemicals 
FC2: fireproof chemicals 
FEF: fridge electronic fitting 
GCM: gear change machine 
IM: irrigation machine 
L: Lathe 
LE: lorry equipment 
M: Medicine 
MM: metallurgy machine 
O: Ore 
P: Petrochemicals 
PCE: plane, car equipment 
PSEF: power supply electronic fitting 
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QEF: quartz electronic fitting 
S: Steel 
SE: supervision equipment 
SEF: speaker electronic fitting 
ST: sharing technology with other state-owned firms 
SW: Software 
T:  Textile 
TEF:  television electronic fitting 
TE1:  train equipment 
TE2:  tricycle equipment 
TF:  traditional food 
TH:  traditional handiwork 



















1 2 3 4 5 
(%) 






26 27 28 
1 07/18 a b i SW 40 ga a c a 6 ah a a af a a a a b b a e 50 20 10 a   
2 07/18 a b i SW 30 ga a c a 14 ah a a a a b a b b b b e 40 20 0 a   
3 07/18 a b e TEF 12 ie a c a 268 acfh a a 
aef, 
CW 
a a a b a b a e 50 20 20 a   
4 07/18 a b e TEF 12 if a c a 360 afh a a acf a a a a a b a e 30 20 20 a   
5 07/18 a a e SE 0.07 fa a c a 60 bgh a a abcef a b a b a b a e 50 10 10 a   






a a a b a a a e 30 10 20 a   
7 07/18 a b f BE 0.3 he a c a 11 bgh a a 
abc, 
CW 
a a a b a c c e 20 10 10 a   
8 07/18 a b f EBE 0.2 he a c a 10 bghc a a 
aef, 
CW 
a a a c c c b e 20 0 10 a   







a a a b a a a e 40 10 20 a   
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26 27 28 






a a a a a a a e 50 20 20 a   
12 07/18 a b c EM 20 if a d a 25 cegh a a aef a a a b a a a e 30 0 10 a   
13 07/18 a b c CM3 5 gc a c a 3 bcgh a a abce a b a c b c b e 20 0 10 a   
14 07/18 a a c MM 0.1 fa b b b 0 g c b  a f c c c c c d 0 0 0 a   
15 07/28 a a b C 5 ga a c a 12 agh a a 
acdef, 
CW 
a a a b a b a e 60 10 30 a   
16 07/28 a b g C1 0.01 fb b b b 0 
secret 
recipe 
a b  a f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
17 07/28 a a i SW 0.1 fa a b a 1 gh a a agh a b a a b b b e 10 10 0 a   
18 08/09 a b b A 12 if a c a 10 cfh a a 
aef, 
CW 
a c a a b c b e 80 10 30 a   






a a a b a a a e 30 20 20 a   
20 08/09 a b d S 5 if a d a 34 ach a a 
acef, 
CW 
a a a a b c a e 20 10 10 a   
21 08/09 a b e FEF 20 ie a c a 4867 acgh a a 
abc, 
CW 
a b a c b c a e 50 20 20 a   
22 08/09 a b e TEF 20 if a c a 909 cfgh a a abcef a b a c a c a e 50 20 20 a   







1 2 3 4 5 
(%) 






26 27 28 
24 08/09 a b i SW 5 ga a c a 6 bch a a abc a b a a a b b e 30 10 10 a   
25 08/09 a b f CE 8 if a c a 11 ach a a 
abcdf, 
CW 
a a a c b a b e 30 0 10 a   
26 08/09 a b f CE 8 if a c a 66 ch a a adf a a a c a a a e 20 0 20 a   
27 08/09 a b b P 30 if a b a 43 acfh a a 
acef, 
CW 
a c b c a b a e 60 20 20 a   
28 08/09 a b d AL 3 if a d a 24 abcg a a 
abd, 
CW 
a b a b b a a e 20 10 20 a   
29 08/09 a b i SW 3 fa a c a 4 bg a a abc a a a b a a b e 20 10 10 a   






a a a b a a a e 50 20 20 a   
31 08/24 a b b C 10 if a d a 24 afh a a 
abef, 
CW 
a a a a b c a e 80 10 30 a   
32 08/24 a b e EF 18 if a c a 1436 cfh a a adef a a a b a a a e 40 10 20 a   
33 08/24 a b i SW 10 fa a c a 9 ag a a a a a a a c c b e 50 10 0 a   
34 08/24 a a i SW 3 fa a b a 3 ch a a abf a b a b b c a e 30 10 20 a   
35 08/24 a a i SW 6 fa a c a 3 bcgh a a a a a a b c c c e 30 20 0 a   
36 08/27 a a e CEF 10 if a d a 156 acfh a a 
abcd, 
CW 
a a a a a a a e 50 10 30 a   







1 2 3 4 5 
(%) 






26 27 28 
38 08/28 a a i SW 0.1 ea a b a 1 gh a a a a b a c c c c e 20 0 0 a   
39 09/03 a a i SW 0.1 ea b b a 1 gh a a a a c b c c c c e 10 10 0 a   
40 09/04 a b h T 0.01 ha a d b 0 TH a b  a a c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
41 09/04 a b h T 0.1 ga a d b 0 TH a b  b a c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
42 09/04 a b h T 0.01 ha a c b 0 TH c b  a a c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
43 09/05 a b g C1 0.01 eb b c a 1 
secret 
recipe 
a b  b f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
44 09/05 a b g C1 0.01 ec b c b 0 
secret 
recipe 
c b  f f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
45 09/05 a b g CM 0.01 fa b c b 0 
secret 
recipe 
c b  f f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
46 09/06 a a c CM4 3 ga a b a 2 bg a a aceg a b b c b c c e 20 0 0 a   
47 09/06 a b c MM 2 hd a c a 2 bch a a abce a a a c c b b e 20 0 10 a   
48 09/06 a b f LE 20 if a d a 12 cfh a a 
acf, 
CW 
a a a c b a b e 50 0 10 a   
49 09/06 a a f TE2 0.2 ha b b b 0 bcgh c b  b c c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
50 09/07 a a a M 0.1 fa a b a 21 gh a a 
hgf, 
CW 
a b b c c c c e 30 0 0 a   
51 09/07 a a a M 0.1 fa a c a 4 gh a a 
gh, 
CW 







1 2 3 4 5 
(%) 






26 27 28 
52 09/07 a b b CP 5 hd a b a 15 ag a a 
abc, 
CW 
a b a c c c c e 60 20 20 a   
53 09/07 a a b FC1 7 ga a c a 3 aeg a a 
aef, 
CW 
a b a c a c b e 50 10 20 a   
54 09/08 a a e EF 0.05 fa b b a 56 bcgh a a abc a a a c b b b e 50 15 20 a   






a a a a a a a e 50 20 20 a   




a b a c c c a e 50 10 10 a   




a b a c c c a e 50 15 20 a   
58 09/12 a a e QEF 0.1 fa b c a 5 bcg a a abef a a a c b b a e 30 0 0 a   
59 09/13 a a c CM4 0.1 fa b c b 0 g c b  b b b f c f c d 0 0 0 a   
60 09/14 a b c GCM 5 hd a c a 1 beg a a abce a b a c c c b e 30 0 0 a   
61 09/14 a a c L 0.01 fa b b b 0 g a b  a f c c c c f c 0 0 0 c   
62 09/17 a b b FC1 15 if a c a 8 ech a a 
acf, 
CW 
a c b b b c b e 50 0 50 a   







1 2 3 4 5 
(%) 






26 27 28 
64 09/19 a b h T 0.1 ha b c b 0 TH a b  a f f c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
65 09/19 a a h T 0.1 ha b c b 0 TH c b  f f f c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
66 09/19 a a h T 0.1 ga b c b 0 TH a b  f f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
67 09/20 a a g C1 0.01 fa b b b 0 
secret 
recipe 
c b  f f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   




a c a b c c b e 20 10 10 a   








a b b c b c b e 20 10 10 a   
70 09/26 a a e EF 0.1 ea b b b 0 beh a b  a b a c c c c d 20 10 0 a   
71 09/26 a a e PSEF 0.1 ea b c b 0 bcgh a b  a b a b c c c d 20 10 10 a   
72 09/27 a a b AP 0.1 fa a c a 3 egh a b  b b b c c c c e 10 0 20 a   
73 09/27 a a b FC2 0.1 ea a b a 3 g a b  c b b c c c c e 20 10 10 a   
74 09/28 a a b C 
around 
3 
ga a c a 7 acgh a a 
ae, 
CW 
a a a b b b c e 50 0 20 a   
75 10/08 a a b CP 0.1 ea b b a 2 bg a a abce a a a c b c b e 50 20 10 a   
76 10/09 a a h T 0.1 ga b b b 0 TH a b  f f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   







1 2 3 4 5 
(%) 






26 27 28 
78 10/11 a a g C1 0.01 ea b c a 2 
secret 
recipe 
c b  f f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
79 10/11 a a g C2 0.01 ea b c a 1 
secret 
recipe 
a b  a f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
80 10/12 a a d S 0.01 ha a b a 2 bcgh a a abch a a a b b c b e 20 0 10 a   
81 10/12 a a d S 0.1 ga b c b 0 bg a b  b b b b c c c d 10 0 0 c   
82 10/13 a a c IM 0.1 fa b c b 0 g a b  a f c f c c c d 0 0 0 c   
83 10/16 a b e SEF 0.09 fc a c a 42 bcfh a a abcf a a a b a b a e 20 10 10 a   
84 10/18 a b c CM1 16 ihd a b a 9 ceh a a ace a a a c b b a e 30 10 20 a   
85 10/19 a a h T 0.01 fa a c b 0 TH a b  f f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
86 10/20 a a h T 0.01 fa b c b 0 TH c b  a f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
87 10/20 a b f CE 10 if a d a 14 ch a a adf a a a b a a b e 20 10 10 a   
88 10/23 a a g C1 0.01 fa b c b 0 
secret 
recipe 
a b  b f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
89 10/24 a a d O 0.01 ha b b b 0 bg c b  b c c c c c c c 0 0 0 c   
90 10/025 a a d O 0.01 ga b b b 0 bcg c b  b c c c c c c d 0 0 0 c   
91 10/25 a a d AL 0.01 ha a c a 5 bcgh a a 
abc, 
CW 
a b a b b c b e 20 0 10 a   







1 2 3 4 5 
(%) 






26 27 28 
93 10/29 a b c CM2 10 ihe a d a 5 bch a a ac a a a b a c a e 30 0 10 a   






a a a c a a a e 30 10 20 a   
95 10/30 a a f TE2 0.1 ha b b b 0 gh c b  c c c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
96 11/02 a b d S 10 if a c a 29 bch a a 
acf, 
CW 
a b a c a c b e 30 0 0 a   
97 11/02 a b d S 0.01 ha b b a 3 bcgh a a 
abc, 
CW 
a b a a a c c e 30 0 10 a   
98 11/05 a b f EBE 0.1 ha a c a 6 bch a a abc a b a b b c c d 10 5 10 a   
99 11/06 a a g CFP 0.01 ea b b a 1 
secret 
recipe 
c b  a f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
100 11/09 a b d AL 3 if a d a 18 ach a a 
acf, 
CW 
b a a c a c b e 20 0 20 a   
101 11/14 a b d S 2 if a c a 12 afg a a 
aef, 
CW 
b a a a c b c e 30 10 0 a   
102 11/16 a a g TF 0.01 ea b c b 0 
secret 
recipe 
c b  b f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
103 11/20 a a g CM 0.01 fa b c a 1 
secret 
recipe 
c b  b f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   







1 2 3 4 5 
(%) 






26 27 28 
105 11/26 a b h T 0.01 ga b c b 0 TH c b  f f c c c c c c 0 0 0 a   
106 12/05 a a d O 5 if a d a 9 aeh a a 
aef, 
CW 
a a a a c b c e 30 20 0 a   
107 12/12 a b f BE 0.1 ha a b a 1 bcg a a abf a b b b c c b d 20 0 10 a   
108 12/18 a a g CM 0.01 ea b b b 0 
secret 
recipe 
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